John Fairly on Magistracy VII.

[Page 121]

CHAPTER VII.

The truth of the second, third, and fourth articles of charge against Seceders proven.—The Presbytery’s explication of Luke xx. 25. and of Rom. xiii. 1. 2. 3. vindicated;—and the unsoundness of those of the Associate Presbytery evinced.—Their unnatural and absurd doctrine anent the qualifications of magistrates more fully disclosed and confuted, &c.

---

WE now proceed to consider Mr. Goodlet’s defence against the three remaining articles:

Article 2. page 29. taken from the Testimony, page 110. “Thus, that the law of God, in the scriptures of truth, hath no concern with the institution of civil government; but only adds its precepts enforcing obedience upon the conscience of every individual, under the pain of damnation, to whomsoever the body politic shall invest with the civil dignity; and that without any regard to the qualifications of persons or office.”

His explanation;—“If these words have any determinate sense, I apprehend it is this; That God gives us no information in his word concerning the office, and duties of the civil magistrate, expressly or implicitly by doctrine, precept, or examples; though he hath given us a variety of precepts enjoining obedience upon every individual to such magistrates as the body politic shall invest with the office.” Partial work indeed! Stuffed with disingenuity! Is this the way he intends to defend truth against error, feigning unjust senses of his own, upon other men’s words, that they may speak the sentiments of his own mind: The Presbytery’s words bear indeed, that their scheme of principles anent civil government is flatly against magistracy being God’s ordinance instituted in his word; against all necessary direction from the divine law, or essential qualifications, agreeable to the word of God, and the deed of our civil covenanted constitution. This they have proven with advantage, upon Seceders, in the sum of their arguments upon the point. Mr. Goodlet

[Page 122]

makes the Defence speak for him, but nothing to the purpose in condemnation of the presbytery’s article of charge against them. Seceders allow “that there is nothing incumbent, upon magistrates, by the word of God, and our covenants, (tho’ in both respects they are fallacious) which they do not acknowledge, and plead for.” If this afford any help, it is in favours of the presbytery against Mr. Goodlet; for his judgment in this matter is expressed, page 12. (above quoted) “That practice, law or sentence, that is not founded in, and flows not from the law of nature, belongs not so civil magistracy. The word of God doth not add one single magistratical duty.” These words of his are directly opposite to the Defence. For what is the use of doctrines and precepts determining the duty of a civil state, as to the constitution of magistrates? Or, what is the use of doctrines and precepts determining the duty of magistrates themselves, if the obscure light of nature is sufficient for both? They must be quite idle, and unnecessary, as has been already cleared.

The last part of the article of charge, he grants would be true, if the presbytery had added these words “in lawful commands.” There must be lawful authority, before there can be lawful commands. Any usurper of, or intruder into authority, may command things that are lawful; but in every such case, such things are only lawful per vim precepti divini, i.e. by virtue of the command of God in his law, but not by virtue of the command of such usurpers or intruders. “Obedience in lawful commands (he says) is exactly the matter in question betwixt Mr. Nairn and them, as stated in page 56.” The scriptures cited to prove the affirmative are, Prov. xxiv. 21. Eccles. x. 4, &c. In the general import of these he thinks they both agree for once. Not so well as he would have the credulous world to believe. Why, says he, they allow the scriptures cited, do prove this general proposition, viz. “That it is the duty of the people of God, to obey and submit to lawful rulers in lawful commands; and that it is utterly unlawful and sinful to oppose such lawful authority.” Well, but here they disagree, and very widely too: What is lawful authority in a moral sense? They allow the scriptures cited prove obedience to lawful moral powers, in lawful commands; Seceders will have any that

[Page 123]

bear the name of power and authority, lawful moral powers, if chosen and set up by the body politic, without regard to necessary essential qualifications, agreeable to the word of God: while destitute of these, they cannot be lawful moral powers. The Presbytery judge them properly and only moral powers, possessed of these necessary qualifications; and for this reason, they allow the scriptures cited to prove this general proposition, relative to moral powers: yet they do not yield, that the scriptures cited do prove that authority lawful, which is set up in direct opposition to the revealed will of God, both in its constitution and general course of administration. The scriptures cited do not countenance Popish and Prelatic government in a land, or over a people bound by their solemn profession and oath to God to contend against and purge out the old leaven of Popery and Prelacy; nor prove the persons under these characters, lawful moral powers. In brief, they prove none to be the lawful moral powers, bearing rule in these covenanted reformed lands, who reign in contempt of the necessary qualifications required in the word of God, and the fundamental laws of our ancient civil reformation, agreeable thereto. To get free however, of these scriptures, as soon, and easy as possible, he supersedes them all, two excepted: page 31. says he, “I shall shortly make an experiment upon the different glosses that the Associate Presbytery and they give upon these two, Luke xxii. 25. and Rom. xiii. 1. 2.” Experiment! upon the scriptures, the very language of divine inspiration, or even upon the sense of scripture, pitiful! This is rather like the language of a philosopher, than a divine: it seems he is not much concerned whether he hit or miss the sense and meaning of the Holy Ghost. Little wonder he sink in the lurch of his own imaginations. After all, his experiment is just the divided opinions of the different opposing Presbyteries, too prolix here to be inserted. The result is, when both their glosses are brought out, he rejects the judgment of the Reformed Presbytery; and, it would appear, for two reasons; 1st. How will this explication prove, that it is the duty of the people of God to obey lawful rulers? I answer, It perfectly well proves obedience to lawful rulers, in lawful commands; but not that Cæsar was a lawful ruler, vested with moral power, and legal authority over a subdued conquered people.

[Page 124]

This they never intended the text should prove, or any thing like it. Cæsar’s stomach was too stuffed, crammed, and crowded with usurpation, idolatry, and murder, to claim the pre-eminence of this text to defend his impious head, and screen his treacherous carcass. 2dly, He rejects the Presbytery’s judgment on this text, because they omitted to quote the sentiments of some eminent divines. And “I can freely tell them (says he) that theirs is opposite to the sentiments of all that ever I saw upon the text.” There is no great matter in that, if it is not opposite to truth. The Presbytery’s sense of the text is, that our Lord gave them an answer, “which left Cæsar’s claim unresolved, as to any positive determination whether it belonged to him or not. He neither expressly says it is lawful or unlawful to pay it; he, in general, teaches to give Cæsar all things that, by the law of God, were due unto him.”

With them Mr. Shields is of the same judgment, page 299. “To that captious question our Lord returns such an answer, as might both solve it, and evade the snare of the propounders, giving a general rule of giving to God and to Cæsar each their own, without defining which of them had the right to the payment in question, upon which they marvelled; which they needed not do, if they had understood in his words an express positive answer declaring an obligation to make that payment to Cæsar.” To the same purpose he speaks, page 705. “That which made them marvel at his wise answer was, that he left the title unstated, and the claim unresolved, whether it belonged to Cæsar or not.”

Mr. Renwick’s judgment may be seen in his Testimony Vindicated to be the same with Mr. Shields, page 189. Another divine agreeing with them is Gee on magistracy, page 320. 328. If Mr. Goodlet will please to consult the Plain Reasons, page 263. he may have the pleasure of seeing the judgment of one of his quondam brethren, agreeing with the above cited divines. Perhaps he may be more agreeable than some other. I make no doubt but the authors I have mentioned will be accounted, with Mr. Goodlet, among the low-lif’d divines, or “doctors of our own dubbing.”

I shall therefore produce the testimony of other two authors, both statesmen, in favours of the Reformed

[Page 125]

Presbytery’s gloss upon this text, but directly opposite to that of the Associate Presbytery. The first is the famous John Milton*, who tho’ he was bred both a soldier and statesman, yet his excellent heroic poem on paradise lost, discovers him to have been no mean divine. His sentiments on the above text, (which was perverted and wrested by Salmasius, much to the same effect as Seceders do it) he expresses in these words, “It is evident that our Saviour’s principles concerning government were not agreeable to the humour of princes. His answer too implies as much. By which he rather turned them away, than instructed them. He asked for the tribute money; whose image and superscription is it? says he. They tell him it was Cæsar’s. Give then to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.——Our Saviour does not take upon him to determine what things are God’s and what Cæsar’s. He leaves that as he found it.—But you say he intimates to them what things were Cæsar’s, to wit, that piece of money, because it bore the emperor’s stamp. And what of all that? How does this advantage your cause? Either Christ allowed nothing at all to be Cæsar’s, but that piece of money that he then had in his hand; and thereby asserted the people’s interest in every thing else; or else, as if you would have us understand him, all money that has the emperor’s stamp upon it, to be the emperor’s own (you make him) contradict himself in giving the magistrate a property in every man’s estate. Whereas he himself pay’d this tribute money with a protestation, that it was more than what either Peter or himself was bound to do, Matth. xvii. 26, 27. The ground you rely on, is very weak; for money bears the prince’s image, not as a token of its being his, but of its being good metal, and that none may presume to counterfeit it.——So that nothing can be more manifest, than that our Saviour in this place, never intended to teach our duty to magistrates: (He would have spoken more plainly if he had) But to reprehend the malice and wickedness of the hypocritical Pharisees.”

_____

*Defence of the people of England against Salmasius, p 55.

[Page 126]

The next evidence I produce to the same purpose is Algernon Sidney*, in his discourses concerning government, in opposition to Filmer†. This book I perceive Mr. Goodlet has seen, but makes very little use of it,—in regard that Mr. Sidney’s sentiments, in many instances, are just a very fine contrast, of Mr. Goodlet’s, and those of the Associate Presbytery, on the head of civil government. His judgment on the text presently under consideration, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, &c. is thus expressed, “We do not deny to any man that which is his due, but do not so well know who is Cæsar, nor what it is that can truly be said to be due to him. I grant that when those words were spoken, the power of the Romans exercised by Tiberius, was then expressed by the name of Cæsar, which he, without any title, had assumed. The Jews, amongst many other nations, having been subdued, submitted to it; and being no way competent judges of the rights belonging to the synod or people of Rome, were obliged to acknowledge that power which their masters were under: Nay, they had by their sins profaned themselves, and given to the Gentiles a right over them, which none could have had, if they had continued in their obedience to the law of God. This was the foundation of the

_____

* Algernon Sidney, son to Robert Earl of Leicester, was an eminent statesman, much esteem’d and employ’d in the time of Charles I. His discourses concerning government, exposed him to the fury of the Royalist faction (towards the end of the reign of Charles II.) to which he fell a sacrifice. He was condemned by Judge Jefferies on November 26, and beheaded on Tower-hill on the 7th of December 1683.

