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Harper I.3

James Dodson

CHAPTER III.

PLEAS FOR THE PERMISSIVE, OR OPTIONAL THEORY STATED.

We address ourselves now to a statement of the arguments which are, or might be, used to sustain the permissive theory as to the employment of instruments in New Testament worship. This theory, it will be remembered, is that God neither requires nor forbids us to use instrumental music in his worship, but that he permits us to do so; that it is lawful to worship him now, as of old, with instruments, and may be very expedient so to do, but in certain circumstances may be inexpedient.

The pleas advanced in support of this view are as follows:

I. The line of argument adopted to establish the preceptive theory. Remarkable as it may appear, this is the method of proof chiefly used by those who do not wish to prove the use of instrumental music in worship obligatory, but only optional. Some, however, claim that instrumental music in worship antedated the time of Moses, and, like the Sabbath, survived the Mosaic ceremonies with which it was for a time associated.

II. It is urged that certain appointments made by God, even in the more rigid dispensation of the Old Testament, were left in a large degree to the discretion or option of his people to be observed or not. This is put forward for the purpose of repelling the very natural objection, that the argument for the preceptive theory cannot avail in behalf of the permissive doctrine. It is tacitly assumed, rather than formally maintained, that in some way what seems to have been once commanded and obligatory in the musical department, is now optional, taking rank in this respect with the ancient regulations in regard to freewill offerings.

III. It is furthermore argued by some that the command to sing, carries necessarily with it the license at least, to use all the appropriate means for the performance of that exercise, and that, as musical instruments are very useful as aids in the production of vocal music, no distinct appointment of them is needed, their utility being adequate evidence of their legitimacy. In connection with this line of argument, it is customary to allege that the use of instruments of music in worship, rests on the same authority as the use of a pitch-pipe or a note-book, and that those who allow the latter appliances to be used in connection with worship should not scruple to admit the former.

IV. It is asserted that the Church is vested with authority to decree rites, not expressly forbidden in Scripture, and must, therefore, at least, have the right to

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declare lawful certain forms not prescribed in Scripture. Not all who plead for license as to the use of instrumental music, would use this argument, but many of them do, and they are all under a strong temptation to resort to it, as is shown by the fact that those among them, who by profession are strict Presbyterians, are found using arrows long supposed to belong only to the quiver of prelacy.

The foregoing are the main pleas employed by those who favor the theory of permission. It is not my purpose to furnish at this stage, a sketch of the arguments by which the prohibitory view may be supported. These will in the sequel be exhibited, partly in the refutation of the rival theories, and partly in a direct form.