Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions I.
James Dodson
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Chapter I
Of Sacred Scripture
I. The Word of God is taken either for Scripture, and is called the prophetic word; or for the Son of God, insofar as He is and is called the Word, ἐνδιάθετον [the inward/internal Word], internal, as in John 1:1–4. The former word is an accidental word; the latter is essential.
II. The Word of God is called the first truth, not essential truth, for in that way God is the first truth, but formal truth; that is, it is the first rule of all things to be believed and done.
III. The Word of God is said to have proceeded immediately from God with respect to origin, because, namely, it has God immediately as its author; but not with respect to promulgation, for God promulgated His word through the prophets and apostles.
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IV. The Word of God, by circumstance, now has greater and now lesser authority.
For if someone is admonished from the Word of God by some private person who does this by office, the one who does not obey certainly sins. But he sins more if he is admonished by someone to whom authority has been given for this; for example, if he does not obey a minister of the divine Word. But he sins most of all if God Himself is the one who immediately admonishes. And from this is understood Hebrews 2:2–4: “For if the word spoken by angels was firm, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation? which at the first began to be declared by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by those who heard Him; God also bearing witness with signs and wonders and various miracles and distributions of the Holy Ghost according to His own will.”
V. The Church is called the political pillar of the truth, not the architectonic pillar. That is, it is not called the pillar because the truth of the divine Word rests upon it as upon a foundation, but because the Word of God has been entrusted to it and is found in it, just as the edicts of princes are commonly fastened to pillars.
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VI. No one is bound to believe the Church except when it agrees with the Word of God.
VII. The authority of Scripture becomes known to us by testimony: the external testimony, the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and the internal testimony, namely the marks and criteria implanted in the Word itself.
Now the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not ecstatic or enthusiastic, but a certain light so pouring itself into the mind that it gently affects it and shows the reasons implanted in the thing itself, though previously hidden.
Objection. If by the testimony of the Holy Spirit it is established that the Word of God is the Word of God, why then do not all Evangelicals agree in all doctrines?
Response. Because the same measure of the Spirit has not been measured out to all.
Objection 2. A circle is committed. For to one asking how the Word of God can be recognized, the response is: “By the testimony of the Holy Spirit.” But when we are asked how we know the testimony of the Holy Spirit to be true, we run back to Scripture.
Response. We do not use the testimony of the Holy Spirit as an argument; we bring it forward only to confess our blindness, and to acknowledge to whom we must ascribe the fact that we recognize the truth of the Word.
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Thus, if someone should ask counsel or an assertion from a wise man, he would not bring forward, as an argument, the motion of his own mind, but the very arguments of the truth and of the matter which he asserts; the discovery of which he professes to have arisen from the light of the mind, whose author, unless he is plainly impious, he will acknowledge to be God.
VIII. Therefore Scripture proves itself, not by an internal argument but by an external one; that is, not authoritatively, but ratiocinatively; because, namely, such things are implanted in the Word itself by which it is certainly recognized to be of divine authority. Thus a noble gem proves itself by its own effects.
The implanted arguments are these: the heavenly majesty of the doctrine; the simplicity, divinity, and purity of the style; the agreement of all the parts with one another; antiquity; the wonder into which it carries us away; so many and such notable miracles performed for the confirmation of the Word; the divine vindication of the sacred books from the rage of enemies and of Satan; the marvelous fulfilment of prophecies; the consent of the Church; the blood of the martyrs; and finally, the low condition of the writers themselves.
Objection. “I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Church moved me.” Augustine.
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Response. The authority of the Church by which Augustine was moved to believe the Gospel was not a certain dominion and right, but the dignity of the Church, approved by great and illustrious arguments of divine providence in preserving the Church, so that in it he recognized the finger of God.
IX. The authority of Sacred Scripture is known from those marks which we have mentioned; yet not always from one single mark, but from several, and sometimes even from all.
The papist adversaries, when we treat of the marks by which Scripture is known to be the Word of God, tear apart those marks, propose them separately, and thus wish to answer them. But this is very improper. For when we say that these are the marks of the divine Word—namely, miracles, predictions of future things, and so forth—they must be understood in such a way that they are not taken separately, but jointly; and so from them a judgment is made concerning the authority of the Word of God.
X. Whatever is in the Word of God has divine authority, either because it has God as its author, or because it is divinely employed for use.
Thus, for example, the doctrine of the Gospel is from God because God is its author. Likewise the narrative—
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—which concerns the crimes of men, their sayings and deeds, has divine authority because it is reported by God. Thus the sayings of heathen poets, because God uses them as true, have divine authority on account of that use.