† Sir Robert Filmer was the author of a book called Patriarcha, written in defence of absolute monarchy, “A book so poorly writ, says Bishop Burnet, that it is strange Sidney bestowed so much pains in answering it.” “But if Sir Robert Filmer’s doctrine, however absurd, was at that time adopted by a great number of persons of every character, it needs not seem strange that our author thought it worth his while to disprove it; and that it was much adopted, we need no other evidence than his dying for opposing it.” See the life of Algernon Sidney, prefix’d to the 1st volume of his discourses on government, page 13.

[Page 127]

Cæsar’s dominion over them, but can have no influence upon us‡.” And again, page 64. “It may also be observed, that Christ did not say this, so much to determine the questions that might arise concerning Cæsar’s power; (for he plainly says that was not his work) but to put the pharisees to silence who tempted him. According to the opinion of the Jews, that the Messias would restore the kingdom of Israel, they thought his first work would be to throw off the Roman yoke; but not believing him to be the man, they would have brought him to avow the thing, that they might destroy him. But as that was not his business, and that his time was not yet come, it was not necessary to give them any other answer than such as might disappoint their purpose.”

Thus far I have gratified Mr. Goodlet in producing the sentiments of some eminent men on this text. And to all the above, I might also have added Mr. Goodlet’s own avouchers, with equal strength as he himself has done. It can easily be granted, what they have said, Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, is certainly just. This is no negative of the sense pled for. He is pleased to cite Mr. Gillespie’s words, but not the place. It is possible he was in doubt about the truth of his own assertion. And indeed it is commendable to stop at the shore, rather than launch into the deep, and perish in the ocean. Mr. Goodlet seems still not satisfied; thence he falls a boasting over a concession the presbytery has granted, which he thinks is mightily unhappy for them; viz. “Though it be granted, that the Jews, had by this time consented to Cæsar’s usurpation, yet that could not legitimate his title nor warrant their subjection for conscience sake.” This is an ænigma, none of an ordinary capacity can comprehend; (this is to discover that his own genius is somewhat very extraordinary) it is really curious how conceitedly some people are when once they imagine themselves head and shoulders above their equals. For clearing this enigmatical proposition concerning the Jews in general, and Paul in particular, let it be considered,

1st, The presbytery’s “granting that by this time the Jews had consented to Cæsar’s usurpation, yet that did not legitimate his title or authority, nor warrant their

_____

‡ Sidney on government, vol. II. pages 61, 62.

[Page 128]

subjection to him for conscience sake,” can be no ænigmatical saying, as Mr. Goodlet would have it.

But, says he, “The will must act in opposition to itself; and this exceeds my dull apprehension for one to usurp over a people by their own consent.” That it is above his judgment, and surpasses his dull apprehension, does it therefore exceed and surpass the judgment and apprehension of all others? a bad conclusion! Meantime the presbytery never said the will can act in opposition to itself: Mr. Goodlet says so, only by a strained inference and ill-connected consequence. Does not Mr. Goodlet know that the will is not a distinct agent by itself; but a power of the same agent, the soul: for this reason it is essential to the will, to have something of a moral disposition of inclination to good; and disinclination to bad, and sometimes a mixture of both: it is very ordinary then for the will to act in opposition to light, knowledge, or conviction in the understanding. This clears the presbytery’s words of any enigmatical sense in point of obscurity, darkness, or ambiguity; nor is this a singular opinion of the presbytery’s; Pool in his Synopsis Criticorum in locum, freely grants, “Cæsar was not king of Israel de jure, but de facto.” Their consenting to his usurpation, was de facto [in fact], not de jure [by law] as king of Israel, and that after he had conquered them by the sword, which properly makes no man king, more than Cromwell was, after he had routed the parliament’s army at Dunbar, afterwards the king’s army at Worcester in England, on September 3d. 1651. which obliged the nations to submit to him as an usurping conqueror, yet it was de facto [in fact], but not de jure [by law].

2dly, Then just, lawful and legal government, was unalterably fixed and determined by the express divine law, Deut. xvii. and 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. The qualifications fitting for the exercise of regal government, expressly specified, viz. able men, in a moral sense, for the discharge of official moral duties. An Israelite, both natural and religious; the spirit of wisdom, for government and justice; not stuffed with avarice, cruelty, &c. but one adorned with candid integrity, a lover of truth, and hater of ungodliness; without these qualifications in some measure, they cannot be owned as the original moral preceptive ordinance of God, by his divine approbation: How then could the Jews, without dispensing with the divine

[Page 129]

law, in opposition with the word of God, consent to his authority as just and legal in the eye of the divine law?

Let us next consider Mr. Goodlet’s serious and willing desire to know whether Paul consented to Cæsar’s usurpation, or authority, when he appealed to him; for, says he, it was a voluntary appeal. The curious reader must be satisfied with his assertion without any evidence in this particular, and take Mr. Goodlet’s word for it; but he happens to be greatly mistaken in the case. Paul and he disagree widely; for says Paul, I was constrained to appeal unto Cæsar, Acts xxviii. 19. Will Mr. Goodlet say this was the will acting in opposition to itself. Certainly Paul can best explain his own meaning in his appeal to Cæsar, and yet Mr. Goodlet says it was voluntary, although Paul expressly says, it was constrained. That Paul’s appeal was a voluntary action under the influence of moral constraint; as Seceders say, cannot be yielded unto without a great deal of irreconcilable difficulty. For this reason he never appealed to them till involuntarily brought before them; he never appealed till by the injustice of his malicious accusers, he was urged to some degree of absolute necessity; either to die as the worst of traitors, or then resign himself to the dernier resort, the last refuge of oppressed innocence, in expectation of justice, as a free born citizen. Evident it is from many instances of his Christian conduct, he never addressed them by appeals, nor any of his fellow condisciples, when at liberty; though he had occasion for it. That this is no forced perverted sense of his appeal, is supported by others of no mean judgment. Mr. Henry on Acts xxviii. 29. compares his case, to David’s flying from the rage of Saul, to the protection of Achish king of Gath;—says, “It is a hard case, that a son of Abraham must be found to appeal to a Philistine, to a Nero, from these who call themselves the seed of Abraham; a hard case, to be safer at Gath or at Rome than at Jerusalem?” Mr. Shields, page 296. will not admit his appeal to be a voluntary action; but the only constrained expedient to save his own life, for which he cites, Acts xxviii. 29. Mr. Goodlet would do well to consider he has laid a very ungenerous and indiscreet charge against the presbytery for writing before they read; and see if this be not exactly the case with himself anent Paul’s voluntary appeal unto Cæsar; Had he been more familiar with his bible, he would

[Page 130]

have had less ground to roar out in such wild uncouth scurrilous language, “That Paul would have been ill used had he been before the Reformed Presbytery,” &c.

The second experiment he offers to make, is upon Rom. xiii. 1—8. Here he uses a great deal of fine rich complements, and in the issue takes it for granted, that there is a perfect agreement betwixt Seceders and Dissenters hereupon. I heartily wish it were so, in agreeableness to truth.

Nothing is further necessary to be offered than what the presbytery have said already on this text, pages 148. 149. At present I shall give what the presbytery grant on this text, and what they refuse to be the import and meaning thereof, for Mr. Goodlet’s further satisfaction and consideration.

1st, They acknowledge the power here spoken of by the apostle is not a physical, but a moral power; a power that is lawful and warranted, in regard of matter, person, title and investiture, a legitimacy in every one of which must go to the making of a moral power; and an illegitimacy in any of these is an illegitimacy in the very being, and constitution, and so a nullity to the power, as moral, and a making it of no authority.

2dly, They grant, that the being of God, or the ordinances of God here spoken of, is not a being of God providentially only, but such a being of God as contains in it his institution and appointment, by the warrant of his word, law and precept. Obedience then is due to such as are set up, according to the preceptive ordination and will of God.

Again, what they refuse as meant in this text is,

1st, They deny this text can be applied to every one advanced by providence to the place of supreme rule, not only without regard to, but in direct opposition to the preceptive will of God.

2dly, They deny, that the text can be applied in a way of pleading, the lawfulness of an Erastian, antiscriptural constitution, that is destitute of all those qualifications above-mentioned, which are always necessary to constitute a moral power, viz. in regard of matter, person, title or investiture.

3dly, They deny, that these texts can be applied to the present national constitution, or to the power wherewith

[Page 131]

the supreme civil rulers in these lands are invested, according to the said constitution, 1. Because the power being Erastian, partly civil, and partly ecclesiastic, by the united constitution, is therefore unlawful in respect of the kind or matter of it. 2. Because the manner of investiture,—and the terms on which the crown is held, (viz. the perpetual maintenance of abjured Prelacy in the lands, with all its corruptions and superstitious appurtenances) are sinful: and thus both the constitution and investiture are in an immediate opposition to the unalterable constitution of the Messiah’s Kingdom*, and founded on the ruin and overthrow of the covenanted reformation.

Lastly, I add that they deny that these apostolical precepts, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. Tit. iii. 1. 1 Pet. ii. 13.—can be applied to the persons and government of those that were actually in power in Rome, when these epistles were wrote. Mr. Goodlet, and the Associate Presbytery, or their amanuensis (as if they were set to defend every thing of that kind that is detestable, and had espoused the cause of tyranny and arbitrary power) apply them to all these without discrimination or distinction; nay, in order to make the apostle patronize their unrighteous model (which makes every present government, magistrate, or possessor of power, though never so wicked and wretchedly abandoned, to be the ordinance of God) when he says, only the powers that be,

_____

* “This is certain, that all nations whatever, which in their present state and government, have given their power to the dragon and the beast, to oppose the Lord Christ withal, shall be shaken, broken, translated, and turned off their old foundations and constitutions, into which the antichristian interest hath been woven for a long season. God will shake the heaven and the earth of the nations, until all the Babylonish rubbish, all their engagements to the Man of Sin be taken away (a). This I have fully demonstrated elsewhere (b).”

