Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions V.
James Dodson
Chapter V
Of God the Father
I. The Father is the principle of the persons in the Most Holy Trinity with respect to origin, not with respect to nature or time.
The Father is called the principle, but neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are things “principiated.”
Socinian objection. When one relative is posited, the other is posited. Response. These are not properly predicamental relatives, concerning which this is stated, but transcendental relatives. Nor, when any relative whatever is posited, is the other posited, as happens in relatives according to saying; for there, if one exists, the other does not immediately exist also.
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II. The Son is from the Father with respect to the mode of subsisting in the essence, not with respect to the essence.
This is an excellent distinction among theologians, where it is said that the Son is not αὐτόθεος [God from Himself, with respect to personal origin], but θεός [God]. Here one must know of the great dispute that arose among the Arminians, Vorstius, and our churches, because the Arminians and Vorstius said that the Son is from the Father with respect to essence, and thus is not αὐτόθεος [God from Himself], God from Himself; for if this were so, He would be a dependent God, and therefore a creature.
III. The generation which is in God is eternal, and yet perfect.
Some dispute whether the Son ceases to be generated or not. For they say: if He ceased, then there is change; if He does not cease, then it is imperfect. But we, in turn, may ask from the adversaries whether the Holy Spirit still proceeds from the Father or not. If He ceased, then the unity has changed; if He still proceeds, then He is imperfect. Therefore the vanity of that argument is clear from this: even in nature there are some permanent acts which nevertheless, as soon as they exist, are perfect. For example, light flows from the sun perpetually, and yet is perfect as soon as it flows. So our vision, as soon as it exists, is perfect, yet it does not cease.
IV. The generation which is in God is not physical, but hyperphysical.
From this it is clear how ineptly the—
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—Socinians argue, who, in order to remove the generation which is in God, are accustomed to bring forward their arguments from physical generation. But this has nothing in common with hyperphysical generation except the name; therefore their argument does not proceed. That it is hyperphysical is clear, because God is not nature, but something above nature.
V. The generation which is in God, although it is hyperphysical, is nevertheless not metaphorical, but properly so called.
The adversaries say that it is not properly called generation, because it is not physical generation. But how ineptly! For here also one could say: God does not have physical being; therefore God does not have being properly so called.
VI. Invocation of God is twofold: absolute or relative.
We add this distinction because it depends on those things which we have just said. Socinus laughs at this distinction and says that every invocation is relative. Response. Adoration is taken either according to its own nature or by reason of the objects. In its own nature every invocation is relative; by attraction of the objects it is either absolute or relative. That invocation is called absolute in which the whole Most Holy Trinity is invoked; relative, in which the Father is invoked through the Son.
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VII. God begets the Son by will and intellect.
The reason is that these are one and the same in God.
Objection. But those things which God wills, He could have not willed; whence those things which He wills are in some way contingent. Response. Those things which God wills are twofold. Some are ad intra [within God], and these cannot fail to be done, and He cannot not will them. Some are ad extra [outside God], and these He could have not willed, and therefore they could have not been done.
VIII. The communication of God is one thing as necessary absolutely; another as necessary from the hypothesis of His will.
It is asked: How is that axiom to be understood, “The good is communicative of itself”? And ought it also to be referred to God? Response. Yes. But concerning God, communication itself is to be understood thus: He communicates to the Son the mode of subsisting in the essence; so the Father and the Son communicate to the Holy Spirit the mode of subsisting in the divine essence. But that communication which is ad extra [outside God], and according to which He communicates Himself to creatures, is a communication which could have not existed; for He could have made none of those things which He made, and therefore could have not communicated Himself to creatures. The Scholastics call the communication ad intra [within God] formal, but that which is ad extra [outside God] affective.
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IX. Active and passive generation do not infer composition in God.
The Socinians urge this, while they meanwhile are indifferent whether composition is granted in God or not. But that there is no composition in God, or that this distinction does not effect composition in God, is proved thus. For neither insofar as they are referred to themselves—for thus they are opposed to one another—nor insofar as they pertain to the essence—for thus they are the same with the essence—does composition follow; so that in the former consideration opposition prevents composition, while in the latter identity with the essence does not admit it.
X. The Son of God is called “as it were only-begotten,” where the particle “as it were” is not assimilative of the true, but expressive of the true.
For it is taken either as noting likeness or as noting truth. But when it is said “the Son as it were only-begotten,” it denotes the truth of the thing; and so also when it is said in Luke 22, “And His sweat was as it were drops of blood.”