XI. It is one thing to know that this or that book is canonical; it is another thing to know that it was written by this or that author.
The Papists are accustomed to ask us: How do we know that the Gospel of Matthew is the Gospel of Matthew, or Luke’s that of Luke? Response. If the question is how we know these books are canonical, then we say: from the implanted arguments which are in them. And so we distinguish the faith by which we believe a book to be canonical from that by which we believe it to have been written by this or that author. For the latter belongs only to historical faith; therefore no one’s salvation is endangered if he does not believe it was written by Matthew, provided he believes it to be canonical, proceeding from the Holy Spirit.
XII. The canonical or authentic Word of God is such both as to words and as to things: as to words in the Hebrew and Greek tongues; as to things in translations.
Thus there is an authenticity either of words or of sense. The former corresponds to the original languages; the latter to translations.
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Some dispute whether the Word of God which is in translations is truly divine. Response. Certainly it is divine as to the things, unless perhaps somewhere it has been badly translated; yet it is not so as to the words. For God dictated in Hebrew and Greek. Hence Sacred Scripture divides all men into Jews and Greeks. No cause of this can be given except that, for all outside the Jews, the Word of God was written in Greek.
XIII. Scripture differs from the Word of God considered in itself as an accident from its subject. For the Word of God existed before Scripture existed, and it existed when there was no use of Scripture. Matthew 5:18.
XIV. Scripture is necessary, not absolutely, but upon the hypothesis of the divine command.
XV. Scripture is perfect both as to matter and as to form.
The form is called the method; the matter is the thing itself. It must be known that there is a twofold method of Scripture: namely, that of the whole Scripture and that of certain parts. The method of the whole Scripture is historical; but the method of the parts is disciplinary or arbitrary. For the Holy Spirit is accustomed so to handle things that He brings forward what conduces to the explanation—
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—and proof, or even to the refutation, of the matter, and that in the order which pleases Him, as may be seen in the Pauline Epistles.
XVI. Scripture is perfect, not because it sets forth perfectly, according to the letter, all the things concerning which it treats, but because it expresses them so far as they are necessary for us to know unto salvation.
It may be called perfect, not adequately to the object, but adequately to the end; for there are certain things of which Scripture treats which cannot be expressed adequately to the capacity of a creature, such as God, the incarnation of the Son of God, and such like. The Holy Spirit reports these to us, not as they are in themselves, but as they can be grasped by us.
XVII. The perfection of Scripture is one thing when essential, another when accidental.
The Papists ask us: If certain books of Scripture contain all the doctrines of faith and precepts of morals, what is the reason so many books have been set forth? Response. Because it was not only necessary that those things should be contained—that is the essential perfection—but it was also fitting that they should be contained in such a way that they would be treated diversely by different men, so that by that means they might be better understood; and also so that, by the consent of diverse men whom God used as amanuenses in recording His Word—
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—He might manifest the divinity of His Word. And this is that accidental perfection.
XVIII. When we call Scripture perfect, we do not mean that all things necessary to salvation are contained in it according to the letter, but that some things must be deduced by certain consequence from those things which are clearly stated.
This is known from Christ and the apostles, who deduced many things by consequence from those things which had been clearly stated; and those things which they had deduced by consequence from Moses and David, they judged Moses to have said. Matthew 22:29.
You will say: “Consequences cannot be understood by the unlearned.” But consequences are twofold: remote and proximate. This is true of the former, with respect to the less exercised; not of the latter. The eye sees remote things either only confusedly or not at all plainly; but it sees near things accurately. Things necessary to salvation are deduced from Scripture by proximate consequence, and therefore they are understood most easily.
XIX. The perfection of the Canon is not estimated from the multitude of books, but from the sufficiency of the doctrines of faith and precepts of morals.
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Some urge that this Canon is not perfect because some books have perished; but we are accustomed to meet them with this distinction.
XX. Traditions are sometimes taken for indifferent ecclesiastical rites, but sometimes for those things which have been delivered in Scripture.
As to the latter member, see 1 Corinthians 11:23. And as to the former, see the rule delivered to us by the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 14:40: “Let all things be done decently and in order.” Hence, although such things are not commanded in Scripture in particular, they are nevertheless commanded in general.