__________

(a) Dr. Owen’s Select Sermons, (folio edit.) page 433. Sermon 39. intitled Christ’s Kingdom, and the Magistrate’s Power.

(b) Sermon on Heb. xii. 28. intitled, The Shaking and Translating of Heaven and Earth. The whole of this sermon as well worth the reader’s perusal.

[Page 132]

be, they (with the thorough-paced royalists) will have him to say, the powers that now be. The apostle by powers that be, meant only the different kinds of power, or magistracy. They make him to intend the persons using or occupying the power. And thus, according to them, the apostles commanded subjection, love and obedience, for conscience sake, and under pain of damnation to the persons and government of Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, Domitian, and the whole of that herd of monsters; than which, to any acquainted with their history and characters*, nothing can be more abominable and absurd. It must be amazingly strange to think by what infatuation they could be brought to believe, (if I may suppose they really do so) and become the patrons of such doctrine. I cannot think it can be from ignorance; and if not, it must surely be from a worse original. The sentiments of the Reformed Presbytery on these texts, as represented above, and in their Testimony, are the same with those of all judicious and sound expositors, whether ancient or later, who have commented on these scriptures. It may be sufficiently clear to any, that the apostles in these texts commanded not subjection, to any particular form of government, nor to any particular person, but to the ordinance of God. To rulers; not to all that were called so, or had that name, but such as were really so; to rulers, not to ragers and tyrants, as this odious doctrine of our author’s will imply. But it will be said, what way are we to know God’s ordinance, or such persons, or rulers, as are so? As there is not, nor cannot be a better or more excellent rule to that purpose than that our Saviour lays down, Matth. vii. 16, 20. By their fruits ye shall know them, i.e. by their works†, (which will ever be according to their dispositions and qualifications) the apostles therefore particularly insist in describing the characters and works of such, Rom. xiii. 3, 4, &c. In opposition to the base and unworthy gloss they put upon these apostolical precepts

_____

* To this purpose, the reader may consult Gordon’s translation of Tacitus.

† “Every magistrate, and every man by his works, will for ever declare whose minister he is; in what spirit he lives, and consequently what obedience is due to him according to the precept of the apostle. Sidney, vol. ii. page 92.”

[Page 133]

and directions, and in vindication of that of the presbytery, I shall produce the judgment of both these two learned and judicious authors before quoted, to which also I shall add a third, Milton against Salmasius, page 62. et seq.

“St Paul in his xiiith chapter to the Romans, gives us a true and clear account of the reason, the original and the design of government, and shews us the true and proper ground of our obedience, that it is far from imposing a necessity upon us of being slaves. Let every soul, i.e. Let every man, submit. Chrysostom tells us, That Paul’s design in this discourse was to make it appear that our Saviour did not go about to introduce principles inconsistent with civil government, but such as strengthened it, and settled it upon the surest foundations. It was commonly said in those days that the doctrine of the apostles was seditious, and themselves persons that endeavoured to shake the settled laws and government of the world: That this was what they aimed at in all they said and did. The apostle in this chapter stops the mouths of such gainsayers. (Thus far Chrysostom). So that the apostles did not write in defence of tyrants, as you do. For there is no power but of God, i.e. no lawful constitution of any government. The most ancient laws that are known to us were formerly ascribed to God as their author; so that the institution of magistracy is jure divino [by divine right], and the end of it is, that mankind might live under certain laws, and be govern’d by them.” And afterwards; “Sometimes the very form of government, if it be amiss, or those persons that have the power in their hands, are not of God, but of men, or of the devil. Luke iv. 6. All this power will I give unto thee, for it is delivered unto me, and I give it to whom I will. Hence the devil is called the prince of this world. And in the xiith of the Revelation, the dragon, the beast, his power, and his throne, and great authority: so that we must not understand Paul as if he spoke of all sorts of magistrates in general, but of lawful magistrates; and so they are described in what follows. We must also understand him of the powers themselves, not of those men always in whose hands they are lodged.

Chrysostom speaks very well and clearly upon this occasion; What, says he, is every prince then appoint-

[Page 134]

ed by God to be so? I say, no such thing. Paul speaks not of the person of the magistrate, but of the magistracy itself. He does not say, There is no prince but who is of God; he says, There is no power but of God. Thus far Chrysostom. For what powers are, are ordained of God; so that Paul speaks only of a lawful magistracy. For what is evil and amiss, cannot be said to be ordained, because it is disorderly; order and disorder cannot consist together in the same subject. The apostle says, the powers that be; and you interpret his words as if he had said, The powers that now be, that you may prove that the Romans ought in conscience to obey Nero, who, you take for granted, was then emperor. I am very well content you should read the words so. The consequence will be, that Englishmen ought to yield obedience to the present government, (viz. Cromwell’s), as it is now established according to a new model. Because you must needs acknowledge, that it is the present government, and ordained of God, as much at least as Nero’s was, He that resists the power, to wit, a lawful power, resists the ordinance of God. The words immediately after, make it as clear as the sun, that the apostle speaks only of a lawful power; for he gives us in them a definition of magistrates, and thereby explains to us who are the persons thus authorised, and upon what account we are to yield obedience, least we should be apt to mistake, and ground extravagant notions upon his discourse. Magistrates, says he, are not a terror to good works, but to evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good: He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. What honest man would not willingly submit to such a magistracy as is here described; and that not only to avoid wrath, and for fear of punishment, but for conscience sake? What ever power enables a man, or whatsoever magistrate takes upon him to act contrary to what Paul makes the duty of those that are in authority, neither is that power, nor that magistrate ordain’d of God; and consequently, to such a magistrate no subjection is commanded, nor is any due; nor are the people forbidden to resist such authority;

[Page 135]

for in so doing, they do not resist the power, nor the magistracy as they are here excellently well described; but they resist a robber, a tyrant, an enemy, who, if he may notwithstanding, in some sense, be called a magistrate upon this account only, because he has power in his hands.—By the same reason, the devil may be called a magistrate.” Thus far he. 1 Pet. ii. 13. 14. &c. he expounds the same way; which I might also note down were it necessary; but this may suffice.

I shall next give the judgment of the learned and noble gentleman Algernon Sidney on this text, vol. ii. page 80. After vindicating verses 1. 2. of Rom. xiii. from the false gloss that Filmer had put upon it, he insists particularly on the spirit and import of the apostle’s words, verses 3. & 4.

“The apostle (says he) farther explaining himself, and shewing who may be accounted magistrates, and what the duty of such an one is, informs us whom we should fear and on what account; Rulers, says he, are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power, do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God;—a revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. He therefore is only the minister of God, who is not a terror to good works, but to evil; who executes wrath upon those that do evil, and is a praise to those that do well. And he who doth well ought not to be afraid of the power, for he shall receive praise. Now, if our author were alive, though he was a man of a hard forehead, I would ask him, whether in his conscience he believed that Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and the rabble of succeeding monsters, were a praise to those that did well, and a terror to those who did evil; and not the contrary, a praise to the worst, and a terror to the best men of the world? Or, for what reason Tacitus* could say, that virtue brought men who lived under them, to certain destruction; and recite so many examples of the brave and good, who were murdered by them for being so, unless they had endeavoured to extinguish all that was good, and to tear† up virtue by the roots. Why did he call Domitian an enemy‡ to virtue, if he was a terror only to

_____

* Ob virtutes certissimum exitium. [Most certain destruction on account of virtues.]

† Ipsam excindere virtutem. [To root out virtue itself.]

‡ Virtutibus infestum. [Hostile to virtues.]

[Page 136]

these that did evil. If the world has hitherto been misled in these things, and given the name of virtue to vice, and of vice to virtue, then Germanicus, Valerianus, Asiaticus, Corbulo, Helvidius, Priscus, Thraseus, Soranus, and others that resembled them, who fell under the rage of those beasts; nay, Paul himself and his disciples, were evil doers: And Marco, Narcissus, Pallas, Vinnius, Laco, and Tigellinus were virtuous and good men. If this be so, we are beholden to Filmer for admonishing mankind of the error in which they had so long continued; if not those who persecuted and murdered them for their virtues were not a terror to such as did evil, and a praise to those who did well. The worst men had no need to fear them, but the best had, because they were the best. All princes therefore that have power, are not to be esteemed equally the ministers of God. They that are so, must receive their dignity from a title that is not common to all, even from a just employment of their power, to the encouragement of virtue, and to the discouragement of vice. He that pretends to the veneration, and obedience due to the ministers of God, must by his actions manifest that he is so. And though I am unwilling to advance a proposition that may sound harshly to tender ears, I am inclined to believe, that the same rule which obliges to yield obedience to the good magistrate, who is the minister of God; and assures us, that in obeying him we obey God, does equally oblige us not to obey those who make themselves the ministers of the devil, lest in obeying them we obey the devil whose works they do.” So speaks this ingenious gentleman on these words.

To these two I shall add only one other evidence in favours of the Presbytery’s sense of these scriptures, and in opposition to Seceders. And that is an author well known, Mr. Benjamin Bennet in the preface to his Memorial of the Reformation, pages 6. 7. in answer to the royalists objection, That the apostle, Rom. xiii. commanded subjection even to Nero, Claudius, and one of which was the power actually reigning when he wrote this epistle. To this he replies,—“It is evident, even to a demonstration, that, as the apostle does not here appoint any particular form of government, so he says nothing of particular present governors, only recommends subjection to governors

[Page 137]

in general, and that from the consideration of the divine institution of the office, and the benefit of it to mankind where duly administered. To resist such governors as answer the end of their office, is no doubt a very great fault, and deserves a proportionable punishment, Κρίμα [verdict], both here and hereafter. But the resisting of tyrants falls not under the apostle’s sentence,—being another sort of creatures,—and the very reverse of that character he gives to the ministers of God, to whom he requires subjection.

