Johannes Maccovius, Century of General Distinctions.
James Dodson
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A Century of the Most General Distinctions
Preliminaries
A distinction is the determination of subject and predicate; otherwise, limitation, modification, or conciliation. Its examination and touchstone are contained in the following theorems.
I. A distinction is either general or special.
A general distinction is made by very common terms, whose use is found in every kind of faculty, such as per se, secondarily, absolutely and relatively, per se and by accident. A special distinction is made in special matters belonging to some special and restricted discipline, as when an ethicist distinguishes between common and heroic virtue, or a politician between an offensive and defensive weapon.
II. Each kind of distinction is made by diverse respects, whose conditions and species must be considered.
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III. There are three conditions of diverse respects: first, agreement; second, diversity; third, perspicuity.
IV. Agreement is when the distinction sought is drawn from the inward parts of the thing, and from the very nature of the subject and predicate.
Therefore it is a sophism when the diverse respects fight against the thing itself. Therefore those things which are true contradictories, whether explicitly, as “God is fiery,” or implicitly, as “man is a lion,” can never in any way be reconciled. Now four things are required for a true contradiction: first, the same subject and predicate; second, that it be said according to the same thing, that is, according to the same part; third, that it be made with respect to the same thing, that is, with the same respect and in exactly the same mode; fourth, that it be at the same time.
V. Diversity is when the distinction is not the same as the thing which it distinguishes, but is some circumstance of it.
Therefore it is an empty tautology if someone says, “A body is sensible in an insensible mode.”
VI. Perspicuity is when the distinction is clear and therefore easily explicable, not chimerical or glassy.
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For that distinction common among certain scholastics, between theological truth and philosophical truth, is evil. The fault committed against this condition is, first, when the distinction is inexplicable. Second, those things are called chimerical which are rough and rugged. Third, a glassy distinction is one which has paint or color. Fourth, when the scholastics ought to have explained this sophism, “A mouse has a foot,” etc., they said that the mouse has an irrational foot; but “rational” pertains to the whole man.
VII. The species of diverse respects are these: some are of diverse things, others of diverse modes.
Modes are like knots: as a knot contributes to the firmness of a thing, so does the mode of a thing. He who holds the mode of a thing holds the thing itself.
Every distinction ought to proceed from things diverse, not adverse.
VIII. The respects of diverse things are sought from the forms themselves.
For example, if someone distinguishes between art and artisan, between philosophy and philosopher, between the thing and the form of the thing, between substance and accident, between name and fact: distinctions of this kind are about diverse matters, that is, about diverse subjects.
Note. First, he who confounds the art with the artisan acts badly.
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Second, from the person to the thing the consequence is not valid; as, “Nero and Caligula were bad rulers; therefore magistracy is bad.” Third, from the accident to the subject the consequence is not valid, that is, from abuse to use. Fourth, the Old Testament was abrogated as to circumstance, not as to substance.
IX. The respects of diverse modes are sought from the multiple determination of one and the same thing.
For the mode of a thing is nothing other than the restriction and determination of the thing. There are four classes of modes: first, the mode of being; second, of predicating; third, of knowing, considering, and beginning; fourth, the mode of one thing’s relation to another.
To this belong the distinctions mediately and immediately, primarily and secondarily, a priori and a posteriori, naturally and sacramentally. A prince acts primarily and mediately through officers. God is known a posteriori by the effect, not a priori by the cause. The heavenly bread is called the body of Christ sacramentally.
X. There are two disciplines that are teachers of modes: physics and logic. The former sets forth the mode of being and knowing; the latter sets forth and proposes the modes of predicating.
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First, not every discipline explains modes. Second, the first is physics and metaphysics. Third, as the essence is, so is the predication. Fourth, the mode of predicating necessarily follows the mode of being; thus we cannot say that a star is animated, because such is not its essence. Likewise, we cannot say that the bread is the body of Christ essentially; for the bread is true bread, but it is called the body sacramentally.
XI. One must accurately distinguish between limited and unlimited axioms, between a limited and an unlimited proposition.
When this is observed, it will be easy to answer that syllogism, often used even by our own teachers: “He who says your theses are theses speaks truth. He who says your theses are false theses says your theses are theses. Therefore, he who says your theses are false theses speaks truth.” This argument is childish, and a sophism unworthy of learned men. It must be resolved from this axiom: from an unlimited proposition to a limited one, the consequence is not valid. For the major is unlimited: “He who says your theses are theses.” The minor is limited: “He who says your theses are false theses.” To say “theses” is unlimited; to say “false theses” is limited. Therefore the consequence is not valid: “It is an animal; therefore it is a dog.”
