Harper II.21
James Dodson
CHAPTER XXI.
THE OPTIONAL THEORY EXAMINED—THE ARGUMENT IN ITS FAVOR DRAWN FROM INSTANCES SUPPOSED TO BE PARALLEL CASES CONSIDERED.
It may be said that the New Testament dispensation is characterized by a degree of liberty which did not pertain to the previous dispensation, and that, therefore, what was imperative in the one is permissive or mildly advisory in the other. But this would be to misinterpret New Testament liberty, which does not consist in the right to disregard divine injunctions applying to us, but in ex-
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emption from numerous and minute ceremonies, such as were imposed upon the Israelites. We have no more right then they had to dispense with the Sabbath or the duty of prayer; nor have we any more right to omit the observance of the Lord’s Supper than they had to omit the observance of the Passover. The sum of these remarks, then, is that if the directions to use musical instruments in worship is still in force, as some of our opponents plainly say, and all of them constructively say, it is no more discretionary with us whether or not we shall use them, than it was with the Jews of old.
Ingenious attempts have been made to mystify this subject and to draw us into general discussions wide of the mark; but the attempts are far from being as subtle as those which Romish controversialists make to befog simple minds in relation to the use of pictures and images in worship. For instance, the writer referred to in a previous note, in laboring to show that the use of instrumental music in worship is optional, not obligatory, cites the fact that although none but male Israelites were commanded to attend the three great feasts of the Levitical economy, women in many cases also, and apparently with divine approval, attended them. The inference which he would have us draw, is that some things connected with the worship of God may be warranted, though not enjoined. But were we even to concede this, it would not follow that a rite or form of worship is warrantable, unless it has been prescribed by God as a rite or form of worship. Nor would the supposed concession avail the advocate of the optional theory, unless he could moreover show that the use of instrumental music is only permitted, but not enjoined. So long as he quotes in support of his view, as even the writer particularly alluded to, is forced to do, such a text as Eph. 5:19, and maintains that those originally addressed by the apostle must have understood him to refer in part to instrumental music he cannot avail himself of the concession, if made, unless besides he can show that the text in question embodies only a permission, not a direction. After the male Israelites had been directed to attend the feasts, had they a right to attend or not, according to their whim? Assuredly not, and just as little right have we to neglect the use of musical instruments in worship, if we have been directed to use them, and directed we have been, if Eph. 5:19, contains a reference to musical instruments.*
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* It may be noted that the maxim “Whatsoever is not commanded (or appointed) by God is forbidden,” has reference to modes of worship merely. Due regard to this restriction would silence many cavils against the principle. God has not expressly commanded us in his word to make a steamboat or a microscope, or a thousand other things which are in use among us; but to make these things is no sin of presumption. It is different however in the matter of worship, to which, and to which alone, the Second commandment relates. The commandment to use bread and wine in the Lord’s Supper, limits us to the use of these in that ordinance, even although there is no prohibition expressly of other things. In the case of free-will offerings under the ceremonial law, the worshipper was not at liberty to present to God something which he had not prescribed or appointed for such a purpose. Nor might the appointed way of presenting a legitimate offering be neglected with impunity. For a lamb, for instance, a lion or a horse might not be substituted, nobler victims though these seemingly might have been. Nor might they be offered even in addition to the lamb, or to whatever victim God had himself, as, for example, in the alternative in offerings must be an alternative specified by God himself, as, for example, in the
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case of the passover, a kid might be substituted for a lamb; but God specified the permissible substitute, Ex. 12:5. The law of worship is substantially the same in all ages.
The same writer, with the same intent, mentions the fact that God prescribed the public reading of the law at the Feast of Tabernacles once in every seven years, and adds that the command to read the law on those set occasions did not preclude or discountenance the private reading of it at other times. If this illustration be to the point, it must be the view of the writer that it was optional with the Israelites whether or not they should read the law privately, if they possessed a copy of it. I think, however, on the contrary, that it was their duty to seek the knowledge of God’s law at all times, whether by reading it or hearing it read. But, aside from this, it may be said, as in the case previously commented on, that the appointment to read the law every seventh year admitted of no optional treatment, and so the direction contained in Eph. 5:19, admits of no optional treatment.
Again, the same advocate of the optional theory thinks he can find countenance for the principle involved in it in our Lord’s supposed sanction of the Feast of Dedication, of the divine origin of which we have no intimation. See John 10:22, 23. Prelatists were wont, in the days of George Gillespie to cite the fact mentioned in those verses as a proof that the church may decree stated festivals, and bind men in conscience to observe them, as any one may see who consults his powerful treatise against “English-Popish Ceremonies,” in which treatise also it may be seen how Gillespie demolishes the plea. At present, I will only say that the feast in question may have been appointed by God, although no record of the original institution of it has been transmitted to us; that there is no evidence that Christ sanctioned the feast; that, if he did sanction it by observing it, the Jews were, at least thenceforward, under obligation to keep it till the time of repeal came; and that, if he did sanction it, this would not prove that we may play fast and loose with such directions as are embraced in Eph. 5:19, not to speak of numerous other passages which most advocates of instrumental music are accustomed to interpret as favoring their view.
It is further urged by the same author that, as, in the Levitical law, provision was made for the presentation of voluntary or free-will offerings, as well as for that of fixed or imperative offerings, so there may now be services of worship which God simply authorizes and does not enjoin. All this is brought forward with the view of proving that some such arrangement as that pertaining to the free-will offerings may exist in relation to the use of instrumental music in worship, so that the use of instruments may be lawful, but not imperative. Without stopping to show in detail that even the free-will offerings were positively provided for by God in his legislation, the legitimate kinds of these offerings and the proper occasions for bringing them being specified, I remark that, had our author only shown us that God placed instrumental music on a level with free-will offerings, leaving it to us to use it or not, at our pleasure, in his worship, his object would have been somewhat served. But, instead of producing proof that instruments of music were merely permitted, he unavoidably presents, in several parts of his
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dissertation, evidence which, if it proves anything in favor of instrumental music, proves that the use of it has been enjoined. Beyond any reasonable doubt, the references to instrumental music in the Old Testament present such music in worship under the aspect of a fixed and imperative offering, not of a free-will offering. Besides, were this music even on a level with the free-will offerings, would it not be egregious offense to omit it from the service of the church, just as it would have been a flagrant sin, in the case of the Israelites, to have ignored the ordinance of free-will offerings? It was the duty of the Old Testament church to maintain, honor and enforce the law of free-will offerings, and if instrumental music now is on the plane with free-will offerings, it is no less the duty of the church now to maintain, honor and enforce the law as it relates to instrumental music.