To put the question beyond all doubt, let us suppose, says he, Nero here meant, and try how finely the text runs when thus applied; I enjoin that every soul, (Christians as well as others) be subject to the higher powers, for the powers that at present be are ordain’d of God. Nero particularly, now at the head of the Roman empire is so, and whoever resists him shall receive damnation, for he is not a terror to good works, (discouraging and persecuting good men,) but only to evil. Do well, and you shall have nothing to fear from Nero, for he is the minister of God for good, a revenger to execute wrath upon evil doers: So that it is your duty to be subject to him, (Nero), not only from fear of punishment, but for conscience sake, and the fear of God. You ought to support him in all his power and dignity, (which he so well employs), paying him such tribute as he demands, and as is due to him; for he is God’s minister, continually attending on this very thing, vigilantly discharging the duty of his office;——every way promoting the good of the community.

This must be the apostle’s sense, or else the objection is nonsense: and I leave it to every impartial person to consider how injurious it must be to an inspired apostle to make him talk at this rate. What an idea must it give the world of Christianity? What would the Romans particularly, (who had such a noble sense of liberty,) have thought of the Christian religion, when they heard one of the chief propagators of it had so zealously espoused the cause of slavery, and obliged all, under pain of damnation, to be subject even to their Nero, whom the senate had condemned as a public enemy, and the people hated as a tyrant?”

From what has been said above upon Luke xx. 25. and

[Page 138]

from this triple testimony from the mouths of such unexceptionable witnesses, approving of the Presbytery’s sense and explication of Rom. xiii. 1. 2. 3. what must now become of Mr. Goodlet’s experiment? And moreover, how came he to palm such a gross lie upon the Presbytery, as to say, that they agreed with himself and his brethren in asserting such vague unnatural stuff, as, “That it was the Roman magistrates,” i.e. The persons or powers then actually reigning in Rome, without distinction or exception, (for he and his brethren make none), “of whom the apostle writes, Rom. xiii. 1.—8. Tit. iii. 1. That these were moral powers, having a right to command, being set up according to God’s preceptive will,—and that the apostle charged and persuaded the Christians in Rome to subject themselves to these Roman magistrates,” as the ordinance of God. He could not but know this to be a falsehood, from what the Presbytery have said, (Testimony, pages 146. 147.) on Luke xx. 25. With respect to the authors I have above quoted, in defence of the Reformed Presbytery’s explication of Luke xx. 25. and Rom. xiii. 1.—8. Mr. Goodlet, no doubt, will object, that their arguments are pointed only against tyrants, and those that write in defence of tyrants. But I would put Mr. Goodlet in mind, that the scheme he undertakes to vindicate, is as much calculate for the meridian of tyranny, as any other. By tyranny, I mean civil tyranny, or tyranny over men’s bodies, lives, and goods: for, as to spiritual tyranny, oppression of the church, the heritage of the Lord*, invad-

_____

* “Every age hath its peculiar work, hath its peculiar light. Now, what is the light which God manifestly gives us in our days? The peculiar light of this generation, is that discovery which the Lord hath made to his people of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny. The opening, unraveling, and revealing the Antichristian interest, interwoven and coupled together in civil and spiritual things, into a state opposite to the kingdom of the Lord Jesus, is the great discovery of these days. Who almost is there amongst us now, who doth not evidently see, that for many generations the western nations have been juggled into spiritual and civil slavery, by the legerdemain of the whore, and the potentates of the earth made drunk with the cup of her abominations? How the whole earth hath

[Page 139]

ing and grasping the Mediator’s prerogatives and crown, this they make no such matter of. I say, it is calculate for the meridian of tyranny; for, if (according to their interpretation), Tiberius, Claudius, Caligula, Nero*, Vitellius, Domitian, and such like wild beasts, were moral powers, and the ordinance of God, I know not who may or can be called tyrants. If the Christians in Rome were by the apostle commanded to give obedience and subjection, for conscience sake to them, (which yet is most injurious to assert), then indeed, no man, nor Christian, to the end of the world, need hesitate or scruple to acknowledge, or honour any in the place of power, as the ordinance of God, let him be or do what he will. And moreover, I can see no difference between the way that Mr. Goodlet and the Associate Presbytery explain these texts, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. &c. and the way that the most rigid royalists have explained them, (or that sense of them that the persecutors urged on the sufferers under the reign of the two brothers) excepting this only, that Mr. Goodlet denies the doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, which the others affirm.

Mr. Goodlet hath no other experiments on any of the texts perverted by Seceders, but the two already noticed; what his reasons are, I shall not determine; possibly he finds it is not easy always to be fighting against scripture, in opposition both to reason and strong working conviction.

_____

[continued from page 138] been rolled in confusion, and the saints hurried out of the world, to give way to their combined interest. Hath not God unveiled that harlot, made her naked, and discovered her abominable filthiness? Is it not evident to him that hath but half an eye, that the whole present constitution of the government of the nations is so cemented with Antichristian mortar, from the very top to the bottom, that without a thorough shaking they cannot be cleansed.” Owen’s Select Sermons, page 335.

* “If it was ill done to drive Nero to despair, or to throw Vitellius into the common sewer, it was not because they were the ministers of God, for their lives were no way conformable to that character which the apostle gives of those who deserve that sacred name.” Sidney on government, vol. 2d, page 96.

[Page 140]

Article 3d, page 36, Testimony, p. 110. This article of charge is matter of certain fact, as it is laid against Seceders, in all its parts, which will appear to the impartial world and diligent reader. When it is set in its proper light, one piece of it with another, it looks too obvious, even to the weak discerner, to be a little glaring and self-evident, against Seceders: Nay, it presents such a grim picture and frightful anatomy of seceding principles, as makes the very spirit of the owners to storm with bitter rage against it. Mr. Goodlet here, in a great measure, seems to have lost the government of his reason, just like one upon the battlement of humour, and tottering upon the summit of extreme ferment; his arguments against this article are rancour and ill-guarded language, thus; “A striking instance of disingenuity and falsehood, says he; they tell lies, and assert what they know to be a falsehood; clouded memories; a vexation to deal with such men; mentiris impudentissime [lying most impudently];” &c. For the sake of the English reader, the translation of these words, is, You are a most impudent base liar, Sir. Being the Capuchin’s answer to the falsifying Jesuit, he must set it down as he got it; it would seem, he could not throw it into such a phrase, as might describe the presbytery’s character generaliter [in general]; to supply this defect, they must apply it particulariter [in particular].

The article about which the hot contest is, reads as follows, “Whomsoever the primores regni, or representatives of a nation, do set up, are lawful magistrates; and that not only according to the providential, but according to the preceptive will of God also. In regard God, the supreme governor, has prescribed no qualifications in his word, as essential to the being of a lawful magistrate, nor told what sort of men they must be that are invested with that office over his professing people; tho’ it is confessed, there are many that are necessary to the well-being and usefulness of that office.”

The first part of this article of charge, is granted by Mr. Goodlet, as the synod’s judgment, yet he quarrels with the second part of it, although it is really maintained by them, and undeniably contained in their principles upon the head of civil government. But, says he, “The presbytery did not assign the second part of the proposition as a reason of the former. Though the Associate Pres-

[Page 141]

bytery had acknowledged both parts of that proposition, as truths separately; yet unless they had, in so many words, or by their form of reasoning, made the one the cause or reason of the other, it is a falsehood to impute it to them.”

The case is just so, as exactly as words can make it: “The Associate Presbytery acknowledge both parts of that proposition as truths separately; and, by their form of reasoning, have made the one the reason of the other.”

The presbytery are so far from having given out “what they knew to be a falsehood,” as a reason of the proposition maintained by the Associate Presbytery, (as Mr. Goodlet in the height of his immoderate rage, and with no small degree of arrogance, asserts, That they give out nothing as a reason but what the Associate Presbytery gives out, and maintains, viz. “That God the supreme governor, has prescribed no qualifications in his word as essential to the being of a lawful magistrate, &c.” Well but they affirm, (says he) that the Associate Presbytery gives this as a reason, whereas they give the precepts already explained, as a reason; viz. Prov. xxiv. 21. Eccles. x. 4. Luke xxii. 25. Rom. xiii. 1—8. Tit. iii. 1. 1 Pet. ii. 13–18. Be it so, Sir, who is controverting this with you; but for what are they given as a reason? Are they not produced as a reason that all men “Ought to be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake, unto all magistrates presently acknowledged by the civil state they belong to,” even while they are destitute of scripture qualifications, &c. which are essential to the being of lawful magistrates in a Christian land. All the scriptures produced and explained by the Associate Presbytery, are given as reasons of the former, exclusive of the latter. But says he, “They affirm that the presbytery give it for a reason, that God has not told us in his word, what sort of men they must be that are invested with the office. Now, what sober Christian could allow himself to assert such a thing; the presbytery says, there are doctrines and precepts expressly and explicitly determining the qualifications and duties of magistrates as to what they should be or do.” Now, what does all this amount to in the issue? These doctrines and precepts which they grant are expressly declared in God’s word, they only grant that they are necessary for a good choice

[Page 142]

of such persons, and consequently to the well-being and usefulness of the persons chosen and invested with the office of a magistrate. But do the Associate Presbytery grant these doctrines, and precepts, &c. to be the essential criterion deciphering the persons to be chosen and invested with the office of a magistrate? Do they allow the qualifications, particularly specified in our reforming acts, and laws settled by the deed of our civil covenanted constitution, as taught in these doctrines and precepts, as absolutely necessary directions, in the choice of such magistrates as to what they should be and do? Nay, they do not, nor any thing like it. Then all their granting is point blank as to the matter in hand; there has been no manner of injustice done them in the last part of the article charged upon them. The presbytery is not disputing what they have owned; but what they have not: Nay, what they deny and oppose as necessary to be granted, in a consistency with reformation principles, agreeable to the scriptures of truth, and the doctrines and precepts contained therein. And moreover, is it not quite idle, as well as basely disingenuous, for Mr. Goodlet to fight against what he himself owns to be truth, viz. that God has prescribed no qualifications in his word, as essential to the being of a lawful magistrate? The presbytery’s reasons, says he, “are what God prescribes in his word, and not what he does not prescribe.” Is not this a polite sly negation of the truth, after a long and tedious suppression of it. At last, he owns all the parts of the proposition, piece by piece, though not all at once or in cumulo [taken all together]. It is truly surprising, that he should quibble about words, for no other end and purpose, but to cover his own and his brethren’s latent deceit. Now, it appears, that what the Reformed Presbytery has charged them with in the above proposition is no falsehood, but pure truth in a naked dress.

