Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions X.
James Dodson
Chapter X
Of Sin
I. Sin is either original or actual.
Original sin is that in which and with which we are born, which begins at the very moment when we begin to be men.
II. Original sin is either imputed or inherent.
Imputed sin is Adam’s defection imputed to us by God, as if it had been committed by ourselves, and on that account we are held equally guilty. Inherent sin is the depravity of our nature and the inclination to every evil, arising from imputed sin and drawing from it as from a matrix; by this inherent sin God punishes in us that former imputed sin. But against the imputation of sin it can be objected that we ourselves—
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—sinned in Adam, and therefore there is no need of imputation. “In whom we sinned,” says the Apostle, Romans 5:12. Response. That “in whom” must be taken not subjectively but causally. Thus, namely, in the same way we are said to have died in Adam. But it would be absurd to explain this subjectively, because we would have been dead before we were born. Therefore “we died in Adam” must be explained thus: we die because through Adam death entered into the world. So also that phrase, “in whom all sinned.” We all sin because Adam caused us to sin, or he is the cause of our sinning, because he sinned.
III. Not only Adam’s sin, but also Eve’s sin, is imputed.
This is proved from the punishment inflicted upon the woman, Genesis 3:16, which could not have been inflicted upon all women if Eve’s sin had not been imputed to them. Scharpius and others prove the contrary from Romans 5, “by one man’s offence,” etc. Response. This must be explained in the same way as husband and wife are said to be one body, and the husband the head of the wife. Therefore Adam is there considered as head, yet Eve is not excluded, as the other part of him.
IV. Imputation is not a physical act, but a moral one.
Therefore it is not required that the object be present, but only that it be certainly future.
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Therefore we say that, by natural propagation, sin is imputed to all who will be born from Adam, just as, from the covenant of God, the righteousness of Christ is imputed to all who will believe in Him.
V. When it was said, “Thou shalt surely die,” God understood a fourfold death.
Temporal death; spiritual death of sin; the death of calamities; and finally eternal death. But you will say: the saying, “in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,” seems to imply that this threatening cannot be verified concerning temporal and eternal death. For concerning the other two kinds of death there is no dispute, since on that very day the first man died spiritually by the death of sin, and also by the death of calamities, since from that very moment he was subject to diseases, labors, etc. But Adam did not die on that day on which he ate of the forbidden fruit, either by temporal death or by eternal death. Response. That phrase, “in the day thou eatest, thou shalt surely die,” is to be explained as: you shall become liable to death; you shall become guilty of death; you shall come under the power of temporal and eternal death. Though these may delay from that time, nevertheless they will most certainly abide over you; their delay does not remove their right of execution and power.
VI. Original sin seems—
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—not only imputed, but also inherent.
Three acts are observed in the generation of man: conception, formation, and birth. In all these sin is already present. Concerning the first two, the words of David are most clear, Psalm 51:5; concerning the last, Ephesians 2:3.
VII. Original sin, as bringing punishment, is the punishment of imputed sin.
For God afflicts with spiritual death on account of sin, and this is also contained in that threatening, “Thou shalt surely die.” This death consists in the privation of the divine image and in the perversity of nature.
VIII. This sin has two parts: one positive, the other privative.
Theologians say that the latter part of this sin, namely the privative part, is expressed in Scripture when it is said that man is not capable of the things of the Spirit of God; that he is not subject to the law of God; that he cannot do good. Jeremiah 13:23. But the positive part is expressed when man is said to be carried daily toward evil, Genesis 6. This quality is called positive, not ethically, for ethically it is something good, a virtue; nor physically, because in that respect also it is something good; but logically, because this is affirmed of man, that he is such.
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IX. Original sin is the cause of all actual sins.
Why then, you will say, are actual sins not equal in all? One man is more prone to sin than another, and not merely more prone, but one man also sins more than another. Response. First, with respect to the regenerate, because the mortification of the old man is unequal in them. Second, with respect to the unregenerate, one is restrained more than another by the grace of God, which theologians call the grace of restraint, lest he rush headlong into every wickedness. Since, therefore, one is more restrained by God than another, it is no wonder that there are degrees of wicked men.
X. Original sin is the gravest of all, since actual sins flow from it.
It is greatest extensively, not intensively. For the sin against the Holy Spirit is greatest intensively.
XI. Actual sin, which is every act repugnant to the law of God, is either in itself or by accident.
Sin by accident is every work which the law forbids if it is done without faith. Such are the works of the Gentiles, which otherwise agree with the material content of the law. Sin in itself is every work forbidden by God.
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XII. Sin in itself is distinguished either from the object, or from the accident, or from degrees.
