Johannes Maccovius, Theological Distinctions II.
James Dodson
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Chapter II
Of the Law
I. Divine law is one thing when general, another when special.
The general law is that which obliges all and each. The special is that which obliges a certain state of men. Thus the general law is: “Thou shalt not kill”; “Thou shalt not steal.” The special is: “Honor parents”; “Do not provoke children to wrath.” Good must be done to all, but especially to the household of faith.
II. The precepts of the Law are one thing when affirmative, another when negative.
This distinction is supremely necessary; for negative precepts bind always and at every time, as: “Thou shalt not kill”; “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” Affirmative precepts do not bind in the same way. For example, the precept concerning the giving of alms: for not everyone can give, nor always, nor to all.
III. Some precepts are of command, others of indulgence.
And this distinction is most useful. For God seems to command many things in Scripture which, nevertheless, if we do not do them, we do not sin; and He seems to command certain things which, if we do not do them, we sin. Those precepts which, if we do not do them, we sin, are called precepts of command. But those things which we can do—
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—and can omit without sin are called precepts of indulgence. Such in the Old Testament were those concerning not lending money to a neighbor on usury, concerning summoning a neighbor into court, and concerning dismissing a wife found in adultery. Such things could either be done or not be done, each without sin, because they were precepts, not precepts of command, but of indulgence.
IV. Certain precepts are as it were natural, and therefore God never commands their contrary; certain precepts are as it were positive, and sometimes He has commanded their contrary.
For example, He never commanded the contrary of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 9th precepts. But He did command the contrary of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th. That is, He never commanded men to have strange gods or to take the name of God in vain. But He commanded the withholding of the duty owed to parents, as when Abraham left his fatherland and went into other lands; He willed the killing of a son; He willed that the Israelites should borrow and not repay.
V. Commands are one thing when of obedience, another when of exploration, another when of conviction.
This is a most useful distinction in many theological controversies. The question is asked concerning external calling: whether those whom God externally calls, He wills to be saved. Scripture denies this, Matthew 22: “Many are—
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—called,” etc. And by calling men are commanded to obey God; yet God does not will that all should obey, at least not that this should have happened in every case. Therefore God sets this forth with this end: that they may be convicted, or explored.
The second use of the distinction is in explaining many places of Scripture. For example, it is asked whether God willed that thing when He commanded Pharaoh to dismiss the Israelite people. Response. God commanded it by a precept of conviction, not of obedience. Again, when He commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, did He also will that thing? Response. He willed it by a precept of exploration. It is asked: Why does God explore, since He has known all things from eternity? Response. God does not explore for His own sake, but for ours, that we may know what we are, as in Job 3. That is, He wills to make us known to ourselves. Thus, when Peter did not know himself, God permitted him to fall, that he might be convicted of his own infirmity and might learn by experience how true that persuasion of his own constancy had been.
VI. Those things to which we are obligated by the Law are of a twofold kind: some things which it commands and teaches, and some things which it only commands.
This is a most useful distinction, and especially against the Socinians and Arminians. They think certain works are works of the Gospel, when we urge that no one is justified by—
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—the works of the Law. They reply that this is indeed so, but that one can nevertheless be justified by works of the Gospel, and that works of the Law are one thing, works of the Gospel another. They say the works of the Gospel are repentance, believing, and so forth. For, they say, it is evident that these are not works of the Law, because the Law commands nothing other than this: “Do this and thou shalt live,” and “Cursed is everyone who does not continue,” etc. Concerning repentance and faith there is deep silence in the Law. Response. Those things which the Law commands are twofold: some it teaches and commands, such as “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt not commit adultery”; some it does not teach, but commands, such as believing the Gospel. For that the Gospel must be believed, to this the Law obliges us, since it wills that we should obey God in whatever He commands us.
The end of the moral Law is one thing in the state of fall and restoration, another in the state of integrity. In the state of integrity it had this end: that man should be justified by it. In the state of fall, its end is the knowledge of sin. You will say: “There is now no end of the moral Law in the state of restoration, because the Law is not laid down for a righteous man.” Response. The Law is not laid upon him for penalty and condemnation, but for direction.
VII. The ceremonial Law, with respect to ecclesiastical rites, makes a species diverse from the moral and forensic Law. But insofar as it contains the doctrine of—
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—sacrifices shadowing forth the advent of Christ, so far it is the doctrine of the Gospel.
There is a very grave controversy among theologians whether the ceremonial Law makes a species contradistinct from the moral and judicial Law, or whether it belongs to the doctrine of the Gospel. Some, as Pareus, will have it simply belong to the doctrine of the Gospel; others, on the contrary, as Amesius; but the distinction just given removes and composes the difficulty.