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“They are theses; therefore they are false.” Now, according to a certain respect, something is said in five ways. First, reduplicatively, when it is so by essence: as, “Man, insofar as he is man, is a rational animal.” Second, generically, that is, predicategorically, when it is by genus: as, “Man as man has a body of three dimensions.” Third, partially, when it is according to a part, or some certain part: as, “Man is mortal as to the body.” “Christ is everywhere as God.” Fourth, external-accidental, when it is by an external accident: as, “The Gospel stirs up seditions not of itself, but by accident.” “Jacob is father and son by different comparison.” Fifth, internal-accidental is said of that which occurs by an internal accident: as, “The good works of the renewed are perfect, with perfection of parts, not of degrees.”
XII. The fallacy from the unlimited to the limited occurs when someone takes simply what ought to have been taken with restriction.
This fallacy is frequent among the Arians when they dispute concerning the Person of Christ. For Christ is less than the Father, not with respect to essence, but with respect to office or economy, with respect to the human nature and mediatorial office.
XIII. Neither Plato nor Aristotle can distinguish here, as the proverb has it—
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—in those things which are true according to the three degrees, [Greek terms], they admit no distinction. Those who wish to dispute against principles display their own ignorance.
XIV. Some words denote privation; some denote negation.
In God, words always denote negation; in creatures, they denote both negation and privation.
A Century of the Most General Distinctions
Decury* I
I. Those distinctions are almost equivalent: between essence and existence; between a thing considered in the abstract and in the concrete; in idea and in subject; in form and in what is formed. Likewise, between the first and second moment; general and—
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* [A “decury” is a group of ten. From the Latin decuria. ED.]
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—special being; finally, substance and circumstance.
For example, theology, and likewise other faculties and virtues, considered in their essence, do not vary, but they vary in existence or subject. Arts also and definitions are from idea, which belongs to perpetual things. The first moment is the general matter. The second moment is the characteristic property, or personal property, which varies the subjects. A decury is a band of soldiers; and just as soldiers are divided into certain ranks, so also here several distinctions are sometimes arranged under one standard. Second, essence denotes universality; more things are required for existence than for essence; existence denotes the circumstance of a thing. Third, idea is nothing other than the form or essence of a thing. Idea is twofold: that of universal things, and this has itself in the same way as human nature from the beginning of the world; and that of singular things, which are changeable.
II. These are equivalent: per se and by accident; by its own nature and by determination; essentially and accidentally; by internal and external occasion; formally and ablatively; with respect to use and abuse; with respect to nature and event; by intrinsic and extrinsic denomination.
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Thus wine of itself cheers, but by accident intoxicates. So riches, by intrinsic denomination, are good things of God; extrinsically, they are incitements to evils. The Gospel, by its own nature, is a savor of life unto life; against nature, it is a savor of death unto death. To this also belong these: abuse does not take away use; let abuse be removed, and use remain. From that which is by accident, the consequence is not valid to the substance of the thing; from the person to the thing, the consequence is not valid.
III. These are the same: equivocally and univocally; truly and apparently; according to essence and appearance; synonymously and homonymously; truly, and as they are by the opinion of men; properly and improperly; according to the truth of the thing and the likeness of the name; in reality and in name only.
For example, true theology is so univocally; false theology, equivocally. Evil is good apparently, in the opinion of the sinner. A living man is truly a man; a dead man is a man in name only. Moreover, physicists variously distinguish these three: univocally, analogically, and equivocally. Univocally is the same as perfectly, as “man is an animal”; this is the same according to agreement and likeness of the thing. An angel is spirit analogically; God, univocally and primarily. This—
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—however, is the same as according to homonymy; as, “sophist” and “physicist” are used equivocally and falsely: the one denotes what is most remote, the other what is middle, and this what is nearest.
Univocals are called perfect; equivocals are imperfect in many ways. Others put it thus: exclusively and nuncupatively. In the first way the devil is called God. Second, something is called so by name only, ψευδώνυμος. Analogical terms extend to the thing; equivocal terms extend to the name.
IV. Broadly and strictly, loosely and precisely, generally and specially, exoterically and acroamatically, popularly and philosophically, coincide.
Thus every discipline is an art, taking the word “art” broadly; strictly, only those disciplines are arts which are directive and organic. Physics is taken by theologians loosely, and thus includes medicine and theology; or precisely, and thus it is contradistinguished from the remaining faculties. Thus air is popularly called water in its own terms. Directive disciplines are those which direct us in the knowledge of things and words. Organic disciplines are those which supply instruments for these. Arts are those which return to man as artisan. Four are called faculties, and are called the quadriga of mankind: theology, physics, medicine, and jurisprudence. The style of sacred—
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—literature is popular; for Scripture does not philosophize.
