Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions VIII.
James Dodson
Chapter VIII
Of the Providence of God
I. The providence of God is occupied in effecting, preserving, acting—
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—promoting to action, and concurring with the agent.
These are the acts of divine providence concerning good: for it makes, preserves, promotes to acting, and concurs in acting, which the Holy Spirit expressed in these words at the end of Romans 11: “Of whom, and through whom, and unto whom are all things.” Moreover, the Scholastic distinction must be noted here, which is made with respect to motion: they say that God goes before, concurs with, and assists the creature; and thus God is the forerunner, co-worker, and helper in good things.
II. All things are necessary in the composite sense, not in the divided sense.
It is asked whether those things which happen happen necessarily. Some answer: with respect to the first cause, not the second. But that answer is worthless; for what is necessary with respect to the first cause is also necessary with respect to the second, because the second cause is subordinated to the first and does not act unless moved by the first. Therefore the Scholastics answer better and more accurately: in the composite sense all things are necessary; in the divided sense they are contingent. The composite sense is when I consider a thing in order to the decree and providence of God, with respect to which all things happen necessarily. In the divided sense, things are said to be considered absolutely in themselves with respect to aptitude, according to which they could have been ordered by God to this or that.
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Thus, for example, in the bones of Christ there was an aptitude according to which they could have been divinely ordered either to be broken or not to be broken. And in this way all things outside God are contingent.
III. Necessity of immutability is one thing, necessity of coercion another.
This distinction flows from the preceding one. We use it especially against those who deny that either contingency or liberty can stand together with necessity.
IV. Necessity is one thing as absolute, another from the hypothesis of the divine will.
It is absolute with respect to God’s works ad intra. It is from hypothesis with respect to God’s works ad extra. This distinction occurs among almost all the Scholastics. Moreover, here the error of those who think liberty cannot stand together with necessity can easily be corrected; since God does all things which He does ad extra necessarily from the hypothesis of His decree, and yet freely.
V. Some things are said not to be God’s care, not because they are not His care at all, but because they are not His care in the same way as other things; and therefore this is said not absolutely, but comparatively.
God cares for all things, yet for one more—
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—than another, because He cares for one on account of another; and by comparison He is said not to care for those things which He cares for less than others. 1 Corinthians 9: “Doth God take care for oxen?”—as if he said, they are not God’s care. But that the matter stands so is clear from the sparrows and the hairs of our head. For if He cares for these and those, why not also oxen?
VI. God is said not to know some, not because He is ignorant of them or does not care for them, but because He does not approve them.
Yet the ἄθεοι wish to construct from this that God does not care for all things, because God is said to know only His own: 2 Timothy 2, “The Lord knoweth them that are His.” Likewise, He is said not to know the wicked, because Christ says in Matthew 7, “I never knew you.” Now they say: if He does not know them, how can He care for them? Response. From the given distinction, one knowledge of God is bare, another approving. God knows them with bare knowledge, for He will be their judge; but He does not know them with the approving knowledge spoken of in the last verse of Psalm 1: “The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous.”
VII. Concerning the evils of guilt, the providence of God is occupied in diverse ways: first, it decrees them; second, permits them; third, most efficaciously directs them to a certain end, so that He draws good out of evils; fourth, finally, He sets—
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—limits to evils, lest they go farther than God wills; lastly, He punishes.
These are the acts of divine providence concerning evils: He decreed them, for whatever things come to pass, He decreed; and He permits them, for if He did not permit them, they would not happen; and He directs them to an end, as is clear from Joseph’s sins—namely, his sale—and Christ’s crucifixion. And He sets an end, lest sinners go farther than He permits. For Joseph’s brothers could sell him, but not kill him; the Jews indeed could kill Christ, but they could not break His bones.
VIII. Permission is twofold: physical and ethical. Ethical permission is concession; physical permission is τὸ non impedire, “the not hindering,” which is considered with respect to sin.
