Harper II.20

The Optional, or Permissive Theory.

CHAPTER XX.

THE OPTIONAL THEORY EXAMINED—THE PLEAS IN ITS BEHALF FOUNDED ON ALLEGED CHURCH AUTHORITY, AND ON THE FACT OF DIVINE APPOINTMENT AND ALLEGED NON-REPEAL CONSIDERED—NOTICE OF THE POSITION THAT INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC, AS A PART OF WORSHIP, ANTEDATED THE MOSAIC ECONOMY AND SURVIVED IT—CERTAIN QUIBBLES DEALT WITH.

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The tenor of the Optional theory, which has been stated more than once, is that it is lawful, and, in certain circumstances, may be a duty, at least an advantage, to combine instrumental with vocal music in the praise of God. The

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arguments wont to be adduced, at least most of them, in support of this position have also been already briefly stated, and my object will now be to refute them.

The first of these which may be noticed is, that the church is invested with authority to decree rites and ceremonies not positively forbidden in scripture, and may, when it deems it for edification, employ musical instruments, and even enjoin the use of them, in worship.

This argument rests on the assumption that the authority claimed is vested in the church; an unwarrantable assumption, as I have already tried to prove. To the discussion of the law of worship some pages have been devoted, and to them I refer for a virtual, if not formal, refutation of the claim in question. The church has no right to use, much less enjoin, forms of worship additional to, or different from those appointed by God in his word.

A second argument used to sustain the Optional theory, is that God having once appointed the use of musical instruments in his worship and never having repealed that appointment, it must be lawful to use them now in worship.

This, it will be observed, is an argument, and probably the most formidable argument for the Preceptive theory, and as such has already been extensively handled in these pages. When used in behalf of the Optional doctrine, this argument entirely overshoots the mark. For, if the old law touching the use of instruments, is still in force, ought it not to be obeyed now just as literally and exactly as when it was first issued? The argument brought forward, would prove too much for those who bring it; for it would prove that instruments of music must be used in worship, whereas all that is meant to be proved is that they may be so used. The point to be proved is that instrumental music in worship is lawful, but not imperative. The argument advanced, if good, proves, indeed, that it is lawful, but it inconveniently goes beyond that point and proves that it is imperative. Such an argument is like a gun which bears as disastrously on the gunner, as on those against whom it is levelled.*

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* A writer, whose pamphlet on Instrumental music I had not read till after the plan of this discussion had been sketched, not, indeed, till a day or two ago, is so alive to the difficulty just suggested, that he abandons to a large extent the customary and, I am convinced, the more successful way of advocating the use of instrumental music in worship, and contends for it chiefly on the ground that the use of such music in worship was a patriarchal institution, if not explicitly appointed, at least sanctioned, by God, which was taken up and connected closely with the temple worship, but, not pertaining originally to the ceremonial system, did not pass away, any more than did the Sabbath, with the abrogation of the Mosaic economy. It is, moreover, assumed in this mode of arguing that, apart from the temple service, instrumental music might, or might not be used at the option of the worshipper, and so the matter, it is contended, stands now.

I can, hardly, call this line of argument ingenious. It might rather, did courtesy not restrain, be characterized as reckless. It owes its paternity, if I be not much mistaken, to Professor Wallace, an Irish champion of the organ, whose ability is readily conceded, but who has betrayed, on deeper questions than that of music, a tendency to rash speculation, for which he has been justly chastised by more than one of his fellow-countrymen.

Our American pamphleteer is constrained by stress of weather to put into the friendly port, so familiar to the pro-instrumental party, namely, the direction of the Apostle (Eph. 5:19) “to do whatever is meant by ‘psallo,’ which, it is maintained, denotes to sing and play, together with the use of the Hebrew word ‘mizmor,’ and its Greek equivalent, ‘psalmos,’ as descriptive of the songs of the authorized Jewish and Christian Psalter.

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In this embarrassment, the pleaders for instruments have recourse to certain quibbles.