V. Absolutely and respectively, in absolute and related consideration, in itself and in another, simply and relatively, according to absolute and related or respective essence, according to the consequence of nature and the graciousness of office, are one.
Thus Paul persecuted the Church in absolute consideration, Christ in related consideration. The bread of the Lord’s Supper must not be considered according to the consequence of nature, but according to the graciousness of office. The Church suffers in itself; Christ, relatively. Adam was mortal by condition of nature, immortal by the bestowal of grace. The soul of man does not die according to absolute essence, but dies in relation to God, that is, as not enjoying the vision of God. Respects and relations, however, can be very inward; these are chief heads of logical invention, so that logic may not improperly be called a volume of relations.
VI. Simple and malicious ignorance, ignorance of pure negation and of depraved disposition, negative and affected or sophistical ignorance, are equivalent.
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Simple ignorance excuses sin, because it is ignorance of particular right and of fact. Affected ignorance does not do the same, but increases sin, such as ignorance of universal right. Of the former Paul says, “God had mercy on me because I did it ignorantly.” Of the latter it is said: “The ignorant Church will be ignored,” namely, in judgment.
[Good deceit includes sophistical, political, and military stratagems; in war, sophistical deceit is not lawful. Particular right is national right, which prevails in some definite place.]
VII. Formally and eminently, subjectively and effectively, essentially and virtually, in the thing itself and eminently, denote the same thing.
Thus wine is hot not subjectively but effectively. A star is also called hot in the same way. God will be all in all eminently, not formally. The sun is hot in itself and effectively.
VIII. In first and second act; in signate and exercised act, namely active potency; in form and operation; in essence and emanation; in essential property and active virtue, are equivalent.
Thus reason is in an infant in first act, not in second act. Faith does not perish in the elect as to—
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—form, though it may perish as to operation. The sun, fire, and like things never lose first act, although by the omnipotence of God second act can be restrained in them.
IX. Knowledge a priori and a posteriori, intellectual and sensual, distinct and confused, perfect and imperfect, comprehensive and apprehensive, adequate and inadequate, are the same.
For example, we do not know God a priori, because He does not allow anything to be His cause; but we know Him a posteriori, not by comprehending, but by apprehending. Moreover, a priori and a posteriori often mean the same as, so to speak, from the former part and the latter. Thus God alone is eternal a priori, but angels and godly men are eternal a posteriori, because they have a beginning but will have no end.
X. Essence and eminence, form and degree, perfection of parts—that is, of essentials—and perfection of degrees, first and second perfection, essential or essence-perfection and quantitative perfection, are equivalent.
Thus religion does not pertain to the essence of the thing itself, but to eminence. Every being is perfect with first perfection, but not with ultimate perfection. The good works—
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—of the regenerate are perfect with perfection of parts, not of degrees. The Epistle to the Romans is perfect with essential perfection, even if it is not perfect with quantitative perfection, which belongs to the whole canon. From the positive to the superlative the consequence is not valid. The positive is essence; the superlative is eminence. From the negation of a mode to the negation of the thing, the consequence is not valid.
Decury II
I. Act and habit differ as lesser and greater.
Hence actual vices are not so enormous as habitual ones. For example, actual drunkenness in Noah admits of pardon; habitual drunkenness in Cambyses does not. Act is the operation itself. Habit is a propensity and an action often repeated and confirmed. Habit is difficult to move. In vices, act is more praised than habit; but in virtues, habit is praised more than act. For one swallow does not make spring.
II. By nature and by grace is the same as from oneself and by gracious communication.
For example, God is eternal by nature; good angels by grace, namely by—
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—rewarding grace, to which punitive justice is opposed.
III. Cumulatively and privatively, and collatively and ablatively, coincide.
Thus the people are said to have resigned power to the prince, namely cumulatively. Likewise, they willed to give the prince a heap of power, that is, full power; nor did they strip themselves of that power. God the Father is said to have given all power to the Son, namely collatively or cumulatively, that He might govern the Church by it.
IV. One thing is said in the formal sense, another in the causal sense.
Thus wine is called hot and Saturn cold, not in the formal sense, but causally, by metonymy of the effect.
V. Something is said in an absolute or comparative sense.
Thus good angels are called impure in comparison with God. Light is sometimes called obscure in comparison with a greater light, in which sense astronomers call certain stars nebulous.
VI. From the part of the thing, and from the part of the concept; from the merit of things, and from the merit of the intellect; according to reason and the consideration of natures, are equivalent.