From the object, one sin is of omission, which is committed against affirmative precepts; another is of commission, which is committed against negative precepts. From the accident, one is reigning, when we listen to sin, Romans 6; another is not reigning, when we crucify the flesh with its lusts, Galatians 5. The former belongs only to the unregenerate; the latter also to the regenerate. From degrees, one sin is through ignorance, another is committed knowingly and voluntarily. The latter is more grievous than the former. The former excuses from so much, not from all. From degrees also, one sin is that which is committed against the law of God in general; another is that which is committed against the doctrine of the Gospel, known specifically. The latter is more grievous than the former. For although the former is sometimes—indeed always, in the elect—remitted, the latter never is; and it is called the sin against the Holy Spirit.
XIII. Sin has its degrees.
Commonly four are reckoned: first, deliberation; second, the purpose of sinning; third, the act itself; fourth, taking pleasure in the act. These degrees are so related that the latter is more grievous than the former. Some add a fifth: glorying—
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—that is, when sin is not human, but diabolical.
XIV. Sin falls not only into the will, but also into the intellect.
There are some theologians who think that sin falls only into the will. But this is foolish. For error of mind also is sin, and this is in the intellect. Second, deliberation belongs to the intellect; but deliberation about something forbidden, in order to do it, is the first degree of sin. Add to this that the whole man, so far as he is man, is regenerated; therefore not only the will, but also the intellect, is regenerated. This certainly would not be the case if sin did not fall into the intellect.
Objection. Every sin must be voluntary; but what is in the intellect is not voluntary, because the intellect precedes the will. Therefore. Response. The major premise is false, for there are some sins which are committed even through ignorance. Numbers 6; Genesis 26. These cannot be called voluntary, and yet they are sins. Second, we say that “voluntary” is spoken of in two ways: either terminatively or efficiently. In the former way, sins can be called voluntary by reason of the will, by which they are determined; in the latter, by reason of the intellect, from which the first deliberation proceeds.
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XV. One sin is done from ignorance, another is committed knowingly.
Sin is committed from ignorance in two ways: either when it is not known that something is sin, in thesis or in hypothesis—that is, when one does not know whether it is lawful to steal or to fornicate, or not; or when it is committed from ignorance in hypothesis—that is, when I know in general that stealing is not to be done, but think it profitable for me to steal. And this ignorance which is from hypothesis is sin, when it is committed knowingly. The former excuses from so much, not from all.
XVI. In a sin of commission, the motion and the defect of the motion must be distinguished.
Theologians are accustomed to say that the material in a sin of commission must be distinguished from the formal. The material is good, for it is motion. But the formal, or the defect and deformity—for it is designated by both names—is evil.
XVII. The sin of omission is referred to actual sin, not because it is actual—for it is the omission of a due action—but because, as a privation, it is referred to its habit, and that habit to action.
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This must be carefully observed, for many contend about how this sin can be referred to actual sin, since it is rather the omission of an action.
XVIII. One sin is against God, another against one’s neighbor. Matthew 18:15.
It is indeed true that every sin is committed against God, and therefore no sin can be said not to be committed against God. But this distinction is not founded on the idea that every sin is not against God, but on this: that not every sin against God is committed immediately; some are committed by means of the neighbor. Hence also, because every sin is committed against God, whether immediate or mediate, no one can authoritatively remit sins; for this is the right of God alone, into which no one can or ought to intrude. But when we are said to forgive our neighbor, this is not to be understood concerning guilt, but only concerning harm, or concerning the injury committed against us by our neighbor’s sin.
XIX. One sin is reigning, another not reigning. Romans 6.
The latter also occurs in the regenerate; the former does not, but only in the unregenerate.
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Objection. Romans 7: “With the mind I serve the law of sin,” which Paul says concerning the regenerate. Response. It is one thing to serve by compulsion, another freely. Sin does not reign in those who serve under compulsion, but in those who serve freely.
XX. One sin is against oneself, another against another.
Sin against oneself is most grievous, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 5 and 6. The reason is that we owe to ourselves the greatest degree of love. Therefore, if we sin against ourselves, we sin most greatly.
XXI. One sin is committed from infirmity, another from full appetite.
The Arminians ridicule this distinction and say: does not even a wicked man sin from infirmity when he sins, since his nature cannot do good? Response. No. For we say that those sin from infirmity who indeed resist sins with their powers, but with imperfect powers; whence it happens that they fall. Yet because their defect becomes a duty, since they are regenerated by the Holy Spirit, they grieve over admitted sins. But those cannot be called infirm who are plainly dead in sins; rather, those who live a spiritual life can be so called, which does not fit wicked men.
