Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions IV.
James Dodson
Chapter IV
Of God
I. The knowledge of God is either natural or revealed.
Natural knowledge of God is that which exists spontaneously in adults of sound mind, so that, with no one teaching them, they are persuaded that there is some most wise and most powerful divine being, who founded and governs the world and the things that are in it, and that this divine being is to be worshiped religiously. The first member of the distinction is found in Romans 1:20; the second in the Gospel, John 1:18. Moreover, it must be known that this knowledge is called “natural,” not because, as Vorstius trifles, it is from nature in the way that sight or hearing, for example, is; but because, when one comes to the use of reason, this very knowledge proceeds from innate principles without anyone teaching.
II. Natural knowledge does not save, but renders men inexcusable.
See Romans 1:20.
[p. 39]
III. The knowledge of God is not comprehensive, but apprehensive.
That is said to be comprehended which is perfectly grasped. God cannot be perfectly grasped, since the infinite cannot be grasped by the finite.
IV. God is apprehended by analogical knowledge, not by analogy of the thing, but of the concept.
Analogy is twofold: of the thing and of the concept. Things which are analogous with respect to the thing have the same genus. But God does not have the same genus with creatures. Therefore here analogy of concept is meant: namely, that we apprehend God, who is infinite, according to the likeness of the concept of those things which are finite.
V. The word “God” is ambiguous.
For it is taken properly of God alone; improperly, both metaphorically for angels and magistracy, and catechrestically for idols, the devil, and the belly.
VI. The word “God” does not denote power, as the Socinians wish, or office, but nature.
Otherwise these propositions would be identical: “God is King,” and “King is King.”
VII. The word “God,” taken of the true God, is received in two ways: οὐσιωδῶς [essentially] and ὑποστατικῶς [hypostatically/personally]—
[p. 40]
—that is, either essentially or personally: essentially for the very essence of God, personally for the persons.
Two things are to be noted here concerning that distinction. First, how it does not follow that there are three gods if the word “God” is taken personally. Second, whether even the word “Father” should be distinguished in the same way, namely, whether it is taken both essentially and personally.
As to the first member, it must be known that “person” is taken abstractly and concretely. When we say that the word “God” is taken personally, we do not understand personality abstractly, but concretely: personality with essence. And therefore, since there is only one essence, which, taken with this or that mode of subsisting, constitutes a person, hence it follows that they cannot be called three Gods, because those three modes of subsisting have only one essence.
As to the word “Father,” it is certain that it is taken in the same way, οὐσιωδῶς [essentially] or ὑποστατικῶς [hypostatically/personally]: οὐσιωδῶς [essentially] in the Lord’s Prayer, and ὑποστατικῶς [hypostatically/personally] in the Apostles’ Creed.
VIII. The word “God” is taken either apart from a construction, or with a construction.
This distinction must be diligently observed against the Socinians. Now “Jehovah” is said—
[p. 41]
—with a construction when it is joined with some thing, as when Jerusalem is called Jehovah; this is not said absolutely, but as if it were said, “the city in which Jehovah dwells.” Likewise, “the banner of Jehovah my God.” But apart from a construction, this word is attributed to God alone.
IX. “Jehovah” is said in the direct case and in the oblique case.
In the direct case it is said only of God; in the oblique case it can be said with respect to the creature, as when it is said, “the mountain of Jehovah.”
X. The attributes of God do not differ in God, except by reason of our mode of conceiving.
The Scholastics anxiously ask how the attributes of God differ in God: whether really, formally, modally, or by reason without a distinction of reason. We say: by reason; and beyond this we are also accustomed to express it in these terms: they differ according to our mode of conceiving.
Objection. The attributes of God differ in definition; therefore they differ among themselves. Response. The attributes of God are defined in relation to creatures and to the effects which He produces concerning the creature, not in relation to God, who is absolutely one. For example, mercy is defined in one way, justice in another, namely because of diverse effects upon diverse objects, although in God they are absolutely—
[p. 42]
—one. For in God, although there is one thing and another thing, there is nevertheless not one person and another person.
XI. The reason why we distinguish the attributes from the essence in God is the inadequacy of our concept.
Some coarse peasant does not grasp the value of a gold or silver coin unless it has first been divided into smaller coins. Such are we also in this knowledge of God. For God is infinite and all things are one; but we do not grasp all those things which are one unless we divide them, as it were. And hence all those things which are attributed to God, and which in God are only one, we perceive as distinct.