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Thus many properties of God are essential, not on God’s part, but on the part of our concept. Thus God is in the category of substance because of our concept.
VII. Something is posited privatively or positively.
Privatively, when something is denied to the thing itself; as the posterity of the first parents were punished in their loins. Thus the sons of treacherous traitors are punished positively when punishment is inflicted on the perpetrators.
VIII. Defect is either negative or privative; and every imperfection is either privative or negative. The latter is not evil; the former is.
Thus in the human nature of Christ there was negative ignorance—what others call miserable defects—but not privative ignorance—what others call culpable affections. Furthermore, imperfection of negation is usually also called comparative; as Adam was imperfect in the state of innocence in relation to God. To this belongs the fact that words beginning with “in-” are taken both privatively and negatively. Man is called unjust privatively; God is called immortal and invisible negatively. Negative terms are contradictory; privative terms are privations.
IX. Intensive and extensive are not taken—
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—in the same way; indeed they are not the same with respect to virtue and bulk.
For example, quantity of virtue, or intensive quantity, is attributed to God, not material or extensive quantity. Intension regards the more excellent degree; extension regards the objects. In this sense faith and the remaining theological virtues are called imperfect intensively, not extensively.
X. Desertion is either of probation or of punishment.
In the former way someone is deserted so that his virtues may be manifested and strengthened; thus God deserted Adam when he was wavering, and a teacher deserts his pupil in the arena of disputation. In the latter way someone is deserted because of his own vice, as God deserted Pharaoh and apostates; thus a parent disinherits a son.
Decury III
I. Material and formal are taken in two ways.
The material is the thing considered; the form is the mode of considering. Thus, in ethics, the thing considered is virtue; the mode of considering is formal. The material is the same as the subject of relation; the formal is the relation itself, as may be seen in a boundary and in the Eucharistic bread. Thus—
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—in a household and a polity there is something material, but not that which is formal, that is, the union of virtue. The formal aspect of relation does not fall under the senses, but is perceived or understood by faith.
II. Material and formal are opposed.
Thus God is in place materially, that is, in every thing whose matter is in some sense called place with respect to the creature; but not formally by reason of Himself. Thus God makes the impious man materially, that is, He makes that subject in which impiety exists, but not formally, that is, He does not infuse impiety. For impiety is not from creation, but happens accidentally.
III. Ignorance is either formal or interpretative.
Formal ignorance is defect of knowledge, as when someone does not know the reason of his duty. Interpretative ignorance is defect of speech about that thing which otherwise we understand. Thus in divine matters, and in other more sublime matters, our tongue often clings in the right and suitable interpretation and pronunciation.
IV. Real being and being of knowledge, or known being, are the same as the being of the thing and the object.
Thus all things were in God as to known being, but they received real being in time.
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V. Formally and by concomitance are opposed.
Thus the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, namely because of necessary consequence and by necessary connection.
VI. Respect and disrespect are opposed.
Thus every creature is called imperfect respectively, that is, contemplatively, not disrespectfully.
VII. Simply and respectively are opposed in two ways; that is, they are the same as properly and improperly.
In this sense tutors are called fathers respectively; Julius Caesar is called the father of Augustus respectively. Second, respectively is the same as with distinction; as, if someone names six or more at once, of whom two or three are his own relatives, he uses this word respectively.
VIII. Authoritatively and declaratively are the same as principally and ministerially.
Thus God alone remits sins authoritatively; ministers, declaratively. A prince enters into a covenant with an enemy principally and authoritatively; an ambassador, ministerially.
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IX. Of right and of fact, and a question of right and of fact, are the same.
Thus the pope claims Italy for himself in fact, not by right. The Turkish emperor claims Constantinople for himself in fact. A question of fact is the question of tyrants, by right or wrong.
X. Love is of communication and of complacency.
Thus God loved us from eternity with love of communication, that we should be holy; but with love of complacency He loves none except believers. Antecedent love is of communication. Consequent love, or delight, is of complacency.
Decury IV
I. The degree of things is either excellent or remiss. The former is called intense degree, or degree of excellence; the latter is positive degree below mediocrity.
Thus fire is hot in an excellent degree; air in a remiss degree. Virtues fall into human weakness remissly, not excellently; thus no regenerate man in this life is in an excellent degree, but in a remiss one. “In part” is the same as remissly.
II. Order is either of number or of virtue—
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—the latter, not the former, must be regarded in domestic society, etc.
And this order is nothing other than unity in moral, civil, and spiritual virtue. In the Church there is an order of number and of virtue, but not of number only. The pope forbids order of number, but not of virtue.