IX. Physical permission consists either in the withdrawal of the grace of God, or in promotion to acting.
Some narrowly define permission as the withdrawal of grace. But it is broader, as we shall now hear. Moreover, the withdrawal of grace is also called desertion by God, 2 Chronicles 32:31: “Jehovah left him.” But promotion is considered in a sin of commission; for unless God moved the sinning creature, it would not be moved, and therefore would not—
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—sin, just as, unless someone drives a lame horse to run, it will not walk, and therefore it will not limp. Meanwhile, however, it must be known that there are two things in sin: the motion itself, and the ἀταξία, or irregularity. God is the author of the motion, but not of the ἀταξία.
X. God is the cause why sin exists, but not why it is sin.
Just as one who drives a lame horse is the cause why limping exists, but not why it is limping; for the foot of the lame horse is the cause why it is limping. And therefore the horse’s foot is the cause of the limping, not the one who drives the horse to run. So also the creature is the nurse of sin, not God, because the creature itself fails in acting.
XI. To the good it never goes badly, and to the evil it never goes well in this life. Psalms 37 and 73.
Bradwardine, in De Causa Dei, brings forward an elegant story to prove this; whether true or fictional, it nevertheless sets the matter clearly before the eyes. There was, he says, a certain hermit who, when he believed that it went well with the evil and badly with the good, began to waver in his mind whether God exists, and, if He exists, whether He is just, since human affairs proceeded in an altogether perverse order. And therefore, having deserted the life of a hermit—
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—he began to wander through the world. As he was doing this, an angel joined himself to him in the form of a man, and began to travel through the provinces together with him. Thus both came to a certain man who received and treated them courteously. In the middle of the night, the angel arose, stole a golden cup from him, and departed with the hermit. Afterward they came to another man, who also received them courteously and treated them kindly. The angel, rising in the middle of the night with the hermit, went to the cradle and smothered the little infant in it. Third, they came to someone who refused to receive them under his roof, but allowed them to spend the night outdoors. When morning came, the angel knocked at the door and gave that golden cup, which he had taken from the good man, to the evil man, adding: “I give this to you for the lodging with which you conveniently received us.” Finally, they came to someone who treated them most humanely. When the angel was now about to depart, he asked the same man to send a servant with him to show them the way. When this had been done, and they had come to a bridge laid over a swift river, the angel took the servant and cast him headlong into the river. The hermit, weighing these things equally, said: “Now I will part from you, because you commit crimes.” But the angel said to him: “Wait, and I shall tell you who I am, and teach you that the things which have been done were justly done at God’s command. I am,” he said, “an angel of God, sent to teach—
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—that many things which seem unjust to man are most just and best. We came to that first man from whom I took away the golden cup. I benefited that man in this matter. For that man feared God before he had that cup; after he received it, he became drunk every day. Therefore God sent me to remove that incentive to drunkenness, lest the good man should be put in danger concerning eternal salvation. To that other inhumane man to whom I gave the cup, I did not do good by this cup, but did much harm. For by this cup he is invited to that vice which the good man had previously practiced—that is, to drinking. Therefore God willed to give him something in this life, since after this life he will have nothing. The man whose infant I killed was liberal toward the poor before he was blessed with that offspring. But after the infant had been born to him, he drew back his hands from the poor. Therefore, lest he also should be placed in danger of salvation on that account, but should return to his former liberality, I struck the infant by God’s command. As for that servant whom his master had sent with us to show us the way, that wicked man had determined that night to kill his master and mistress with their children. But because God loves that family, He sent me to prevent this evil. Go,” he said, “and do not judge divine providence perversely because it seems to go badly with the good and well with the evil.”
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XII. In divine providence, the ends are often hidden from us.
Certainly many are hidden; and from this it follows that we ought rather to adore divine providence than to search it out.
XIII. Contingency and liberty are consistent with the efficacious providence of God.
For the fall of a sparrow is contingent, and yet it does not occur without the providence of God. Thus Rehoboam’s giving an answer less pleasing to the elders was contingent, and yet, with respect to God, foreordained. 1 Kings 12:15.