The evidence of the proposition, now fully proven, may be yet further manifest and cleared, from what he owns, pages 38, 39. The Associate Presbytery, pages 79, 80. maintain (says he) “That God by his word requires, that magistrates, as well as all others, in their respective stations, should have all the qualifications he sets forth therein, and perform all the duties he prescribes to

[Page 143]

them, as they would desire, to have their government blessed, and their service acceptable to him.”

First, Let it be observed, that according to Mr. Goodlet’s representation of the synod’s mind in the above citation, that God by his word requires that magistrates should have qualifications only in common with all others in their respective stations, otherwise, no qualifications are essential to them as magistrates. Will he allow them no superior qualifications; as they are in a superior station? Are moral scriptural qualifications no more necessary to the doing of the magistrate’s work, than the tailor’s, shoe-maker’s work, &c? Not at all; “only with others in their respective stations.”

Secondly, From this, therefore it evidently appears, he judges no qualifications are essential to magistrates as magistrates, none that profess the Christian religion; but they are required by God, in his word, to have qualifications answerable to the Christian character in every station of life, be their mechanic trade, or secular business what it will, they are negotiating in or about; whatever they do, they are bound by the Christian military oath, to do all to the glory of God. Well, but the magistrate must act, not only to the glory of God; but for the glory of God. Take heed what ye do, for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the judgment. I foresee, however, that it will be both vain and tiresome to follow Mr. Goodlet through all his ambages [evasions], loopings and slimy wreathings on this head. The sum of all is this, They deny scripture qualifications, and not only these, but all distinguishing or special qualifications as essential to the constitution of a lawful magistrate: And affirm, that no other are essentially necessary to such a purpose, than such natural, and moral abilities and qualifications as are common among men (as has been already observed.) Now, this doctrine of theirs is so palpably contradictious to the law of nature, as well as the law of scripture; so directly cross to the very reason and nature of things, that it is most surprising to think how Mr. Goodlet and his brethren have got the conscience and confidence to maintain it with so much stubbornness and obstinacy. To clear this a little, let it be observed, that every creature that God has made, was made for some useful and valuable end, and not in vain. So true is the old maxim, Deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra. [God and nature do nothing in vain.]

[Page 144]

The highest end is his own glory, in a display of his wonderful perfections, Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself. His next (and subordinate end) to this (as to the creatures of his make in this lower world) was the service, sustenance and comfort of man, Gen. i. 29. and ix. 2, 3. Psal. viii. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Psalm cxv. 16. The earth hath he given to the children of men.——There is not a creature in heaven or earth that is designed, either for the glory of God, or service and benefit of man (as all of them are); nay, there is not a tree, herb, flower; not an animal, vegetable or mineral, designed for food or physic, but it is endowed with such virtues, qualities and properties as are essentially necessary in order to its answering such an end. Now, surely if the civil magistrate be of God’s creation, i.e. of his institution, he must either be provided with such qualifications as are necessary in order to his fulfilling the work, and answering the ends of his creation, or else, it must be said, that God has acted quite otherwise and differently in this piece of his workmanship, from the way he acted in all the rest. The very supposition of which is most absurd.

The Associate Presbytery say indeed, “That magistrates are always supposed to be in the actual possession of these—moral and acquired qualifications which they ought to have.” “They are supposed.” What strange indifferency is here? To suppose is just no more than to imagine. Must men rest satisfied with an imaginary fictitious conceit, an uncertain conjecture, in a matter on which the safety and security of their most valuable concerns both temporal and spiritual depends, and therefore in which they ought to have the clearest grounds of certainty? This puts one in mind of the foolish man that Mr. Rutherfoord tells us of †, who supposed Pontius Pilate to have been a good man, because he found him in the Creed. And indeed, according to this basely neutral and indifferent temper of Seceders, if they once find a man in the throne, (or in a fair way to it,) they can soon suppose him to be good enough.

In opposition to their unnatural and unreasonable doctrine on this head, I shall here insert some of the sentiments of the well accomplished statesman before-mentioned, Algernon Sidney; “No obedience can be due to him

_____

† Lex Rex.

[Page 145]

or them who have not a right of commanding; this (right) cannot reasonably be conferred upon any that are not esteemed willing and able rightly to execute it. This ability to perform the highest works that come within the reach of man, and integrity of will not to be diverted from it by any temptation, or consideration of private advantages, comprehending all that is most commendable in man: we may easily see that when men act according to the law of their own nature, which is reason, they can have no other rule to direct them in advancing one above another, than the opinion of a man’s virtue and ability, best to perform the duty incumbent upon him; that is, by all means to procure the good of the people committed to his charge. He is only fit to conduct a ship who understands the art of a pilot. When we are sick, we seek the assistance of such as are best skilled in physic. The command of an army is prudently conferred upon him that hath most industry, skill, experience, and valour. In like manner, he only can, according to the rules of nature, be advanced to the dignities of the world, who excels in the virtues required for the performance of the duties annexed to them; for he only can answer the end of his institution. The law of every instituted power is to accomplish the end of its institution, (as creatures are to do the will of their Creator), and in deflecting from it overthrow their own being. Magistrates are distinguished from other men, by the power with which the law invests them for the public good. He that cannot, or will not procure that good, destroys his own being, and becomes like to other men. In matters of the greatest importance, detur digniori [let it be given to the worthier one] is the voice of nature: all her most sacred laws are perverted, if this be not observed in the disposition of the governments of mankind: but all is neglected and violated, if they are not put into the hands of such as excel not in all manner of virtues; for they only are worthy of them; and they only can have a right who are worthy; because they only perform the end for which they are instituted*.” Et alibi, pages 48. 49.——If there be any precept that, by the light of nature, we can, in matters of this kind, look upon as certain, it is, That the government of a people should be given

_____

* Discourses on government, vol. i. pages 66. 67.

[Page 146]

to him that can best perform the duties of it. No man has it for himself, or from himself, but for and from those, who before he had it were his equals, that he may do good to them. If there were a man who in wisdom, valour, justice, and purity excelled all others, he might be called a king by nature, because he is best able to bear the weight of so great a charge, and like a good shepherd to lead the people to good. Now, lest I should follow my own inventions, and call them reason, or the light of God in us, I desire it may be observed, that God himself hath ever taken this method. When he raised up Moses to be the leader of his people, he endued him with the most admirable gifts of his Spirit that ever he bestowed upon a man. When he chose seventy men to assist him, he endued them with the same spirit. Joshua had no other title to succeed him than the like evidence of God’s presence with him.”

To these quotations from this accurate and ingenious political writer, I shall add one from a reverend Calvinist divine, approving and bearing witness to the same truth; “All civilized nations and countries have expressed their sense of this, that governors and men in authority ought to be of good understanding. In the portraitures of the Egyptian kings, their crowns and diadems were twisted with serpents, to denote how requisite wisdom is in persons of that rank and station, and in all subordinate magistrates and rulers. When our forefathers, the Saxons, gave the name of Koning, which is synonymous with a wise man, to their kings, they taught us what was a necessary property in crowned heads. If they want this, they are a very ridiculous and shameful spectacle, howsoever great and splendid their titles are. Most excellently to this purpose, one of the ancients takes notice how shameful and absurd it is for him who hath the ensigns of public authority carried before him, to be a weak and foolish person; these look very ill together. It is, saith he, a mistaken vanity, and an empty and insignificant shew of honour, to shine in purple, and bear all other badges of government, and yet to have a dark and sordid soul, a mind destitute of knowledge and reason. It must needs be, that wisdom and understanding are indispensable requisites in a public person, for otherwise, you require not that in a magistrate,

[Page 147]

which is one of the greatest accomplishments of mankind; nay, otherwise, even the meanest and most brutish creatures might be preferred to public places; as the Roman history tells us, that a besotted emperor, who had an excessive kindness for one of his horses, had a design to honour him with the consulship. There is a necessity then of a sufficient portion of wisdom and knowledge, unless we will admit of a neighing consul. It is true, this which I mention in the first place, is not the chiefest and principal qualification of a ruler; for a good heart is of more worth than a good head; yet, it is certain, that the head influences on the heart and life; and no man, especially no magistrate, can be really good, unless he knows and understands his duty. This leads the way to all the rest; for sobriety, justice, and mercifulness, and all that I shall name afterwards, must be founded in knowledge and discretion. An ignorant magistrate can neither be just himself, nor give instances of justice or mercy towards others.——The groundwork then of all goodness is in the understanding; and especially a governor’s duty must have this for its basis*.”

Now, from all this, these three things (I think), may evidently appear:

1st, That the dictates of nature and scripture do not contradict each other, but do harmoniously agree as to the particular qualifications that are required as essential to the being of a lawful magistrate, or a magistrate of God’s creation. What God speaks silently by the voice of nature and providence, he loudly proclaims in his written word.

2dly, How rational, as well as scriptural, the doctrine which the Reformed Presbytery hold and plead for (on this head,) is; and how much opposite to both, the contrary doctrine of the Associate Presbytery must be? And if contrary to reason and scripture, (however agreeable it may be to the lusts of men), it cannot but be opposite to the real good, interest, and benefit of man, considered either as a social, a reasonable, or a religious being, and particularly to the good and benefit of the church of God.

3dly, It may be hence evident, That the mere election, voice, and choice of civil society, or body politic, is so far from being capable to confer a right to rule or government

_____

* Dr. Edwards’ Theologia Reformata, pages 495. 496.