III. The order of doctrine is either of wisdom or of power.
The former is exact, like the balance of Critolaus and the rule of Polycletus; the latter is popular, and like the Lesbian rule.
IV. Knowledge is theoretical and practical, that is, bare and effective.
The former is that by which someone understands, and is called knowledge of simple intelligence. The latter is that by which someone embraces a known thing with solid affection. In the former way God knows the ungodly; in the latter way, only the godly.
V. More excellent and more eligible differ.
The former is that which is worthier by its own nature; the latter is that which, because of certain circumstances, must be preferred to others. Thus gold is more excellent than iron, but iron is more eligible than gold for a blacksmith. And although wine is more generous than water, yet water is more eligible to the Venetians and Belgians.
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VI. Goodness is either natural, moral, or supernatural.
The first belongs to every being; in this respect even the devil is good. The second is ethical virtue, such as existed even among the Gentiles. The third belongs to Christians insofar as they believe.
VII. A good is such either simply, or in relation to good; and this is called a neutral or indifferent good.
Thus riches are good insofar as they are instruments of virtue. The same judgment should be made concerning all goods of body and fortune, which have their measure from the goods of the soul, and their amiableness from them. Thus beauty is rather called comeliness if no virtue is present.
VIII. Knowledge is either intuitive or abstractive.
The former is more perfect than the latter. Hence God knows all things by intuiting, not by abstracting. In the other life the elect will see God intuitively. In the former, the thing itself is seen; in the latter, the species or images of things.
IX. Appetite is either innate or elicited. The former is implanted in the creature; the latter is excited by the object.
Thus all rational souls are borne toward—
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—the glory of God by innate appetite; but that appetite is without previous knowledge, and in this way man desires to know, namely, by ordered appetite. For appetite is twofold by reason of its object: ordered and disordered. The former wills the end and the means; the latter, the end only. When man more and more knows the excellence of some thing, he desires it by elicited appetite.
X. Transcendental and predicamental differ greatly.
The transcendental is what is superior to every category. Being is most singular as being. The predicamental is what belongs to some definite category of being, as are the ten highest genera of things. Here the rule must be held: God, and whatever is said of God, has the nature of the transcendent. Hence divine actions and relations are not accidents, but transcendentals.
Decury V
I. Assertive and narrative are opposed.
Thus we say that we commemorate something by narrating, not by asserting. To this belongs the distinction between lying and speaking a falsehood; for many by no means lie when they speak—
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—a falsehood. For to lie is to go against the mind, when the mouth and conscience do not agree.
II. Historically and oratorically are the same as plainly and symbolically.
Hence we say that someone praises another oratorically, that is, with a rhetorical figure, lifting him up to heaven.
III. Abstractly and applicatively are opposed.
Abstractly is the same as in itself. Applicatively is the same as in legitimate use. For example, the hypocrite receives the sacrament abstractly, not applicatively. The same judgment applies to all instruments and means. Every instrument has its perfection from its end and legitimate use.
IV. Δύναμις and ἐξουσία differ.
The former is actual possession; the latter is faculty. Thus omnipotence and all power differ: the former is an attribute of Deity; the latter, of the Mediator. And all power was given to Him by reason of office and economy. The Roman emperor has the power of occupying the East, yet lacks the potency.
V. Power is either pure and absolute, or limited and mixed.
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Thus the whole people has absolute power; the prince has limited power, since he depends on the fundamental laws and on the people. The prince depends on the law of nature, divine law, and fundamental law. Therefore, insofar as he is a man, he is said to observe the law of nature; insofar as he is a Christian, the divine law; insofar as he is prince, the fundamental law.
VI. According to potency and according to purpose differ.
Thus the logician and the sophist are the same according to potency, but not the same according to purpose. For the logician does not have a principle of deceiving. Thus a good work often goes badly, because there was not a good purpose there. The hypocrite and the good man have indeed one potency, but not one intention. For both frequent the temple, but with different end and mode.
VII. According to property and similitude differ greatly.
For example, God alone is good according to property. The creature, however, is good according to similitude. Hence it is clear that not every property of a thing is caused, but a similar effect can be produced, as when the sun illuminates the air.
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VIII. Equal and similar differ as greater and lesser.
Thus man is not equal to God, but similar. To this place belongs that distinction between proportion of equality and proportion of likeness: between finite and infinite there is no proportion of equality, but there is likeness, either univocal, as Alexander the Great is like Philip his father, or equivocal, as man is said to be like God.
IX. Order is either of natural condition or of God’s absolute power.
According to the natural condition of the thing, it cannot happen that the sun should stop its course; but it can happen according to God’s absolute power. For all creatures are endowed with obediential potency. Yet this must be taken in such a way that God’s absolute power is not extended to contradictories, as, God cannot lie.