VIII. The ceremonies which were observed in the Old Testament were shadows of future things, if by “shadow” you understand a type; but they were not shadows if you take “shadow” for a vain and worthless thing. Hebrews 10:1.
Many are offended that we call the sacrifices shadows, and they say that “shadow” is taken for a vain thing, as though it were said, “shadow and dust”; but the matter is not so, for Scripture itself calls them a shadow, Hebrews 10:1. But “shadow” is taken for a type.
IX. Sacrifice is threefold: ἱλαστικόν [propitiatory], εὐχαριστικόν [thank-offering], λύτρον [ransom].
This is a distinction of theologians, but it is not sufficiently accurate; for it ought rather to be distinguished thus: sacrifice is either ἱλαστικόν [propitiatory], or—
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—εὐχαριστικόν [thank-offering]; and the ἱλαστικόν [propitiatory] is either typical or real, which is called λύτρον [ransom].
X. Typical sacrifices expiated sins typically, not really.
XI. Sacrifices did not please God ex opere operato [by the work performed], but insofar as they were types of Christ.
This is a well-known distinction, which must be defended against the Jews, who think that those sacrifices pleased God ex opere operato; for if that were true, then even the Mass, once exhibited, would please Him. But this is false. Isaiah 1:6.
XII. Without shedding of blood there is no remission, when sacrifices are viewed collectively or taken together, but not separately.
Many reason foolishly from the Epistle to the Hebrews 9 and say that every sacrifice had to be bloody. But see the contrary in Leviticus 5:11–13, where it is plain that some unbloody sacrifice is given. And therefore they do not reason accurately enough against the Mass when they say it is a contradiction for the Mass to be a sacrifice and to be unbloody. Hence also the distinction of sacrifices among the Hebrews into those which were called זבח [zebach: victim, slaughter-offering], from זבח [zabach: he slaughtered/sacrificed], and those which were called מנחה [minchah: gift, present, oblation], under which also—
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—unbloody sacrifices were comprehended. Therefore it must be said: no sacrifice which is a victim is or can be unbloody. But the Pontifical Mass is such a sacrifice, since they say it is a victim for the living and the dead. Therefore it cannot be unbloody. But to say simply that “to be a sacrifice” and “to be unbloody” is a contradiction in the adjective is foolish, as is plain from what has been said. For there were certain sacrifices from the sacrificial meal, of which Leviticus 5:11–13 speaks, which are referred to the מנחות [minchoth: grain-offerings/gifts]; whence there were some which were by no means bloody. Therefore it is not absurd for a sacrifice to be unbloody, even if for another reason it necessarily follows that the sacrifice of Christ was bloody; because all sacrifices, taken collectively, refer to Christ, the one and only sacrifice.
XIII. Individual sacrifices are inadequate types of Christ, not adequate ones.
Thus the slaughter of a beast was an inadequate type of Christ; for it did not shadow forth all things that were to be in Christ. So also the burning was an inadequate type of Christ, because it signified only the death of Gehenna, whereas many other things occurred in Christ.
XIV. Some are called types absolutely; others are sacrificial types.
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Not every type is a sacrifice, although every sacrifice is a type. For example, the serpent in John 3:14 was a type of Christ; so was Jonah, Matthew 12; yet neither was a sacrifice.
XV. Some sacrifices are ordinary, others extraordinary.
This distinction depends partly on the circumstance of place, and partly on causes: namely, that some were not performed in the temple; some were performed not by priests, but by prophets or others, as by Gideon, Judges 6, and by Manoah, Judges 13.
XVI. The word “to sacrifice” is taken in two ways: first, for simply killing; second, for killing in sacrifice. Genesis 31.
Therefore this distinction is noted so that it may be shown that that Passover lamb was not a sacrifice, although it is said to have been slain; for “slaying” is taken here in the first signification.
XVII. The priest is called “high,” not because he has rule over others, but because he performed the highest functions.
This distinction is used against the Pontificals, who think that in the Old Testament there was one visible head of the visible Church, to whom all things were subject. But the contrary appears from Hebrews 9, and it is clear—
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—why he was called the high priest: namely, not because he was a head ruling over the Church, but only because he performed the highest functions.
XVIII. One priest is Aaronic; another Melchizedekian.
Christ is Melchizedekian; the rest were Aaronic. Let the Pontificals be told to say of which order they are. Not of the former, because then they would be Jews; not of the latter, because after Melchizedek there was no one of that order except the one Christ.
XIX. The forensic Law is not abolished with respect to those things which are common to all; but it is entirely abolished with respect to those things which were peculiar to the Jewish nation.
See concerning this our Commonplaces.