XII. Some attributes of God are absolute; others are relative.
This distinction is common among theologians, but it is not always explained in this way, and it has some difficulty with respect to the latter member. For the Vorstians always argue from this that these attributes are not God, because they could have not existed. For example, when they dispute concerning the decrees, they say: the decree could have not existed, because God could have not decreed; and yet God could not not be. But in these matters such arguments proceed from ignorance of the relative attributes of God. For they signify two things: the essence of God—
[p. 43]
—and some denomination from an external thing, or nomenclature. The denomination of God could have not existed; that is, the will of God could have not been called a decree, and yet the will itself could not have not existed. Thus God could have not been Creator, and could have not had this name; but He could not have not been God.
XIII. Some attributes of God are communicable; others are incommunicable.
Those are called incommunicable of which nothing similar is found in creatures, such as being infinite, eternal, immense. Those are communicable of which something analogous is found in creatures, such as wisdom, will, justice, mercy, knowledge. Moreover, this analogue which is in creatures is either a vestige of God or the image of God. The vestige of God is called being, or essence; likewise life, which vestige is also in living things other than men and angels. But the image of God is that likeness with God with respect to intellect, will, integrity, justice, and dominion over creatures, which falls only to men and angels.
XIV. God is immutable with respect to essence, place, and will.
For if His essence had to be changed, it would have to be changed by one more powerful, and God has no such—
[p. 44]
—one. Nor is He mutable with respect to place, because He is everywhere. Here it is blasphemously objected by atheists that he who is everywhere is nowhere. But this is verified not of God, but of men, who are divided by occupations in various places. Nor is He mutable with respect to will, because He does not change it. But the knowledge which seems to have accrued to God in time, as “Creator,” denotes not a change in God, but in the creature.
XV. “Eternal” is said in two ways: properly and improperly. Properly, it is that which lacks beginning, end, and all succession. Improperly, “eternal” is that which has beginning and succession, but will have no end, such as falls to men and angels.
Among the philosophers, time, aevum, and eternity are distinguished. Time is that which has beginning, end, and succession. Aevum is that which indeed does not lack beginning and succession, but lacks end, which is called eternity from the part after. But eternity is that which lacks beginning, end, and succession, and is called eternity from the part before and from the part after.
XVI. Things coexist with eternity, not adequately, but inadequately.
[p. 45]
That is, in God there is no succession of present, past, and future, but all things are present to Him.
XVII. “Infinite” is said in two ways: either as it is opposed to the determinate, and by the Greeks is called ἀόριστον [indefinite], as though you should say “not defined”; for example, discrete quantity, an undefined power. Or as it is opposed to that which is limited, and it is called τὸ ἄπειρον [the infinite]. And in this way God is infinite, because He does not have the boundaries of His essence.
XVIII. God is everywhere as a conserving cause in His effects.
Certainly not as something located in a place, as if He were contained by some thing. Therefore that distinction of the Scholastics is not to be approved, at least as to its first member, whereby they say: God is in a place repletively, spirit definitively, and body circumscriptively.
XIX. Wherever God is, He is whole.
Objection. But He does not have parts; and if He is whole in one thing, He is not whole in another. Response. “Whole” is taken either absolutely for the perfect, or relatively with respect to parts. God is called whole in the former way, not the latter. Then, it is one thing to be whole—
[p. 46]
—another to be wholly so.” For “to be wholly” signifies being somewhere in such a way that He is not elsewhere outside that place. Therefore God is said to be whole wherever He is, but not wholly. For He is wholly only in Himself.
XX. God is immortal and invisible negatively, not privatively.
Even angels are invisible negatively, but they are not immortal negatively, but privatively.
Objection. But death cannot befall angels; therefore they cannot be called privatively immortal. Response. “Immortal” is opposed not only to “mortal,” but also to annihilation; so that angels, in the first signification, are not mortal, yet in the latter they are annihilable.
XXI. The vision of God is fivefold: 1. in dreams; 2. in signs; 3. in the flesh; 4. through faith; 5. from creation and effects. Romans 1:19–20.
Vorstius contends that God is seen with bodily eyes, but absurdly. For God is spirit, and cannot be seen with bodily eyes.
XXII. The power of God is said of God not properly, but improperly.
God is purest act. Therefore when He is said to be able to do something, it does not designate a power in Him, but a passive potency in the subject—
[p. 47]
—whereby it can undergo the act of divine action, which is nothing other than non-repugnance, so that the thing may be done by the power of God.