[Page 148]

on any, (as Seceders teach), that it is only the actual possession of these essentially necessary qualifications that gives a right to any one to stand a candidate for such an important trust and dignity; nor have the body politic any right to choose, or put such power into the hands of any but such as are qualified according to the law of this institution. Whenever they act contrary to this law, (which is uniformly the same, both in nature and scripture,) and in so far as they do so, their act is null and void; (the reason is, because no man can have a right to fight against God, and nature, reason, and religion: for, in so doing, he fights against himself, his own good and happiness, which is most unnatural.) But all the sacred laws of God, whether expressed to us in nature or scripture, are perverted, violated, and trampled on, where this office, power, and dignity is disposed of, into the hands of unworthy men, i.e. such as are morally unfit, and uncapable for answering the ends, and performing the duties of it.

Mr. Goodlet, in justification of his own, and the Associate Presbytery’s opposition to the necessity of scripture qualifications unto the being and constitution of a lawful magistrate, brings in a detached quotation from Mr. Rutherfoord, but to no purpose for him, but the contrary, as I shall make evident. The emphasis of his proof from Mr. Rutherfoord lies here; Mr. Rutherfoord had put the question, (being an objection of the Anabaptists,) Whether “it be an essential ingredient of a king, as a king, that he be a man fearing God, hating covetousness, and that he read in the book of the law, that he may fear God.” To this Mr. Rutherfoord answers; “There is a twofold goodness; one of the magistrate, as a magistrate, another as a good Christian magistrate. The former is an official goodness, a magistratical prudence, justice, and goodness; this is required of the magistrate as such: But there is another goodness required of the magistrate, as they are members of the Jewish church, and as they are Christians. Magistrates, not as magistrates, but as good and Christian, are to be such as fear God, hate covetousness, respect not the face and favour of men, &c.—Justice and righteous judgment, in a spiritual and evangelic way, belongeth not to the essence of a magistrate.”

[Page 149]

Reply 1. Mr. Rutherfoord disputes and argues here against the Anabaptists, (ut in confesso est [as is admitted]), and therefore nothing that he speaks in any such argument can either concern or affect the Reformed Presbytery. And till once Mr. Goodlet proves, by better argument and evidence than his own slanderous tongue, that the Presbytery are of their principles, or that their doctrine is “vile Erastian stuff,” and the “slimy wreathings of the poisonous serpent,” (as he is pleased to call it.) Nothing brought either from Rutherfoord or Gillespie, (all whose arguments are directly pointed against Royalists, Erastians, or Anabaptists) can at all concern or touch them. The question is not, Whether these things, as spiritual and evangelical graces, or these duties done in a spiritual and evangelical way, (which is the sense against which Mr. Rutherfoord disputes,) be required as essential to the being of a lawful magistrate; (for in this sense of them, they are not essential to the being either of lawful magistrate, or lawful minister,) but, Whether those moral abilities that are required in the word of God be not, in the very nature of things, essential to the being of the magistrate or ruler, in order to his answering the end of his institution, and doing his work. And these are, (1.) That they be wise, able, understanding men, &c. (not weak, ignorant, or fools,) Exod. xviii. 21. Deut. i. 13. 15. Ezra vii. 25. (2.) That they be just men, men of truth, and known integrity, fearing God, and hating covetousness, (not wicked, unjust, false, deceitful, covetous, &c.) This I affirm, and so doth Mr. Rutherfoord too in the place Mr. Goodlet quotes from him, viz. “That there is a magistratical prudence, justice and goodness,—of which the scripture speaks as essential to the magistrate, as a magistrate.” But,

Reply 2. If Mr. Goodlet denies verbatim, that the fear of God, hating covetousness, &c. are essential qualifications of rulers, I would ask him,

(1.) Whether he can give an instance of any people in the world that ever set up an Atheist, (even though guided only by the light of nature,) as a magistrate or ruler over them. Those who are enemies to God and religion, cannot be friendly to men, Luke xviii. 2. 3. 4. 5. or fit to rule over them: Nay, let him bring an instance, if he can, of any people exalting one to this dignity and power over them,

[Page 150]

them, that was a known enemy to the god they acknowledged, and religion they professed. By the fear of God in these precepts, we are by no means to understand real religion, or saving subjective grace, nor can it be understood so; God never commanded the Israelites, nor any man or people to take such, and to set them as rulers over them, because it is not the prerogative of man, but of God, who only knows the heart, to know who are really such; i.e. who are sincerely and truly just, good, and religious: but both the law of God, and the very light of nature and reason, require any people, colony, or body of men uniting together in civil society, for their mutual good and advantage, and who know the true God, and profess the true religion, to choose such only as are, to appearance at least, and by profession, friendly, and well affected towards themselves, their religion, and their God; and who give the (comparatively) best evidences of integrity in the profession they make; and to refuse those of the opposite character. For any such people to set a stranger over them, (a stranger to the above-mentioned character), would be most immoral, unnatural, and impious; contrary both to the moral law of God, Deut. xvii. 15. and to the very light of nature.

(2.) If the hatred of covetousness be not an essential qualification of kings and rulers; (and, N. B. This even many Heathens have excelled in, though they knew nothing of true religion, or saving grace), I would gladly know, whether he thinks covetousness, or the love of covetousness, Psalm x. 3. be one, for I know no medium, or middle way, or character lying between these two.

But I leave this now, and shall go on to observe further, That Mr. Goodlet seems grievously tormented, that, “in this article of charge, the Presbytery bring in their favourite distinction, (as he calls it), between a providential and preceptive magistrate;” a distinction that has ever been allowed and acknowledged by every sober thinking person, and particularly, by both the church and nation of Scotland about the middle of the last century. See a Testimony and Warning against the Toleration, by the Presbytery of Edinburgh, October 5. 1659, where, in stating and answering objections against their Testimony, they speak thus;

“Object. 1. A testimony will but irritate the providen-

[Page 151]

tial magistrate, (viz. Oliver Cromwell,) under whose power we are.

Answ. It is the kindly fruit of a faithful testimony, to torment them that dwell on the earth, Rev. xi. 10. compared with Rev. xii. 11.

Again, Object. 8. Diverse godly ministers and others will be content to give in a testimony against toleration, providing they may have this clause inserted in it, That we shall live peaceably under the providential magistrate.

Answ. It were not wisdom for any such to obstruct, or clear duty by a most unclear clause, &c.”

Thus we may see how commonly this distinction was used and acknowledged then. Mr. Goodlet however roars mightily against it for a little, and then falls to the Billingsgate scold, to ease his stomach; says he, “They have no argument to support their distinction, but some fruitless attempts, and shameless sophistry, so lumpish, that one may feel it through a pair of mittens.” Language most surprising! more becoming the mouth of a mountebank [charlatan], or Merry-Andrew [clown] on a stage, than a sober Christian, or minister of the gospel. Is this the argument he uses to overthrow their distinction? A mercenary tongue will say any thing for its hire; what will the unjust advocate not say for money, in behalf of his client? It is easy to speak in a cause at this rate. Mr. Goodlet must willingly overlook the Presbytery’s arguments, justly and candidly digested under nine considerations at large, wherein they offer both reason and arguments to support the necessary distinction betwixt the preceptive and providential will of God; and at the same time, have disconcerted the fallacious deceit, and counterfeit reasoning of Seceders on this point. After all, the Presbytery’s arguments remain entirely untouched, and in full force against Seceders, on this head of necessary distinction. After a tedious transcription out of the Defence, he refers the distinction to an after examination; only, says he, “I would willingly know what is the distinction they make between a providential moral duty, and a preceptive moral duty.” If it could be supposed that Mr. Goodlet was really ignorant of the necessary and proper distinction between the providential and preceptive will of God, it were truly a great pity but to lay some useful lessons of instruction before him; but it is evi-

[Page 152]

dent this is not the case, from his own concession, page 12. They, viz. the Reformed Presbytery, “would have the world believe, that the Associate Synod has it for a principle, that there is no distinction can be made betwixt the preceptive, and providential will of God; that providence, in all respects, is the rule of duty, as much as the precept is;—that providence is a complete rule without the written word.” I believe the charge may be just enough, and sufficiently proven too, as a necessary consequence of their antiscriptural scheme: however, the Presbytery are far from desiring the world to believe any other thing of Seceders, than what they profess to be, among the new articles of their faith proposed to be believed; yea, and not so much, or then they would have the world believe new articles of faith, without any foundation in the word: but the Presbytery have cause to apprehend the credulous world may fall under the power of seduction, by giving implicit credit to their new notions of faith, which respect the preceptive and providential will of God; and was the Presbytery so disposed, as Mr. Goodlet represents them, they would have something still more odious to proclaim to the world, viz. Mr. Goodlet’s confused unintelligible question, “What may be the distinction between a providential moral duty, and a preceptive moral duty?” I have already answered this in the preceding chapter, and shall only here observe, that these terms are singularly new and strange. A “providential moral duty,” is void of any good and solid sense and meaning, unless providence were to be allowed as our rule of duty, separate from the word, which cannot be admitted. In like manner, a “preceptive moral duty,” in his terms, is certainly a mere tautology in language; the same as if one would say, a moral moral duty. For though there are, it may be, some duties that are preceptive, that cannot, in the strict sense of the word, be called moral, yet there is no moral duty but it is preceptive; so that it would appear this loose and vague way of speaking, is used only to be a screen over some rotten principle, for though the setting up of magistrates among any people be a moral duty, (as I have already allowed), yet it is false to assert, that the setting up of any sort of men, among any people, is a moral duty. (This however is the foundation and origin of this ignorance query Mr. Goodlet puts here, as has been

[Page 153]

demonstrated above), viz. That whomsoever the civil society in any nation set up, be he Pagan, Papist, Atheist, or be what he will, he is the ordinance of God, according to his word. Well; but the next question is, How Seceders are to clear themselves of the charge imputed to them? Mr. Goodlet offers not the least defence here; but wants to know the difference, and yet refuses the accusation to be just. How can he know it to be unjust, and yet be ignorant in the matter? This indeed is somewhat enigmatical: But if he wants to be informed, let him consult the Presbytery’s reasons, which they use for the support of their distinction; if he finds them unjust, let him reject them with reason and argument; but till this be done, their reasons remain in full force, and the Seceding scheme is thereby condemned at once. And after all, if his ignorance remains, pains must be taken to instruct him. Mr. Goodlet concludes this article of charge with another question; “If, says he, the providential magistrate derive his office from God as the supreme Lord and King of all the world; from whom doth the preceptive magistrate derive his? Here they must be plain, and speak out.” I own this way of reasoning brings this point more directly to a crisis; and for decision of it, at his desire, I am willing to be plain, and speak out. I thought the Presbytery had been plain enough already; But since, not to his satisfaction, I am ready to oblige him a little further in the language of plain ingenuity, without known guile or deceit in the matter.