XXII. Believers sin more grievously than unbelievers—
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—first, because they have greater knowledge; second, because they have powers to resist, even if imperfect, while the others have none. Conversely, unbelievers sin more grievously: first, because they are carried into sins by full appetite, while believers sin with a broken will; second, believers grieve over admitted sins, while the others please themselves in committed sins.
XXIII. Illumination is twofold: convincing, only so far that one is convinced, and this occurs in the unregenerate; and persuading, by which one is affected by grace so that he himself is persuaded, and this alone belongs to believers. The first is treated in Hebrews 6.
XXIV. Sin is taken away in believers in this life: first, so that in part it does not exist; second, so that it is not at all imputed.
Therefore there are sins in believers, but they are not imputed.
XXV. No sin is given as venial, but every sin is mortal by its nature.
In the event, some sins are venial, which are remitted on account of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.
XXVI. In sin there is aversion from good and conversion to evil.
For in every sin man turns himself away from—
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—God, to the creature, or to the illicit use of the creature.
XXVII. The sin of Adam is not inherent in us.
Because it is a transient act; but it is imputed to us.
XXVIII. He who sins in one point is guilty of all.
This is a rule of Scripture, whose meaning is somewhat obscure. Therefore it must be known that a man is held guilty of all, not because he will bear a punishment adequate to all of them, but because he will bear such a punishment as sinners bear for each one of those sins, namely eternal death. More plainly: such a cursed man deserves eternal punishment, but not in that degree as one who has sinned against many things.
XXIX. The place of sin is in this life.
Some ask whether after this life, in hell, the wicked sin. Some affirm it, but the Scholastics deny it. First, because there will be no law in hell, and where there is no law, there is no transgression. Second, even if there were law, nevertheless there would not be sin, because all the faculties of men will be so fixed upon the punishments which they suffer, that there will be no occasion or place for sinning.
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XXX. Sin affects man with eternal death, not efficiently, but meritoriously.
That is, sin is the meritorious cause, but it does not itself inflict death; rather, God does so on account of it. Therefore God will inflict punishment upon sinners on account of their sins and their deserts.
XXXI. God cannot but hate sins.
For sin fights against the nature of God, namely His holiness. Joshua 24: God is a strong and holy God; He will not bear your defection. Habakkuk 1: His eye is purer than to behold evil.
XXXII. Sin deserves punishment because it is something undue; and it deserves infinite punishment because it is committed against the infinite God.
The Scholastics are accustomed to call this, in evil, demerit; that is, they say there is demerit because the better a thing is, the more it deserves to be loved. Therefore a greater sin is committed in proportion as the subject against which it is committed is better. But since the good is infinite, an infinite guilt also arises from it.
XXXIII. The consequence of sin is either guilt, or punishment, or stain.
Guilt is the desert by which the person who sinned—
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—is punished. Deuteronomy 27: “Cursed,” etc. This guilt is removed in believers. Romans 8:1. But you will say: where sin is, there is guilt. Sin is in believers; therefore guilt is. Response. Where there is sin that is imputed, there is guilt. And so the minor premise is denied, because though sin is in believers, it is nevertheless not imputed to them, because Christ was made sin for them. 2 Corinthians 5.
XXXIV. Punishment is one thing; chastisement is another.
Chastisement always proceeds from God as from a loving Father, and tends to the good of the one who is chastised. Punishment, however, proceeds from God as angry and as Judge, unto the evil of the one who is punished. The former is the rod in the hands of God the Father, chastising His sons whom He loves, for their good. The latter is the iron sceptre, breaking them for their evil as a potter’s vessel.
XXXV. The evil of guilt is greater than the evil of punishment.
Therefore a man ought rather to suffer anything before he would defile himself with sin, before he would admit the smallest guilt.
XXXVI. Ministers remit sins ministerially and declaratively, not authoritatively.
Because they have only the ministerial key, not the lordly key, which belongs to Christ alone.
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Addition
It is asked: Since God threatened death to man who had sinned, did He not change His sentence when He punished Christ in his stead, who, in the place of Adam and of believers, sustained death?
Response. God never changes His sentence, even if He seems to do the contrary of what He had predicted that He would do, because what He predicted in such a case was conditional, even if He kept the condition back. The example is in the Ninevites. But they say that God did not say everything in that threatening, “thou shalt surely die,” but kept back certain things which He was going to do, as became plain from the event. For example, in this sense: in the day thou eatest, thou shalt die; this was set down as actual, but either in thy own person or in the person of the Redeemer. We assent to this response of Martyr.