Thus, they allege that some things have been authorized by God without being enjoined; a certain discretionary liberty being left to us to observe or not observe them. In this category, they think instrumental music in worship is to be placed. Although this position has been already combated substantially in our discussion of the law of worship, it may be wise to scrutinize it somewhat more closely, and offer some strictures in detail upon it.

1. It is granted that there are certain things connected with the church of Christ, and divine worship, which God has left to be regulated by human prudence subject to the general rules of his word. For instance, God has not determined precisely for us, as in respect to the tabernacle and temple he did for the Jews, what must be the fashion and dimensions of the houses in which we shall assemble for public worship; at what hour or hours we shall meet on the Sabbath; how long the services shall continue; how many shall be the prayers offered at each meeting; how many and what particular psalms shall be sung on each occasion; how much scripture and what parts of it shall be read at any meeting; and how long the sermon shall be. These are matters in which we must use our judgment under the general guidance of the word.

2. Be it observed that matters thus left discretionary belong rather to the head of “circa sacra,” than to that of “sacra” that is they are circumstances closely connected with the worship of God, but not properly rites or forms of worship. Even among the Israelites, rigorous and minute as were the regulations about their worship, there must have been many things of this discretionary sort. So in

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[continued from page 67] The objections to this view, it may be briefly stated here, are numerous, most of which will be apparent from our previous or subsequent discussion. Particularly it may be urged against it: (1.) That the writer can adduce no clear instance of worship with musical instruments before the time of Moses, nay not before the time of David; (2.) That even if instrumental music in worship had flourished as a practice in patriarchal times, this fact would not prove that it was not symbolic and ceremonial, for the very essence of the ceremonial law was recognized in the worship of the patriarchal age. Bloody sacrifices and the correlated distinction of animals into clean and unclean were not unknown in pre-Mosaic times; (3.) That only an enthusiast, I feel tempted to say, a fanatic, for instrumental music can regard it and the Sabbath as having an equal right to be reckoned as permanent moral institutions. The one is, and the other is not, incorporated expressly and enthroned in the moral law. The Sabbath, moreover, was as definitely associated with the Levitical ceremonial in the legislation of Moses as it ever afterwards came to be; but no provision for the use of music in worship was made by Moses, unless in the later form of the silver trumpets; (4.) That the argument, so far as it rests on Eph. 5:19, and the alleged reference to instrumental music involved in the very word psalm, labors under the difficulty of the sly substitution of a “may be” for the rigorous “must be” to which the premises point, for, where the Apostle gives a direction, our author recognizes only a permission, hardly an advice; and (5.) That this line of argument is exposed to most of the objections drawn from the references in the Psalms to instrumental music, objections urged so pertinaciously against us. Nay these objections may be urged with greater plausibility against the position of this writer than against ours; for he holds that instruments may lawfully be used in worship, yet he calmly ignores the commands in the Psalms to use them or treats them as mere advices, whereas we maintain that it is wrong to use them now, and try to show that the commands in question neither require nor countenance the use of musical instruments in this age, any more than certain other passages in the Psalms sanction the observance of the rite of sacrifice in our time.

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our case, God may have accorded to us liberty in this direction, while allowing us no right to modify or disregard any forms of worship which he has enjoined.

