Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions VII.
James Dodson
Chapter VII
Of Predestination
I. Predestination is either of men or of angels.
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Of men: Romans 8:30, “Whom He predestinated.” Of angels: 1 Timothy 5:21, “and the elect angels.”
II. Predestination is either election or reprobation.
There is serious dispute whether predestination can be attributed to both. We affirm it, and show it by one argument. If sins are said in Scripture to be predestinated, then men also are predestinated to commit them. Therefore predestination belongs to reprobation. But the former is true: Acts 2:23 and 4:27–28. Therefore, if sins are said to be predestinated, and men to them, why can the word predestination not also be attributed to reprobation? And indeed with much stronger reason, because reprobation is a destination to punishment, which is morally good, because it is done according to the laws of God’s justice; whereas sins are evil, and yet the word predestination is accommodated to them. Why then not also to reprobation, which is good, since it is an act of God’s justice?
III. Predestination is absolute with respect to any impulsive cause outside God.
For if there were an impulsive cause which moved God to do this or that, God would be a dependent cause. Yet predestination is not absolute with respect to means; for example, He decreed to save believers, but through and on account of Christ. Thus He decreed—
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—to damn the reprobate on account of sins.
IV. The object of predestination is one thing with respect to the end as it is in intention, and another as it is in execution.
With respect to the end as it is in intention, the object is creatable man. With respect to the end as it is in execution, it is man to be created, created, to be permitted into the fall, and fallen. The reason for the former is that an end is not concerning nothing, but concerning something; now that concerning which the end is considered is viewed as something which can come to be. In this respect, with regard to God, it cannot be considered as something future; otherwise God would have decreed something future with an uncertain end.
The proof of the latter is this: because God could not attain that end which He set before Himself in the display of vindicatory justice and mercy, not from any defect of power but from the object, unless He had decreed to create man, created him, and permitted him into the fall. Therefore this also will be the object with respect to the end as it is in execution.
V. Election is one thing to grace, another to glory.
Others say it thus: election is one thing to the end, another to the means. Meanwhile, it must be known that they are distinguished only—
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—by their objects. For God wills all things by one act; so He elected all things. And when election to grace is said to be later than election to glory, this must be understood as later by nature, not in time; because, although God by one most simple act elected us to both, yet He elected us to one on account of the other: that is, He elected us to grace because He had elected us to glory.
VI. We were elected so that we might be in Christ, not because we already were.
This passage, Ephesians 1, “He chose us in Him,” troubles some; but there is no difficulty here. For He elected us to be, so that the sense is: He elected us, not because we were, but that we might be. See the parallel place, James 2:5: “Hath not God chosen the poor of this world rich in faith?” Certainly, not those who already were such, but those who would be such, as is clear from the following theme. For He chose the rich in the same way as heirs; but heirs are not those who already were heirs, but those who would be.
VII. God willed salvation for us, not with respect to Christ in the order of intention; but He willed it with respect to Christ in the order of the end in execution.
Objection of the adversaries. If God willed Christ for us—
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—only on account of salvation, then He willed salvation before Christ; therefore He did not will it with respect to Christ. For certainly salvation is conferred upon us on account of Christ, nor is there salvation in anyone else. Acts 4. Response. If “He willed” is taken with respect to intention, it is true that it is not with respect to Christ; but if, in execution, with respect to Christ, then certainly it is on account of Christ. This is precisely what we say: God gives and appointed salvation to us so that He might confer that salvation upon us on account of Christ.
VIII. Reprobation is either negative or positive.
We call negative reprobation “not being elected,” which Scripture expresses in these words: not being written in the book of life; not being chosen in Christ. Positive reprobation is ordination to punishments, and to those things on account of which punishments are inflicted.