X. Immediately and mediately are opposed.
Thus God does some things mediately, some immediately. This distinction has use in human life, where the action of inferiors is ascribed to superiors. Thus what an ambassador does in the name of the prince, the prince himself is said to do.
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Decury VI
I. Transitively and distributively are opposed.
The former denotes migration; the latter, communication. Thus the light of the sun is in the air not transitively, but communicatively. This distinction is useful in considering the communication of properties, which is not granted. [Property is not communicated, but the effect of the property is.]
II. To be and to subsist differ as common and proper.
Thus one and the same essence is common to the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. Subsistence is proper to each. The soul of man does not depend on the body as to essence, although it depends on it as to existence.
III. We often distinguish between simply and to this one.
Thus just punishment is good in itself and simply, but it is evil to this one. Thus serpents are good in themselves, but they are evil to this or that one.
IV. In the distinction between being and acting, a manifold reconciliation is sought.
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For the accident excels in acting; the subject excels in being. Thus heat in fire heats, and also heats those things which are outside the fire.
V. Nature and economy, essence and disposition, form and dispensation, matter and office, are not synonyms.
Thus one thing is attributed to Christ by reason of nature, another by reason of economy. So in politics, instruments are not to be considered by reason of form, but of office.
VI. Some things are to be understood according to essence, others according to the mode of predication.
As when Herod is called a fox, not the words, but the predication, must be considered. The same judgment applies to all tropes and figures; and the rule must be diligently held: words are to be understood according to the subject matter.
VII. Directly and indirectly are opposed.
Thus something can be in a certain category indirectly, which is not directly in any. Thus a part is indirectly in a category, namely in that in which the whole is. So a prince has rule over some directly, over others indirectly.
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VIII. The respect of agent and instrument are opposed.
Thus God confers something as Author; man, as minister. Every instrument, however, acts dispositively.
IX. Effectively and permissively are opposed.
Thus good works proceed from the providence of God effectively; evils and sins, permissively.
X. Sufficiency and efficiency differ.
Thus a teacher applies human diligence, that is, such as could suffice for thoroughly instructing all his pupils, although it is not efficacious in each and every one. Thus God gave sufficient grace to the first parents.
Decury VII
I. Essentially and characteristically are opposed.
Essence is indeed common nature; character is singular nature. Thus risibility is the property of the whole human species, but it belongs to this or that person. Thus the three Persons of the Holy Trinity equally have essential properties, but not personal ones.
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II. Proportion is either arithmetical or geometrical.
The former consists in equality of differences; the latter in equality of ratios. There is commutative equality in the former, distributive in the latter. Moreover, God, the Best and Greatest, observes arithmetical proportion in the government of the world.
III. One must distinguish between the thing itself and the way of speaking.
For many things often differ more in mode of expression than in the thing itself. It must be noted, however, that one should not labor too much over words, provided the thing itself is understood.
IV. Dialectically and analytically, declaratively and logically, oratorically and metaphysically, are the same as popularly and exactly.
Thus ecclesiastical pastors often speak rhetorically. Here it will not be unfair—indeed, most fitting—to examine all things by the balance of art. The same judgment applies to the writings of certain classical authors, and of certain theologians and politicians, etc.
V. Above nature and against nature differ.
For what is above nature transcends nature naturally; what is against nature—
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—destroys nature. For example, the articles of faith are not against nature, but above nature, because grace accedes to nature and exceeds it, but does not abolish it.
It must be observed that nothing can be given which is against universal nature; nevertheless many things are given which are against particular nature. Such are evils, both of fault and of punishment. “Against” denotes excellence; “above” denotes repugnancy. To sin is against nature, because it destroys it. Thus when man sins, he is brutish, for by sinning he destroys the image of God. Universal nature respects the species; the devil endeavors to destroy this, but God never permits it. Yet He permits particular nature to be destroyed.
VI. To be and to have, essentially and habitually, coincide.
Thus God is good essentially; man, habitually. But there are as many modes of being as there are modes of predicating. For, according to time, something has true quantity, quality, and figure. To this belongs the distinction between what and what kind: as, God is wise, and wisdom is predicated of Him in respect of what He is; but man is wise, and wisdom is predicated of him in respect of what kind he is. Often, to have is the same as to possess; in this sense God alone is said to have immortality—
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—[“what” denotes substance; “what kind” denotes every accident which supervenes.]
VII. A middle is either of participation or of negation.
The former has nothing in common with the extremes, as virtue is the middle of good actions; for it is none of the vices. The latter has something in common with the extremes; as all colors are intermediate between white and black: whatever gathers the sight has something in common with blackness; whatever disperses it, with whiteness.