3. Even if it could be proved that we are at liberty to add somewhat to the ordinances of worship prescribed by God, this would not prove that we have a right to disobey or neglect any positive injunction laid on us by him. Those with whom we are now reasoning do not claim that the church has authority to introduce a form of worship not sanctioned by God. They do not maintain that it would be right, without divine warrant or authorization to use instrumental music. But how do they prove that God has warranted the use of it? By citing the commands issued by him to the Old Testament church to employ it, and affirming that these commands have never been revoked, but are even repeated in the New Testament. That is to say, they argue that we may use instruments in worship, because God once commanded that they be so used, and has never withdrawn the command. Nor this only, but they also repudiate the principle, that instrumental music is imperative, alleging on the contrary, that it is optional, a discretionary power in relation to it being allowed us. But how preposterous is such reasoning! When God appointed through David, and other prophets, the use of musical instruments in the central seat of Israelitish worship, was the matter of using them as indicated, left optional with the Israelites? Even granting that, under extraordinary circumstances, the omission to use such instruments might have occurred without blame, would that have warranted the Israelites in neglecting to praise God with the instruments which he had appointed to be used for that end? It is palpably evident that the use of instruments in the temple, was not a matter left to the discretion of the priests, or of the priests and people combined, but was obligatory. Under that appointment, together with numerous calls in the Psalms to use instruments, as well as alleged exhortations and injunctions in the New Testament to the same effect, or under part of these pleas, our opponents claim the right to use instruments now in worship. They ought, however, to notice that the very passages of scripture which give, as they think, the right, impose also the obligation to use instruments of music in the worship of God. If they will appropriate the commands as their plea and authority for using instruments now, they must accept those commands as authoritative directions to employ them. If the law as to music is still in force, and if that law in Old Testament times obliged to the use of instruments, does it not still do the same? If the law has been relaxed so far as to leave the use of instruments to human option, will those who say so point to the passage or passages of sacred writ which tell us that such a modification has been made by him who gave us the law? We hold that the law touching instruments was ceremonial and has passed away; but our opponents hold the reverse. Holding this, will they be so good as to show us their authority for believing that the law has been changed, and is no longer imperative but permissive, or, at most, advisory? Even though the law should be understood to be advisory, surely advice or exhortation from such a quarter bears in it the force almost of command, and, if so, it is difficult to see how those who count the law advisory, can claim the liberty of neglecting it, or can say so serenely to their

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brethren, “You can use instruments or not, as you choose.” The advocates of instrumental music believe that God appointed the use of vocal music in his worship. Are they prepared to say that this too is now optional, and that the church may without fault resolve to drop out practically from its ritual, the singing of the praise of God. The Quakers object to singing as well as to instrumental music in worship, but they do not limp in their logic as do those with whom we now deal, for the former maintain that singing and instrumental music were alike ceremonial, and are now neither obligatory nor allowable.*

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* Some of the considerations advanced above will not apply to those, who, on the assumption that instrumental music was optionally used in worship before the giving of the law, plead that it may be so used now. But they who take this ground need to show that instrumental music was used in worship with divine approval before the giving of the law at Sinai; that the use of it was then optional; and that because it preceded the Levitical law it cannot have partaken of a ceremonial character.

Now, the only evidence presented to prove that it was used acceptably in worship before the giving of the law is the record of the action of Miriam and the other women at the Red Sea. On this I have already commented, and have sought to show that there is not adequate ground for the belief that the procedure of Miriam and the other women was an act of formal worship at all. But were we to admit that this was an instance of worship proper, what proof can be given that the instrumental music was a mere optional element? Might not this have been as imperative as singing?

Furthermore, what right has any one to claim that this music was not ceremonial because it was used before the giving of the law? Its precedence of the establishment of the full ceremonial system does not prove it to be non-ceremonial. Sacrifice existed as a religious rite from the Fall onward. The distinction into clean and unclean existed at least as early as the time of Noah. The Passover was appointed before the passage of the Red Sea.

Moreover, if the arrangements of the great occasion on which Miriam is presented to us as an instrumental performer still survive in force, even as optional arrangements, may not the singing without accompaniment in our worshipping assemblies be confined to one company consisting of men, and the instrumental performance be limited to another company consisting exclusively of women?

What also is to become of the exercise of dancing? Miriam and her attendants appear to have danced. The word “Mecholah” occurring in the plural in Ex. 15:20, is properly translated “dances.” In every instance in which it occurs in the Old Testament it may fitly be so rendered, and in some places, for example Judges 21:21, and Jer. 31:4, it seems most reasonably to demand this translation. May not then a strong plea on the ground taken by our opponents be made out for dancing as at least an optional exercise in worship? David certainly danced on one solemn occasion before the Lord, while in Ps. 149:3, some countenance is given to it, unless the translation of that verse must be changed.