XI. “Proper” is said in many ways.
“Proper” is said, first, as that which is opposed to another’s; thus God’s proper people are spoken of, that is, a people not belonging to another. Second, “proper” is taken as it is opposed to that which is not natural to someone; thus—
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—one’s own blood. Third, “proper” is taken as it is opposed to a common accident; thus it is proper to the divine nature to be everywhere. Fourth, as it is opposed to adoptive; and in this way Christ is called the proper Son. Romans 8.
XII. “Son of God” is said in many ways: either the Son who is begotten from the essence of the Father; or by right of creation, such as the angels, Job 1; or by right of adoption, and thus all believers are sons of God.
It is asked whether even the human nature of Christ can be called the Son of God. The commentaries on the catechism here wish it to be Son by reason of the hypostatic union; but in Scripture there is nothing of the kind—indeed, the contrary. For “Son of God” is always said of Christ insofar as He is man, as in Romans 1: “concerning His Son, who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh,” and everywhere.
XIII. The Son of God cannot work of Himself except what He has seen the Father doing.
Socinus thinks this place demonstrates that Christ is not God. But ineptly. For this is not said there from defect of power, but because of the inseparability of the nature, since the Son is of one essence with the Father. Therefore also in the same place, John 5, it is said that He works equally with the Father—
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—which could not be unless He were of the same nature with the Father.
XIV. “Firstborn” is said in two ways. First, properly, it is taken for him who was born before all others like himself. Second, improperly, by a metonymy of the antecedent for the consequent, he is called firstborn who is lord and heir of all paternal goods. When Christ is called the firstborn of creatures, it is taken in the latter signification. Thus David is called the firstborn of kings, Psalm 89:27, because he was chief and first among kings.
XV. The Son is less than the Father. John 14:28.
First, by reason of the human nature. Second, by reason of the mediatorial office. Hence the rule of theologians: Inequality of office does not make inequality of nature.
XVI. The Holy Spirit is taken either for the gifts, or for the author of the gifts. 1 Corinthians 12.
XVII. The Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son.
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The Greeks deny this and say that He proceeds from the Father alone. But He indeed proceeds from the Father, yet not so that the Son is excluded.
XVIII. When the Holy Spirit is said to be given to someone, it does not denote His local presence, but a certain operation.
Because the Holy Spirit is everywhere. Therefore when He is said to come and to be given, by this is understood the operation which He there performs.
XIX. The procession of the Holy Spirit is twofold: eternal and temporal.
The eternal signifies the mode of subsisting in the divine essence. The temporal signifies nothing other than operation.
XX. The Holy Spirit is said to intercede for us not properly, but improperly. Romans 8.
He does not intercede, but makes us intercessors and askers of God. He intercedes for us not formally, but effectively, as the Scholastics speak.
XXI. The Holy Spirit is in God the Father and the Son in such a way that the Father and the Son are in the Holy Spirit.
Theologians call this περιχώρησιν [perichoresis, mutual indwelling], which is, if you render it in Latin, immeatio [interpenetration]. But the Socinians—
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—contend that the Holy Spirit is not God and a person because He is in a person; and by this reasoning they deny that the Father and the Son are persons. For the Father is in the Son, and the Son also is in the Father, as John 14:10–11.
XXII. God and the creature have nothing common except the name.
For if they had anything common, that would be either finite or infinite. If finite, then God is finite; if infinite, then the creature is infinite.
XXIII. Abstracts are verified of God more than concretes.
That is, God is rather essence than being, wisdom than wise, immensity than immense. But one must know that this is true in absolute attributes; for in relatives which denote action, concretes are verified more. For it better fits to say God is Creator than creation.
XXIV. There cannot be more than one infinite.
Even the heathen recognized this, for there cannot be more than one independent entity. It is proved thus: if this were so, then those infinite things would either contain one another, and then they would not be infinite essence; or they would not, and so they would also have definite—
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—boundaries of essence, because one would stand apart from the other.
XXV. One must not argue from omnipotence to that whose contrary stands in Scripture.
For example, if someone should wish to argue thus: God can condemn believers; therefore He will condemn them. For the contrary stands in Scripture.
XXVI. One must not argue from the omnipotence of God unless His will is also established.
For it would be foolish if I said: God can make me a king; therefore He will do it.
XXVII. The will of God is the rule of every good.
This can be taken in two ways: either that it is the cause of every good, or that whatever God wills is good. But here it must be known that certain things are just because God wills them, while He wills certain things because they are just.
XXVIII. Affection in God is nothing but the effect and will of God.
Thus wrath and hatred signify the will of God to punish.