XXI. Tradition is one thing when genuine, another when fabricated.
The genuine traditions are those of which we have spoken. The fabricated are those which the Papists are accustomed to thrust upon the Church, such as the Mass, Purgatory, and other trifles of that kind. Here it must be noted that in these traditions they contradict themselves; for they assert that they are not written, and yet they wish to prove them from Scripture.
XXII. It is one thing to commemorate a benefit of God; it is another thing to commemorate the time which the Church has appointed for that benefit to be remembered.
The Papists are accustomed, in order to argue for the imperfection of Scripture—
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—to say: Where is it commanded in Scripture, “On this day thou shalt celebrate the nativity of Christ; on that day, the Passover; on that day, Pentecost”? Yet, they say, all these are articles of faith. Therefore some articles of faith do not stand in Scripture. Response. From the distinction already given: that Christ was born, rose again, and ascended into heaven are indeed articles of faith; but the day on which these things are to be celebrated is not such an article, but only an ecclesiastical ordinance, so that, had it pleased the Church, it could have appointed other days for this commemoration.
XXIII. The perspicuity of Scripture is one thing when subjective, another when objective.
We have treated this distinction in the commonplaces. The subjective perspicuity of Scripture is supreme; that is, insofar as Scripture is clear in itself and by itself. Its objective perspicuity is not the same, and this not by fault of Scripture, but by the fault of men and of our depraved nature. Just as men whose eyes are dim cannot see the light of the sun, this is not from any fault of the sun, which is most bright in itself, but from the fault of their dim eyes.
XXIV. Theologians distinguish between Scripture and the matter of Scripture.
For everything which the Holy Spirit says in Scripture concerning hidden things is clear; but—
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—He does not say everything concerning obscure things, but only those things of which we are capable and which it is expedient for us to know. For example, the Trinity is a matter of Scripture concerning which, nevertheless, the Holy Spirit speaks clearly in Scripture and according to our capacity; yet He does not say everything concerning the Trinity, because we are not capable of all things. Therefore the matter of Scripture can be obscure, while Scripture concerning that matter is clear.
XXV. It is one thing to speak of the perspicuity of the doctrines of faith and precepts of morals; it is another to speak of prophecies which concern events uncertain to us.
The former are perspicuous in Scripture; the latter are not so before they have been fulfilled, according to that rule of the theologians: prophecies are not understood before their fulfilment.
XXVI. Scripture is clear in different ways and degrees; namely, more to adults than to infants.
Scripture distinguishes between adults and infants, 1 Corinthians 3; Hebrews 5:13–14. This distinction arises from the fact that some profit more than others in the knowledge of divine truth. Yet here—
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—it must be noted concerning this distinction that, although some profit more than others in the knowledge of the truth, and some perceive more distinctly than others, nevertheless all perceive so much as is sufficient for them unto salvation.
Another thing to be noted here is that certain distinctions arise from this distinction. For example, some articles of faith are Catholic, others Theological. The Catholic are those which are necessary for all to know unto salvation, without which no one is saved; such as those proposed in the Catechism, at least the Decalogue, the Apostles’ Creed, and so forth. The Theological are those which are not necessary for all to know, but at least for those who preside over the teaching of others, whether in churches or in schools; such are those articles which are deduced by consequence from others.
A second distinction arises from the preceding one, namely into implicit and explicit faith. But we take these terms here in another sense than the Papists do. For they call implicit faith “the faith of the charcoal-burner,” and define it by ignorance. With us, explicit faith is that faith which belongs to adults, who grasp more things and more distinctly than infants. But implicit faith is that which also belongs to infants, which does not grasp as many things as the faith of adults, nor so distinctly.
XXVII. Scripture is perspicuous—
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—to us, not by our nature, but by the grace of God illuminating us.
It is not known to us by nature, but by the grace which illuminates us. Here certain distinctions which arise from this must be explained.
The first is between the knowledge of the Law and of the Gospel. Theologians say that the Law is known even by unregenerate men in a material respect, that is, with respect to the precepts, but not in a formal respect, that is, with respect to the end; for the unregenerate do not know the end of the Law, namely, that from it they may acknowledge sin and misery, and from that desire deliverance. The second point is that they do not know even this material reason perfectly; for not all precepts are known by nature, as is plain even from the Pharisees, who neither understood all things nor understood them perfectly.