And first, In general, I own there is a plain difference, and proper distinction to be made between persons being only providentially exalted to the throne of regal dignity and kingly power; and those that are regularly and more directly called to kingly government and authority, conform to the institution and preceptive will of God revealed in the scriptures of truth, the only unerring rule of faith and life, both for superiors and inferiors.

Secondly, and more particularly, I own and affirm;

1st, That all power and authority is originally from God; the supreme King and Lord of heaven and earth, Rom. xiii. 1. (only I am here to be understood as speaking of lawful instituted authority, and of no other.) The power and authority that our Lord Jesus Christ hath as Mediator is from God, Matth. xxviii. 18. All power is given un-

[Page 154]

to me in heaven and in earth. John xvii. 2. Thou hast given him power over all flesh.

2dly, I own and affirm, That the magistratical office and power is of God, and from him, and is not immediately derived from Christ as Mediator: as, on the other hand, the ministerial office and power, though ultimately, originally, and mediately of God, yet is immediately from our Lord Jesus Christ the Mediator, the king and head of his church, 2 Cor. v. 20. Now then, we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us. Gal. i. 1. Paul an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised him from the dead. Nevertheless,

3dly, Though the magistrate’s office and power be from God as Creator, and not from Christ as Mediator, yet it is undeniably clear and plain from scripture revelation, that this office and power is put in subjection to the Mediator, To whom there is given dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him, Dan. vii. 14. All things are put in subjection under his feet, Heb. ii. 8. 9. Angels, authorities and powers are made subject to him. He is made both Lord and Christ, Acts ii. 36. and exalted, to be head, (an head of power and government,) over all things to his church, which is his body, Eph. i. 22. 23. The sum and import of all these sacred texts, (with relation to this particular under our present consideration), is, (1.) That this glorious and august person* hath

_____

* “All power on earth is given unto Christ, what is that? This to be sure follows of consequence; for he that hath all power in heaven, cannot but have all power on earth. And I think this imports two things;—a power over the earth, and a power under the earth. 1. A power over the earth; tho’ his kingdom be not of this world, but distinct from all earthly kingdoms, yet he hath a general power over all things, and all persons on earth, from the greatest to the most minute; for, he being King of kings, and Lord of lords, his kingdom rules over all. His providential power and government extends from the king upon the throne, to the sparrow upon the bush; from the disposing of kingdoms and scepters on the earth, to the numbering of the hairs on our head.” R. Erskine’s works, sermon 51. intitled, The Mediator’s Power in Heaven and Earth.

[Page 155]

the sole power of the actual disposal of this office, place, and dignity, throughout the whole world, put into, and lodged in his hand. Thereupon, he is represented, Rev. xix. as having many crowns upon his head*, and as having on his vesture, and on his thigh, a name written, King of kings, and Lord of lords†. He that rules in Jacob, (Psal. lix. 13.) rules to the ends of the earth; even as to those kingdoms among men, and such dominion as is acquired in a most irregular way; such as take their occasional rise and beginning from the deepest human disorder and confusion. Such were those four kingdoms mentioned, Dan. vii. which sprung from the striving of the four winds upon the great sea. Yet he rules even in these ragings of the sea, and tumults of the people, Psal. lxv. 7. He sits at the helm, both ordering these confusions, over-ruling and disposing the issues of them so as to fulfil his own will, purposes, and ends, which are various, but all pointing

_____

* The words of Dr. Guise’s excellent Paraphrase on both these texts are well worth the reader’s attentive notice; ver. 12.——And on his head were many crowns.—“And on his head was a representation of many crowns, set, as it were one upon another; the symbols of his natural and mediatorial authority, and universal dominion over the church and the world, in all spiritual and temporal concerns, and of his subduing all nations and things unto himself.”

† Ver. 16. And he hath on his vesture, and on his thigh, &c. “And this victorious avenger of his church upon his and their enemies, was further represented as having an inscription of another of his distinguishing titles, like a motto wrote upon his upper raiment, and particularly that part of it which covered his thigh, the place where the sword usually hangs, in order to its being drawn, (Psal. xlv. 3), and where it might be visible to all around him, (King of kings, and Lord of lords), importing, that he is, and by his mighty acts, would soon effectually prove himself to be, by way of eminence, the sovereign Lord and Ruler of all the potentates, princes, and nobles of the earth, (far beyond what the vain-glorious monarchs of the East could claim), to govern, influence, or restrain, save, or destroy them, and to do his will and work, by, and upon them, as seems best in his sight.” Guise’s Paraphrase on the New Testament, vol. 3.

[Page 156]

towards the coming and enlargement of his own kingdom* among men. However men may fight, strive, and contend for dignity, rule, and pre-eminency in the world, work and counter-work one another, without any acknowledgment of God in their actings, without any regard to the rules of justice and righteousness, but in all designedly fulfil their own lusts and wills, yet they, their actions, and the final issue of them, are wholly in the hand of this supreme disposer of all things and all events. See Isaiah x. 7. xiv. 15. So that, as the inspired psalmist speaks, Psal. lxxv. 6, 7. Promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south; but God is the judge, he putteth down one, and setteth up another. No men get into these places of power and eminence over others, without, or contrary to his providential will and disposal. Nay, it is to be observed further, (though the workings of his providence in this, as well as various other instances, be particularly deep and mysterious), That he hath a sovereign and holy hand in raising up and exalting even such unto superiority of place, and power over men, as pervert, and, from their malignant and vile dispositions, can do no other than pervert and abuse such power, to tyranny, oppression, and all acts of injustice: he sets up, and hath in the way of

_____

* “This, (here, viz. Dan. vii. 2. 13.) is a perpetual antithesis and opposition that is put between the kingdoms of this world, and the kingdom of Christ, that they rise out of the strivings of the winds upon the sea; he comes with the clouds of heaven: They are brought in by commotions, tumults, wars, desolations, and so shall all the shakings of the nations be, to punish them for their old opposition, and to translate them into a subserviency to his interest. The coming in of the kingdom of Christ shall not be by the arm of flesh, nor shall it be the product of the strifes and contests of men. It is not to be done by might or power, but by the Spirit of the Lord of hosts, Zech. iv. 6. Great wars, desolations, alterations shall precede it; but it is not the sons of men that by outward force shall build the New Jerusalem that comes down from heaven adorn’d as a bride for Christ. It shall be by the glorious manifestation of his own power, and that by his Spirit subduing the souls of men unto it.” Owen, ubi supra, 434. serm. entitled, Christ’s Kingdom, and the Magistrate’s power.

[Page 157]

his providence, exalted such to be a scourge and plague to mankind in general, and sometimes particularly to his church and people. To this purpose see Exod. ix. 16. Rom. ix. 17. The scripture saith of Pharaoh, even for this same purpose I have raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee. And Hab. i. 12. The prophet (speaking of the oppressive ravenous Chaldean tyrant, &c. says, O Lord, thou hast ordained them for judgment; and, O mighty God, thou hast established them for correction. Thus it is threatened, Isa. iii. 4. I will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them. And the Lord, by the prophet Ezekiel, speaking of the unrighteous and wicked acts of their unrighteous rulers, owns them as from himself in the way of judgment and punishment on the people, for their revolting from, and trampling upon his righteous laws and statutes, Ezek. xx. 25. Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they could not live. Thus we may clearly see from the word of God, what sovereign disposing, ruling, and over-ruling power our Lord Jesus Christ the Mediator hath, in reference to the affairs of this world, the rulers and kingdoms thereof. Thus he rules supreme over those who regard no law, divine nor human, but act arbitrarily and according to their own lusts. And thus, in this sense, it will be readily owned, that all magistrates, or such as are in the place, or bear the name of magistrates, whatever, or whoever they be, are providential. Divine providence concurs in bringing to pass whatever comes to pass in the world, good, or bad; but it is justly denied, that all providential magistrates are also preceptive, and that because it is evidently contradictory both to scripture and to common sense.

(2.) Another thing that belongs to the headship and supreme power of the Mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ, with reference to the civil magistrate, is, That he hath both the law, and the administration of the law of this institution in his hand, both as it is expressed in the book of nature, and in the book of Scripture; and that as to the distribution both of rewards and punishments, Psal. xxii. 28. The kingdom is the Lord’s, and he is the governour among the nations. Every one of these particulars may be undeniably clear, these things considered;

1. That our Lord Jesus Christ hath both the book of nature

[Page 158]

nature and providence, wherein the law of nature is originally written and expressed, in his hand: he hath the administration of the kingdom of providence in his hand, as hath been proved above, and will, I suppose, be granted on all hands, and what it would be most injurious to deny. But if the kingdom of nature and providence, and the management thereof, be in the hand of Christ, it will evidently, and without contradiction follow, that the law of nature is in his hand. And that the same law, (and the administration of it), as it is expressed to us in scripture, is in his hand, none will nor can refuse. For the illustration of this a little, and to clear it from the imputation of novelty, I shall here insert some of the words of an old divine, who has been generally esteemed both sound and singularly judicious. “That (says he) which we call the light of nature, and the light of the law, (that is of scripture,) is gathered up and centered in Christ. As that light which was in the world before the fourth day of the creation was gathered and embodied in the sun, and from thence flowed to the world. All the light was created to be brought into that body, and to flow from thence upon the several parts of the world, and to be communicated from thence to other creatures; so that there is no light in the world but from and by the sun; and no light of the knowledge of God but from and by Christ. Some therefore make the sun a natural type of Christ; as the sun was created the fourth day of the creation, so Christ was incarnate about the four thousandth year of the world, the fourth divine day, a thousand years being as one day in God’s sight. All light was only to flow from it; and indeed, all the light of the knowledge of God that ever was, did spring from Christ; none ever knew God by his own strength and natural abilities, but as they were kept up and animated by the Mediator*.”

