Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions IX.
James Dodson
Chapter IX
Of Free Will
I. Free will stands otherwise in the state of integrity, otherwise in the state of fall, otherwise in the state of restoration, and otherwise in the state of glorification.
In integrity man was able to stand and not to stand. In the state of fall, he cannot not sin, and yet he sins most freely. In the state of restoration, he is inclined partly to good, partly to evil, according to the measure of regeneration. In the state of glorification, he cannot sin. This very thing has already been explained more fully above.
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II. Man in the state of integrity could not not fall in the composite sense; he could not fall in the divided sense.
Theologians dispute about this, whether man could not fall in the state of integrity; but the difficulty is removed by the distinction. For, if you consider the decree of God, man could not not fall; that is, he necessarily fell. This is to consider man in the composite sense. But if you consider man in himself, that is, in the divided sense, as he was apt either to stand or to fall, then he could either fall or not fall.
III. Liberty is either of contradiction or of contrariety.
Liberty of contrariety is that which has respect to good or evil. Liberty of contradiction is that which has respect to one and the same object, either to be accepted or rejected.
IV. Liberty is one thing from right, another from misery, another from coercion.
Liberty from right belongs to God alone, and hence He is said to be of absolute power. Liberty from misery belonged to man in the state of integrity, belongs to the good angels, and will also belong to us when glorified.
Liberty from coercion belongs to every rational creature.
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V. Some actions are free, others unwilling.
Free actions are those in which someone acts willingly. Unwilling actions are those in which someone acts unwillingly; for example, if someone is compelled by a robber to hand over his goods, or if someone at sea is compelled to throw merchandise overboard to lighten the ship.
VI. The will cannot be compelled.
For if it were compelled, either it would be unwilling in what it willed, or it would will what it did not will. And thus the will would be “unwill.”
VII. The will is always carried toward good under the aspect of good.
But good is twofold: true or apparent. For often that appears good to the intellect which is otherwise evil, and the will is carried toward it under the appearance of the true.
VIII. The will follows the intellect.
For if it did not follow the guidance of the intellect, then either it would be carried toward the unknown, which is contrary to nature, because there is no desire for the unknown; or it would be carried toward evil under the aspect of evil, which also would be contrary to nature, for each thing loves itself by natural instinct.
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IX. The actions of the will are manifold, and not of the same kind.
This rule is ethical, but it has great use in theology. For some actions are elicited, and some are commanded. Elicited actions are internal, such as loving and hating. Commanded actions are those which are now outside the subject, such as embracing and rejecting.