Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions VI.
James Dodson
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Chapter VI
Of Creation
I. Creation is twofold: mediate and immediate. Mediate creation is that which is made from an unfit thing. Immediate creation is that which is made from nothing.
That God made all things from nothing is clear from Romans 4:17: “Who calleth those things which are not, as though they were”; and from Hebrews 11:3: “Through faith we understand that the world was not made of things which do appear.”
II. The particle “through,” which the Holy Spirit uses in the work of creation, sometimes absolutely denotes the efficient cause, and sometimes the order in acting.
That it denotes cause is clear from Romans 11:36: “Of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things.” It denotes order when it is attributed to the Son: John 1, “through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made.”
III. God is called the end of all things, not of need, but of perfection and assimilation.
It is said in Proverbs 16:4 that God founded all things for Himself. It is asked how this is to be understood. Response. Concerning an end of perfection, because God had no need of creatures, nor was He lacking them. Therefore He created all things—
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—for Himself, as the end of assimilation, that He might communicate Himself to creatures. Job 23.
IV. Whatever things God made, He did not make by a stretch of time, but in a moment.
Psalm 33: “He spake,” it says, “and they were made.” Yet here reconciliation must be applied, for God is said to have worked in six days. This is to be understood thus: that He made them in six moments, so that the things which are said to have been made on each single day are to be judged to have been made in the moment of that day.
V. God rested from His works, and yet He works.
The former is found in the book of Genesis; the latter in John 5. Let the reconciliation be this: He rested from creating new species, but He did not rest from conserving and propagating the created species. For conservation is, as it were, the continuation of creation.
VI. God made all things very good, and yet mutable.
It is asked: How can this be true? Response. Goodness is twofold: of an independent being and of a dependent being. The former is simple and immutable; the latter is mutable. Indeed, it so follows the creature that it is its property of the fourth mode. Nor is this mutability in creatures a privative defect, but a negative defect, which in a rational creature is not sin.
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It is then asked: How do our theologians deduce from this the moral goodness of man, since the matter here concerns the common goodness of things, which certainly cannot be moral unless we wish to infer that moral good falls upon everything that exists? Response. The matter here is not concerning some general goodness, but concerning that goodness which is proper to each species. Therefore, since moral goodness is proper to man, it is also to be understood in this place.
VII. A harmful thing is either from the first creation itself, or from the fall.
It is asked whether even harmful beasts were created, and likewise poisonous herbs. Response. No. For those things which are accustomed to harm men were not going to be harmful in the state of integrity; but that they now harm—this has been added from fault, so that they are a punishment to us.
VIII. Whatever is confused is such either by reason of the secondary cause or of the primary cause.
All things are said to have been made by God in a certain number, weight, and measure. It could now be inferred that there will be no confusion in things; but experience teaches that this is false. Response. Things appear confused by reason of us which, by reason of God, are most ordered. For all things are directed to certain ends; second, by certain means. Both of these are clear from the doctrine of providence.
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IX. The sin of the angels is either first with respect to object, or first with respect to motion.
Our theologians dispute greatly about what the first sin was. And indeed, if we ask concerning the first motion, this is easily known; for every actual sin has these steps: first, doubt joined with deliberation; second, the intention of doing it; third, the deed itself. Therefore the sin of the devils, first with respect to motion, was doubt, and therefore unbelief. But what was first with respect to object is not easily known; yet it is probable that it was pride.
X. Among the angels there is order, not by reason of nature, but by reason of offices.
That is, greater things have been entrusted to some, lesser things to others.
XI. One angel is created; another is uncreated.
For the Angel is called the Son of God, who is eternal God. Exodus 3. For He who here is called the Angel of Jehovah is called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and He is called Jehovah in Genesis 22. Likewise, He is the Angel of the face of God. But whether this Angel is called Michael is disputed from Scripture. We deny it. For that Michael did not dare to fasten the mark of cursing upon Satan, but said—
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—“The Lord rebuke thee.” But Christ dared to fasten the mark of cursing upon Satan. Mark 1:25.
XII. Man has only two essential parts: namely, body and soul.
This is clear from Matthew 10, where Christ says, “Fear not them which kill the body,” etc.; and from Ecclesiastes 12: “The body returns to the earth, the spirit to God.”
Objection from Paul to the Hebrews 4:12, where three are named: body, soul, and spirit. Response. When soul and spirit are distinguished from body, two diverse things are not understood, but one and the same thing expressed by diverse faculties. For by “soul” is understood the sensitive soul; by “spirit,” the rational faculty, as this is proved at length by Theodore Beza in his major annotations on the New Testament.
XIII. Man in the state of integrity was able not to die. In the state of fall he is not able not to die. In the state of glorification he will not be able to die.