IX. Positive reprobation is either absolute or comparative.
Absolute reprobation is ordination to destruction; it is commonly expressed by these phrases: prescribed or destined to condemnation; vessels fitted or prepared for destruction, Romans 9. Comparative reprobation, however, is ordination not only to punishment, but to greater punishment; for example, those who will suffer heavier punishments in comparison with others are reprobated comparatively to greater punishments.
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X. The word “election” is taken either for the decree, or for temporal election.
For the decree: Ephesians 1, “He chose us in Christ.” For temporal election: 1 Corinthians 1, “God hath chosen the weak things.”
XI. Reprobation is likewise taken either for the decree, as when we say that some are prepared for destruction; or for temporal rejection, as is clear in the Jews, Romans 10–11.
XII. Hatred is twofold: negative or privative.
Negative hatred is spoken of when God does not love some; and with this hatred He is said to have hated Esau before he had done any evil. Positive hatred is that by which He pursues sinners. Psalm 5:6. The latter hatred is on account of sin, not the former.
XIII. Love is twofold: of benevolence and of complacency.
The love of benevolence is called by the Scholastics ordinative love; with this love He also loves sinners, to whom He wills to do good. John 3:16: “God so loved the world,” etc.; and Romans 5: “God commendeth His love toward us.” The love of complacency is that by which we are pleasing to Him—
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—concerning which Ephesians 1 says: “He hath made us accepted in His beloved.” It is called by the Scholastics collative love.
XIV. Predestination places nothing in the predestinated person.
XV. God has so predestinated to the end that He also predestinates to the means.
Therefore they reason foolishly who say: If God predestinates me to life, then whether I believe or do not believe, I will nevertheless be saved. For God, who predestinates, does not predestinate only to life, but also to the means through which life is to be reached. For example, God prolonged King Hezekiah’s life by fifteen years. Meanwhile, Hezekiah is admonished by Isaiah to apply a lump of figs to the ulcer from which he lay sick. 2 Kings 20. So Paul had received the promise that none of those with whom he was being carried on the sea would perish; nevertheless, when he saw the sailors about to flee, he said, “Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved.” For he knew that, just as they were destined by God to the end, so also they were destined to the means.
XVI. The evil of punishment is morally good, physically evil to the one suffering—
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—and this is said rightly, since predestination is spoken of with respect to the end, but damnation cannot be an end because it is evil. Response. It is not evil insofar as it is considered as punishment, for it takes place according to the laws of God’s justice.
XVII. God wills all things by one act of willing, yet in such a way that He wills one thing on account of another.
It is asked: What is election, and what is reprobation? Response. It is the definite will of God. “Therefore,” you will say, “there are diverse wills in God.” Response. There is one most simple act, which is now called reprobation, now election, because of its relation to certain objects and the effects concerning those objects. For example: when I say Creator, Redeemer, Preserver, I say that God is one; but He receives various names because He produces diverse effects.
XVIII. Election is immutable.
This is a most certain rule of theology. For since God is in no way mutable, He will also be immutable with respect to will, because the will of God is God Himself.
XIX. Election is absolute.
Arminian objection. If it is absolute, then it is without means. Response. It is absolute not from means, nor from the end, but from an impulsive cause outside God. For there is no impulsive cause outside God by which—
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—God is moved; otherwise there would be passive potency in God, and thus He would be mutable and imperfect.
XX. God wills this to be on account of that, but He does not will this on account of that.
This Scholastic rule is most useful in the doctrine of predestination, provided it is understood. Its meaning is that a cause of the divine will is not to be assigned from the side of the act of willing, although a reason can be assigned from the side of the things willed, insofar as God wills that one thing be on account of another.
XXI. Reprobation is the necessary antecedent of condemnation and sins.
Piscator, who in other respects disputes soundly concerning the doctrine of predestination, fell into no small error. Namely, he held that sins are effects of reprobation, which is false; for then they would be effects of the divine will, and in this way God would be the author of sin. Therefore reprobation is not the cause, but the antecedent of sin. God elected believers not terminatively as those who already were such, but objectively as those who would be such.