VIII. Totally and partially are opposed.
Thus the elect lose faith not totally, but partially. And man is said to perish in part; for the soul does not perish, but the body is dissolved into its principles, namely the elements.
IX. Explicitly and implicitly, in so many words and by good consequence, expressly and analogically, are synonyms.
Thus many things are contained in Scripture, as also in Justinian’s law, not according to the letter, but according to the sense. So the word “Trinity” is not found in Scripture, but the analogy is found; for it is said that God is threefold.
X. Things conflicting in the thing itself and things conflicting in appearance do not contradict each other.
[p. 189]
Thus in Scripture, as also in law and elsewhere, there are many apparent contradictions. When two seemingly conflicting passages occur, they must be reconciled by a good distinction.
Decury VIII
I. Thesis and hypothesis differ as generally and specially.
To this belongs the rule: transfer the thesis to the hypothesis. For we often call the hypothesis the foundation of some matter; as when it is said that a disputation rests on a false hypothesis, that is, on a false foundation.
II. The middle of the thing and of the person, arithmetical and geometrical, of equality and of ratio, are equivalent.
The former differs equally from its extremes, as the center of a circle. The latter is unequally distant, as may be seen in the rule of proportion. The former is discerned in arithmetical proportion; the latter, in geometrical. The former always remains the same; the latter can be accommodated to circumstances.
III. Perfective and destructive, preservative and corruptive, perfecting and defective, are opposed.
[p. 190]
Hence passion, privation, abolition, and negation are divided into perfective and destructive; as to be reformed to the image of God is a perfective passion; to be deformed to the image of the devil is destructive.
IV. Sensible and intelligible, material and immaterial, physical and logical, gross and analogical, are homonyms.
Thus angels are said to have intelligible matter, not sensible matter. Knowledge likewise is divided into sensitive and intellective. [Physical things are sensible; logical things are intelligible.]
V. The state of quantity and of quality are opposed: the former consists in breadth; the latter in the union of virtue.
Thus in every society one should regard the state of quality rather than quantity. There are also those who distinguish quantity so that quantity is either of breadth or of excellence; in this sense the Turkish empire is called greater than the Roman. To this also belongs the distinction between how much and what kind, or between degree and the thing itself, between mode and essence. Thus the elect do not lose faith as to what kind it is, but as to how much.
[p. 191]
VI. The whole thing and the whole of the thing differ.
The whole thing is said of a subject by reason of one part; the whole of the thing is said of both parts of the subject. Thus the whole man understands and dies, but not the whole of man. The whole Christ is everywhere, but not the whole of Christ. [The whole thing denotes the person; the whole of the thing denotes one nature or the other, or an essential part.]
VII. Finally and for a time are opposed.
Thus the elect fall from the grace of God, not finally, but for a time, in the way that the sun suffers an eclipse.
VIII. Philosophical and sophistical are opposed.
Thus philosophical ignorance is that by which someone is prepared; sophistical ignorance is that by which someone does not wish to learn.
IX. Purpose and infirmity, malice and weakness, deliberately and from infirmity, are opposed.
Thus a good man sins not from settled purpose, but from infirmity.
X. Gymnastically and dogmatically, interrogatively—
[p. 192]
—and definitively, for the sake of exercise and seriously, are the same.
Thus many dispute against articles of faith in order to exercise both themselves and others, not in order to reveal the sentiments of their mind. This distinction coincides with something being done tentatively and assertively, as when a teacher proposes a sophism to his pupil.
Decury IX
I. The principle which and the principle by which are opposed.
The former is the chief efficient cause, and the very suppositum which acts; the latter is nothing other than the instrument for the act. The whole man is the principle which speaks; the tongue, however, is the principle by which we speak. Thus the whole person of Christ is the principle which; one or the other nature is the principle by which.
Hence it is easy to answer that sophism: Whatever sees has eyes. Your eyes see. Therefore your eyes have eyes. Likewise: Whatever speaks has a tongue. Your tongue speaks. Therefore your tongue has a tongue. The major premise must be limited from the foundation supplied by the distinction between the principle which and the principle by which, in this way: Whatever sees, namely as the principle which, has eyes. But—
[p. 193]
—my eyes do not see as the principle which, but only as the principle by which; therefore it is not necessary that they have eyes.
II. More and greater differ: the former denotes intension, the latter extension.
For example, substance indeed admits of greater and lesser, but not of more and less. Moreover, more and less do not vary the species, but the degree. Thus the lowest faith does not differ in species, but in degree; so heroic virtue differs from common virtue only in degree.