XXIII. The power of God is distinguished into ordinary and absolute.
Ordinary power is that which is according to the definite counsel of God. Absolute power is that which is considered absolutely in itself. Concerning this it is asked whether it is in God. Calvin seems to deny it, but wrongly; for those places of Scripture cannot conveniently be explained otherwise: “God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.” “Can I not ask my Father, and He will give me twelve legions of angels?”
XXIV. Power and authority are distinguished in Christ.
Authority denotes office; power denotes nature.
XXV. Knowledge in God is twofold: knowledge of vision and of simple intelligence.
Knowledge of vision is said to be knowledge of future things, which rests upon the decree of God. For God knows future things because He has decreed them. Knowledge of simple intelligence is said to be knowledge of possibles, as when God knows what is possible to Himself, even if He is not going to do it; and it rests upon absolute power. But it must be known that the Arminians have devised a third species of divine knowledge, and call it middle knowledge, or conditioned knowledge, namely, when God knows that something will—
[p. 48]
—happen which He never decreed. But that is absurd. For nothing happens which God has not decreed. Lamentations 3:37.
XXVI. Contingency is not determinate truth.
That is, with respect to the created intellect, not the uncreated. Hence the philosophers say that the divine intellect is the measure, norm, and rule of the created intellect.
XXVII. Things are because God knows them, namely by practical knowledge and by the knowledge of vision, which rests upon the decree of God; but He does not know them because they are.
Otherwise the intellect of God would be conformed to the thing, and so would have passive potency for acquiring perfection from the thing; and He would be perfected by the thing, which is most absurd.
XXVIII. The will of God is one thing as permissive, another as effective.
XXIX. Permission is twofold: physical or ethical.
Physical permission is τὸ μὴ κωλύειν [the “not hindering”]. Acts 14:16; Matthew 19:8. By not hindering, God permits sins in two ways: either by withdrawing grace—not inherent grace, but assisting grace, 2 Chronicles 32:31, which occurs in a sin of omission; or by moving the evil creature to work, which occurs in a sin of commission.
[p. 49]
XXX. The distinction of the will into will of sign and will of good pleasure is not a distinction, but only the explanation of an ambiguous word.
For the will of sign is nothing other than the word of God; but the word of God is an effect of the will of God, not the will itself.
XXXI. The will of good pleasure and the will of sign do not conflict, if the will of sign is judged from its end.
The adversaries say that we establish conflicting wills in God, because we say that God does not will to save all whom He calls; for He calls some, not that He may save them, but that He may render them inexcusable.
XXXII. The will of good pleasure is not called such by reason of the object about which it is occupied, but by reason of the impulsive cause, or from the manner of willing: namely, that He acts thus because it pleases Him.
When we say that all things happen by the will of good pleasure, we do not say that all things which happen are pleasing to God, and therefore sin also; that is false.
XXXIII. The distinction of God’s will—
[p. 50]
—into absolute and conditioned is most vain.
For just as God cannot be distinguished, so neither can His will. For the will of God is God.
XXXIV. Likewise, the distinction into antecedent and consequent will is vain.
For it places mutability in God. It supposes that God willed all men to be saved, but afterward, when He saw that not all would believe, changed His mind and willed that none should be saved except believers. Such change cannot fall in God. James 1:17.
XXXV. There is no distinction of the divine will into approving only, or approving and effecting at the same time.
Some of our own men are accustomed to use this distinction. God, they say, wills approvingly that all should be saved, but not effectively. But this is inept. For what God approves, that He wills. Psalm 115:3: “All things that God willed,” or in which He delighted, “He did.”
XXXVI. Thus the distinction of efficacious and inefficacious will is vain.
For every will of God is fulfilled, and God does not change His will, as is clear from Isaiah 46:10; nor can anyone render the will of God void. Isaiah 49.
[p. 51]
Objection. But God does not effect all things which He wills. Response. “Efficacious” is not said from effecting, nor does it signify “efficient,” but the same as “not rendered void”; so that the sense is: no will of God is void.
XXXVII. Counsel is attributed to God not properly, but improperly.
Counsel has place in him who consults; he who consults is ignorant. But in God there is no ignorance; therefore there is no consultation. Therefore it is attributed to God κατ’ ἀνθρωποπάθειαν [according to anthropopathic speech], taken from a wise man who does nothing without counsel.