The second distinction is of knowledge into apprehensive and judicative; into that which is with persuasion, and that which is only with conviction; into disciplinary and experimental; into that which is under its proper species, and that which is under an alien species. Yet these distinctions coincide. For there is a certain knowledge which persuades a man, such as the knowledge that is in believers; and there is a knowledge which convinces a man of the truth of a matter, such as fell to the Pharisees and falls to certain unregenerate men. Disciplinary knowledge is when something is taught by precepts. Experimental knowledge is that—
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—which we acquire by experience. Experimental knowledge of divine and heavenly things belongs to believers. But disciplinary knowledge sometimes belongs even to reprobates. Knowledge under an alien species is when I know something, but do not esteem it as highly as it ought to be esteemed, or suppose it to be something other than it is. For example, if someone does not esteem the Word of God as highly as it is in itself, he is not unlike one who judges gold to be brass. Such knowledge of divine things belongs to reprobates. But knowledge under its proper species belongs only to believers. Hence Scripture calls the unregenerate fools and unwise, because they grasp divine things under an alien species, the noblest things under the species of the vilest.
XXVIII. Knowledge is one thing in thesis, another in hypothesis.
It is asked: How can a man, whether believer or unbeliever, knowingly sin, since no one wills evil under the aspect of evil? Response. That knowledge is said to be in thesis, not in hypothesis. That is, such a person knows in general that this evil is evil: to commit fornication, to steal; but he supposes it to be good for himself. Hence the poet’s saying must be explained thus: “I see and approve the better things; I follow the worse.” Namely, I see the better things with respect to thesis; with respect to hypothesis I do not see them, and so I follow evil.
XXIX. With respect to knowledge—
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—men are called perfect and infants.
And there is someone who thinks these things cannot stand together: that one is perfect with respect to the knowledge of God, and yet that we are regenerated only inchoatively. But there is no conflict between these. For one is called perfect with respect to infancy, and yet is called inchoative with respect to completion. Therefore these things no more conflict than this: that Scripture asserts certain persons to be adults, and yet meanwhile says, “we know in part, and we prophesy in part.” 1 Corinthians 13.
XXX. Interpretation is one thing when verbal, another when real; or, one is of words, another of sense. Interpretation must not be of one’s own explanation. 2 Peter 1:20.
It is asked: How can these things stand together, that everyone is said to be bound to search the Scriptures, and that interpretation must not be of one’s own explanation?
Response. It must be known that one’s own explanation is not here opposed to an explanation which is legitimately made by anyone through the Scriptures, but to that explanation which is most alien from Scripture and yet is forced upon Scripture.
XXXI. Interpretation is one thing when analogous to the context, another when analogous to the faith.
The use of this distinction is great.
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Theologians often bring forward various interpretations of places of Scripture. The Fathers also often do not agree in the explanation of this or that place, and they indeed bring interpretations analogous to the faith, but not always analogous to the context; for there cannot be more than one thing analogous to the context, because more than one thing cannot be true.
XXXII. The first means of interpreting Scripture is the analogy of faith; that is, the constant, open, and perpetual sense of Scripture in the open and least obscure places of Scripture.
Such are the articles of faith in the Creed, the Lord’s Prayer, the Decalogue, and the whole Catechism, each part of which can be confirmed from the sayings of Scripture. Nevertheless the analogy of faith alone is not sufficient, because an interpretation may be analogous to the faith which nevertheless is not analogous to the text.
The remaining means of interpretation are: frequent prayer; knowledge of languages; inspection of the fountains; consideration of the argument and scope; distinction of proper and improper words; noting of causes, circumstances, antecedents, and consequents; logical analysis; comparison of obscure things with clearer, similar things with similar, dissimilar things with dissimilar.
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See Piscator’s Exegetica concerning Scripture, Aphorism 16.
XXXIII. Sometimes all the means of interpreting Scripture must be applied in explaining a certain place; sometimes only some.
This must be well observed against the Pontifical sophists, who, in order to evade those means of interpreting Scripture which our men are accustomed to apply, examine them separately. Yet our meaning is not that each one by itself is sufficient, but that either all, or most, ought to be applied. Indeed, it must be noted that not every part of Scripture needs interpretation. For since Scripture must be explained by Scripture, some part must be so clear that it needs no interpretation; otherwise there would be a process to infinity.
XXXIV. Although the Church does not give authority to the Word of God, and although all its own things must be examined by the Word of God, nevertheless its authority is greater than that of any private person.
The Papists are accustomed to object to us: “If,” they say, “we must receive explanations of Scripture on this condition, that they agree with the Word of God, then we owe the same reverence to all private persons as to the Church, because—
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—if a private person speaks with Scripture, we must also receive him.”