III. Essentially and virtually, subjectively and objectively, in itself and in effect, sound the same.
Thus justice and mercy are equal in the essence of God; but mercy is greater by reason of effects or objects.
IV. Indifferent and external are opposed.
That is, one is simply good or evil, as virtue and vice; the other is good by its own nature, and yet accidentally becomes evil. Such are riches, and many ceremonies which are neither commanded nor forbidden, as uncovering the head at the name of Jesus. There are also necessary ceremonies, which rest on some command.
[p. 194]
V. Necessity of coercion and of immutability, of violence and of nature, of impulsion and of determination, coincide.
Necessity of coercion respects man’s locomotive power, which alone can be compelled; not the will, which can be led, bent, and persuaded, but cannot be compelled. Necessity of immutability, however, respects the form and property of the thing; in this sense we say that God is necessarily good, and that fire is necessarily hot.
VI. Priority of nature is either by intention or by generation, that is, according to the order of nature intending and generating.
In the former way, that is called prior which is more perfect, as the end is prior to the means. In the latter way, that is called prior which comes first; in this sense imperfect things are prior to perfect things.
VII. Diverse and adverse are opposed.
Diverse things are those which are so distinguished that they can agree in the same thing, as piety and riches. Adverse things are those which are so distinguished that they cannot agree in the same thing unless they are reduced to diverse things, as heat and cold, virtue and vice. From all the topics of logical invention a consequence can be connected, except from diverse things. For whatever follows, follows either by force of agreement or by force of disagreement. But in diverse things—
[p. 195]
—neither agreement nor disagreement is necessary.
VIII. Necessity is either of matter, and is discerned in the axiom; or of form, which is discerned in the syllogism.
The former is discerned in the immutable connection of subject and predicate, as, “God is omnipotent.” The latter is discerned in the inference of the conclusion from the premises, and can have place in contingent matter, indeed even in false matter; as, “An ass has wings; therefore it flies.” This is necessary by necessity of inference, not of form.
IX. Another person and another thing differ.
The one denotes the person; the other, the thing. Thus in man there is not another and another person, but another and another thing; and so also in Christ. But in the Holy Trinity there is not another and another thing, but another and another person.
X. Alone is taken categorematically and syncategorematically.
In the former way, it is the same as separate; in the latter way, it is the same as only, or merely. Thus the eye sees alone, that is, only; but not alone, that is, separated from the body. So faith alone justifies, so that works are excluded, namely syncategorematically; but not alone, that is, separated from works.
[p. 196]
Decury X
I. Quality or condition is either internal or external.
The internal pertains to the nature of the cause, as the diligence of a pupil. The external has no bearing on the matter under consideration; as in a court, one must not regard whether someone is rich or poor. Therefore it is not προσωποληψία—respect of persons—if someone prefers the godly and diligent man to the ungodly and negligent one.
II. Emanation and transmutation differ.
The former is in immanent acts, that is, internal acts which reside in the agent, as when God the Father begets the Son. The latter is in transitive acts, as creation is. Where there is generation, there is mutation. This does not always hold. For generation is either emanative or transmutative; mutation follows from the latter, not from the former. Creation is a transmutative mutation, by which God changes His work, but He Himself is not changed.
III. The whole is either of perfection, as God; or of completion, as the creature. The former is totally whole; the latter, whole by parts.
IV. The universal is either in being—
[p. 197]
—or in predicating, or in causing; thus God is universal, not in the first way, but in the last.
V. The universal in being is either genus or species.
God is neither genus nor species, but the supreme individual. Yet He is universal in causing, because He is the cause of all things.
VI. Goodness and perfection are either essential or accidental.
If the former is considered, God could not have made a better world; but He could have done so with respect to the latter.
VII. To do a good thing and to do well differ as greater and lesser.
Thus the ungodly do many good things: they give alms, etc. But only the godly do well.
[To do a good thing denotes the act; to do well denotes the habit.]
VIII. Broad, light, and lightest denote three degrees of vices.
IX. Whole and corrupted, ordered and disordered, constituted and destitute, well-affected and disturbed, are opposed.
[p. 198]
Thus nature, kingdom, society—anything whatever—is considered in these two ways.
X. Vulgar and heroic, common and excellent, popular and above the lot of the common people, are opposed.
As when virtue is distinguished into vulgar and heroic.
The kingdom of nature, of grace, and of glory: their limits must be carefully discerned. The kingdom of nature is of power and providence. The kingdom of grace is of faith, predestination, and the Church militant. The kingdom of glory is of vision, grace, and the Church triumphant.
By this distinction, as by a Cynosure, we seal this Century of Distinctions.
FINIS.