In the state of integrity he was able not to die, because he was able not to sin. In the state of fall it has once been appointed to all men to die, Hebrews 9, because “the wages of sin is death.” In the state of glory they will be like the angels, Luke 20, immortal.
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XIV. Man in the state of integrity was corruptible by nature, but not to be corrupted, by the grace and benefit of God.
That he was corruptible by nature is clear: first, he was composed of the four elements; second, he ate and drank. Yet he was not going to die, because death is on account of sin.
Objection. Whatever is on account of sin is a punishment; but mortality is on account of sin. Therefore, consequently, man was not mortal. Response. We do not say that man was mortal by proximate potency; but when we say that he was able to die, we understand a remote potency, or possibility of dying, which others call non-repugnance.
XV. In the state of integrity man’s intellect was good mutably, and his will was good mutably.
It is asked: Since man was good in the state of integrity, could a good tree therefore bring forth evil fruits? Response. A good tree which is immutably good cannot bring forth evil fruits; but one which is good mutably can, for it can be changed and become evil from good.
XVI. Ignorance of those things—
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—which we ought not to know is not sin; but ignorance of those things which we ought to know is sin.
It is asked whether it was sin that Eve did not know that the serpent was able to speak. Response. No. For this was among those things which she was not bound to know, but would only afterward have attained by experience. But this was sin: that she thought there was in that forbidden tree the power of the knowledge of good and evil, when it was only a sacrament.
XVII. Free will stood otherwise in the state of integrity, otherwise in the state of fall, otherwise in the state of restoration, and otherwise in the state of glorification.
In the state of integrity, man was able to will and not to will; for his nature was capable of either, and therefore he was free from misery and coercion. In the state of fall, he is so disposed that he cannot will spiritual good, nor moral good well; yet he can reject spiritual good and fail to do moral good. Therefore he is free from coercion, but not from misery. In the state of restoration, man is indeed disposed toward both, but in part free from misery and coercion. In the state of glorification, he can will nothing but good; therefore he will be free in every way from misery and coercion.
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XVIII. The image of God consists in nature, rectitude, and dominion.
In nature: Genesis 9:6, “Whoso sheddeth blood,” etc. In rectitude: Ephesians 4:20–23; Colossians 3:8–10. In dominion: Genesis 1:26.
XIX. Every creation has the character of newness, and therefore could not have existed from eternity.
There are some absurd philosophers who teach that God could have created all things from eternity. They press it thus: “Could not God always have made the world? If so, then also from eternity.” Response. He could always do so in time together with time, but not without time; for that is a contradiction.
XX. Active creation is God Himself.
Some of the Scholastics deny this, others affirm it, but some distinguish between active and passive creation. Now that rule is to be noted: verbals ending in -io, descending from active verbs, signify both action and passion. Therefore, taking the word “creation” actively, we say that it is God Himself, not so if taken passively. And that this is so is shown thus: Is that active creation created by creation, or not? If by created creation, I shall go on again asking what it is, whether creature or God. If it is a creature, was it created by created creation? And so the process will go on to infinity.
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XXI. Of all created things the end and the efficient cause are the same.
The efficient cause acts for the sake of the end. Since, therefore, the efficient cause of created things was such that no cause outside creatures can be given except God, God Himself will also be the end of all things.
XXII. God is never frustrated of His end.
A secondary cause can be frustrated of its end, but not the first cause: first, because whatever is frustrated of its end is ignorant, but God is ignorant of nothing; second, because he who is frustrated of his end lacks power to bring it about, but all things are in God’s power.
XXIII. Divine things are not to be judged from the human intellect.
This is a most useful rule. It is found in Isaiah 55: “My ways are not as your ways,” etc. This rule is asserted because many think, since God made all things in measure, weight, and order, that what this rule says cannot stand, because many things are confused. Response. According to this rule, things that are confused must not be estimated from the human intellect, but from the divine.
XXIV. That which is absolutely—
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—worthy can, in a certain respect, be unworthy.
Worthiness is either absolute or relative. Thus the angels, considered relatively insofar as they are sent for the ministry of the elect, are less worthy than the elect. But considered absolutely in their own nature, they are more worthy than the elect. So Christ, insofar as He is the means of salvation, is less worthy than the Church. But considered absolutely in His own nature, He infinitely exceeds the Church in His dignity.
XXV. Among the good angels there is order, not from excellence of nature, but from eminence of offices.
Theologians dispute concerning what this order rests upon. We say that it rests not upon excellence of nature, but upon eminence of offices.
XXVI. The image of God is not said univocally of Christ and of us.
For Christ is the essential image; we are the accidental image, and indeed the accidental analogical image, as it is commonly said.