Response. He sins more who does not hear the Church than he who does not hear a private person. And the reason is that what the private person does, he does from office; but what the Church does, it does from authority. He sins more grievously who does not hear one who speaks with authority than one who speaks from office.
XXXV. It is one thing for something to belong to someone with respect to inscription; another with respect to common use.
Thus the Epistle to the Romans belongs to the Romans with respect to inscription, but to the universal Church with respect to common use. For Paul is said to have written to all believers what he wrote to the Romans. 2 Peter 3:15.
XXXVI. The mode of operation of Scripture is not real or physical, but moral.
Objection. By Scripture we are born again. 1 Peter 1:23. Therefore it acts really.
Response. Regeneration is the work of God alone, no less than creation. But when regeneration is attributed to the Word of God, it is attributed in the same way as miracles are attributed to the apostles, who contributed nothing to the performance of the miracles, for they were the work of God; and yet they are attributed to them because without their intervention they were not—
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—done. So also regeneration is attributed to the Word of God, because it does not take place without the intervention of the Word of God.
XXXVII. The Word of God translated into other tongues does not indeed have the same originating authority, yet it has derived authority.
XXXVIII. The objects of Theology and Philosophy are diverse and distinct.
Yet Theology and Philosophy do not conflict. Just as the shoemaker’s art and the tailor’s art, although they have diverse objects, nevertheless do not conflict with one another.
XXXIX. Truth does not conflict with truth.
Yet truth can be distinct. Therefore the truth of Theology does not conflict with the truth of Philosophy, and yet they are distinct. For example: Philosophy teaches that a virgin cannot give birth. Naturally, this is true. Theology teaches that a virgin can give birth. Supernaturally, this also is true. These truths are not the same, and yet they are truths that do not conflict.
XL. Sound reason does not conflict with Theology.
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We say “sound,” for corrupt reason does conflict.
Objection. Yet the regenerate intellect does not grasp divine things perfectly.
Response. It is one thing to conflict with a thing; it is another not to comprehend it.
XLI. Reason is required for Theology, not as an argument, but as an instrument.
That is, not that we prove something by reason, but that we may grasp and understand divine things, we must have reason. For neither infants nor the mentally incapacitated can learn Theology.
XLII. From divine testimony in things necessary to salvation there proceeds both an affirmative and a negative argument.
We say: in things necessary to be known unto salvation. This follows from the fact that Scripture contains all doctrines of faith and precepts of morals most perfectly. But in those things which are not necessary to be known unto salvation, this does not hold; for Scripture treats of the remaining things outside Theology, but not perfectly—only incidentally.
XLIII. Whatever is deduced from Scripture by good consequence is itself Scripture.
Men often say such things from which certain things—
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—are deduced which they are unwilling to admit; hence there is a deduction to the impossible. And the reason is that men often report things as true from which afterward other things are elicited which plainly show that they are not true, and drive men to retractation. But the most wise God said nothing without understanding all things which ought to be elicited from them. Hence even that which is elicited from Scripture is called Scripture; and what is elicited from Moses and David, Moses and David are said to have spoken. See Matthew 22; Luke 20; Acts 2.
XLIV. In accurate disputations, improper expressions must be exchanged for proper ones.
This is a most noble rule; for in disputations Scripture is often abused if someone utters it in improper words. But he who disputes accurately ought to compel his opponent to exchange improper words for proper ones. If he cannot, it must be said that we are unwilling to interpret in his favor. But if the opponent refuses, he must be repelled from disputations. The reason for the rule is this: improper expressions are obscure; obscure things do not convince; therefore neither do improper expressions. That obscure things do not convince is certain; for how can what is not understood convince someone to believe this or that?
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XLV. Arguments deduced from parables prove nothing except with respect to the scope.
This is a most useful rule. Therefore one must always see what the scope of the parable is, which scope is also usually called the formal element of the parable. Hence one may also see how ineptly the Socinians argue from Matthew 18 that God forgives our sins without any satisfaction having been accepted, because that master who remitted the debts to his servant did this without any satisfaction being accepted. For this argument is not taken from the scope; the scope is that God remits sins to those who remit sins to others, but the scope is not that God remits in the same manner in which that man remitted.
So also the Arminians argue badly when they teach that God renews the benefit of justification because here God renewed the benefit; for this is not from the scope of the parable. But if it were permissible to argue from the material element, then we could equally say that someone can forgive another against God’s will, because here he is said to have cast his fellow-servant into prison.
But concerning both these rules this scholastic axiom must be observed: Symbolic Theology is not Argumentative.