2. For further proof of this, let it be considered, that Christ the Mediator is equally the judge and avenger of the breaches of the law of nature among the heathen nations of the world, (who have not, and so cannot, sin against the written law), as he is of the violation and contempt of the written law, among those who are favoured with the light thereof. For ascertaining this truth, I shall only refer

_____

* Charnock’s works, vol. ii. page 477.

[Page 159]

the reader to the serious perusal of the whole first chapter, and to the ninth verse of the second chapter of the prophecy of Amos. There the prophet, in the name of the Lord, denounces many very dreadful comminations [threatenings] of wrath and punishment against a number of heathen cities and nations, (viz. Damascus, Syria, Tyrus, Edom, Moab, Ammon, Gaza, &c.) for their outrageous violations of the law of nature, (by inhumanity, cruelty, treachery, &c.) as well as, at the same time, and in the same name, threatens the people of Judah and Israel with awful divine wrath, for their contempt and violation of the written law of God delivered unto them. In place of inserting the whole of these verses referred to, it may suffice here to note down and compare verses 13. and 14. of chapter first, with the 4. and 5. verses of the second chapter. Thus saith the Lord, For three transgressions of the children of Ammon, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they have ripped up the women with child of Gilead.—But I will kindle a fire in the wall of Rabbah, and it shall devour the palaces thereof.—Thus saith the Lord, For three transgressions of Judah, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof: Because they have despised the law of the Lord, and have not kept his commandments, and their lies caused them to err, after the which their fathers have walked. But I will send a fire upon Judah, and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem. Notwithstanding of this I have inserted, I would recommend the whole verses above-mentioned to the reader’s attentive consideration, from which it will appear evident to a demonstration, that our Lord Jesus Christ, as Mediator, is equally the judge and avenger of the breaches of the law of nature, as he is of those of the written law expressed in scripture revelation, and therefore must certainly and undeniably have it in his hand and custody, as the great custos et vindex legis divinae, (i.e. the keeper and avenger of the divine law), which way soever it is expressed, or made known to men.*

_____

* I am very sensible that what I have said above in explaining and proving this very intricate and critical point, the headship, power, and authority of our Lord Jesus Christ as Mediator, is contrary to the sentiments of some of our own reforming divines, particularly those of Mr. Gillespie on this head, expressed

[Page 160]

(3.) Another thing that evidently belongs to this headship and power of our Lord Jesus Christ, with reference to the ordinance of the civil magistrate, is, That all those

_____

[continued from page 159] in his book against the Erastians, entitled, Aaron’s Rod blossoming. It may be evident to any judicious and intelligent reader, that Mr. Gillespie hath gone into some particular sentimental extremes in his disputations against the Erastians, as odd and out of the way as those of his contemporary and fellow soldier, the famous Mr. Rutherfoord fell into, in his controversy with the Antinomians. He seems to me to advance some things in defence of the truth he pleads for, really and greatly injurious to the truth; greatly injurious to the scripture doctrine of the Mediator’s supreme and universal headship of power over all persons and things, wherewith he is clothed by the Father, who hath made him both Lord and Christ, Acts ii. 36. Philip. ii. 9. 10. Take one instance of this, in place of more that I could give; Mr. Gillespie speaks and writes, as if he had believed, that the actual moral government of the nations of the world was divided between God as Creator, and Christ the Mediator: That God as Creator, governs the Heathen world by the law of nature and nations, and consequently, that Christ is concerned with those parts only, that are enlightened with divine revelation by the written law expressed in scripture. (Vide Aaron’s Rod blossoming, page 244.) This carries the appearance of a denial of Christ’s power and dominion as Mediator, as in no respect extending further than over the church: Nay, from page 194, to page 430, he purposely disputes against it, and explodes it. I own these great men were raised up and honoured of God to appear for and plead his cause and truth; nevertheless, there was no necessity that, in pleading for, and vindicating one truth, they should have spoken and asserted such things as were injurious and wounding to other of the truths of God. The truth might have been cleared and established against all their and its adversaries, (and may still be), without raising any such method. The same seems to have been the case with them, in some particulars of this kind, as with him in another case, of whom the poet says, Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim. [He falls into Scylla while wishing to avoid Charybdis.] I know well, that some are so attached to these great men, that they think it little less than heresy to contradict any thing they have said. For my part, I would desire rather to be of Paul’s mind, Gal. ii. 11. To withstand them to the face, wherein they are to be blamed; and (as we are taught by the highest authority), to call no man father, though their names otherwise be precious to me.

[Page 161]

gifts, qualifications, and moral endowments that are fundamentally necessary to the actual being and constitution of instituted rule and government, (i.e. such as are necessary to fit men for the execution of such a work and trust,) are undoubtedly by and from him. This I take to be the most obvious sense of Prov. viii. 14. 15. 16. Counsel is mine, and sound wisdom——by me kings reign, and princes decree justice; By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth. Where we may observe these things,

1. The person speaking, Christ the eternal Wisdom of God, as mediator, as all commentators agree. That Wisdom here is a person, and not the property or attribute of wisdom only, is evident from the use of the personal pronouns, I, mine; that it is Christ as Mediator that here speaks, is also evident, (1.) From the words of verse 23. I was set up from everlasting; wherein, to ascertain his authority and divine commission to speak and call to men, and the sons of men, he declares his constitution from everlasting to that work. Compare Psalm ii. 7. (2.) From his avouching counsel, wisdom, strength, righteousness, &c. to be his, in some singular distinctive way, which can be understood of him no otherwise than as Mediator, in whom dwells all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; for otherwise these equally belong to the Father and Holy Spirit. Compare with this John xvi. 15. All things that the Father hath, are mine; and Matth. xi. 27.

_____

* To what I have said already concerning the Mediator’s supremacy and headship, I shall here just add the sentiments of the grave and judicious author of the Fulfilling of the Scriptures, part i. page 320. third edition. “It is clear (saith he) that the Lord hath declared that it is his counsel and will, that his Son Christ should, in the latter times, take unto him his great power and reign, Rev. xi. 17. yea, cause the world know him to be, head of principalities and powers, as well as of the church. For his glory in this truth as a king, which former ages seem’d in so great a measure to darken, must then clearly shine forth. I truly think men’s appearing with such violence and rage against so concerning a truth, now in these days, doth promise some eminent appearance of the Lord therein, and that he shall yet more solemnly assert the same before the world.”

[Page 162]

2. What is spoken, or what he speaks of himself. By me kings reign, and princes decree justice. Here there is nothing said of the office itself, or of the different species of civil officers and government. He does not say, this, or these, are by me, or of my ordination. These are indeed all of him, and by him, as the God of nature, but not the God of grace, or as Mediator; but he speaks only of the persons that exercise and administrate these offices. Concerning them he says, By me kings reign, &c. i.e. (1.) “They are made kings by him, and are under him; (not in the way of subordination, but of subserviency and subjection;) he sets them up, and deposes them at pleasure; they have their kingdoms, crowns, and sceptres from him, (as hath been above shewn), and are accountable to him,” not only as men, but as kings; For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, John v. 22. (2.) And what I think more principally intended here, is, That all those qualifications and virtuous endowments that fit and enable persons for the discharge of this office, so as to answer the ends of the institution, viz. the glory of God, and good of men, are by him and from him, in whose hand all that wisdom, prudence, knowledge, &c. which is designed to be given to men, either of a common or saving kind, is lodged. Hence the many scripture promises of good and righteous rulers, Isa. i. 26. And I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning: afterward thou shalt be called, The city of righteousness, the faithful city. Isa. xlix. 23. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet, and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me. Isa. lx. 17. For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver, and for wood brass, and for stones iron: I will also make thy officers peace, and thine exactors righteousness. Here I observe two things, 1. That the Spirit of God does by no means sustain or approve the characters and persons of all that are so called without exception, or have such power in their hand, as kings, princes, rulers, but such as reign, or rule; such as are not useless, idle, inactive, being uncapable, or unwilling to perform the duties of the office, but such as are active and vigilant; such as rule, i.e. act according

[Page 163]

to rule, according to the rule and law of the institution; such as govern orderly, wisely, righteously. No other kind of administration but such, is here sustained as government; and no other persons but such as do so, are here sustained and homologated as at all deserving of the name of kings or rulers. By me kings reign, and princes decree justice. 2. That this actual reign, rule, and government, which the Spirit of God here only sustains, as of divine appointment, is founded upon, and arises from the actual, (and not the supposed,) possession of those moral scriptural qualifications, (about the necessity of which to the being of kings and government, the contest is between the Associate and the Reformed Presbytery.) It is morally impossible for any man to act wisely, justly, righteously, but from the subjective knowledge and principles of wisdom, justice, and righteousness. This is that which the wisdom of God here affirms, By me, i.e. by wisdom that comes from me, Kings reign, and princes decree justice; and without which no man is morally capable of reigning, whatever power he may have in his hand, nor yet of decreeing justice; uncapable either of enacting, or of executing good and righteous laws already made. The truth of this particular may further and more clearly appear, from the instances of Moses, Numb. xi. 17. of Joshua, Numb. xxvii. 18. of Saul, 1 Sam. x. 9. of David, 1 Sam. xiii. 14. of Solomon, 1 Kings iii. 9. 12. And moreover, though these gifts and qualifications that are thus necessary for the execution and discharge of this office be, in respect of their measure and degree, distinguishing, yet, being but common in respect of kind, the dispensation of them is not wholly confined to the members of the visible church; nay, they have sometimes been bestowed on Heathens who knew not God: a very particular instance of which, recorded in scripture history and prophecy, is that of Cyrus, Isa. xlv. who, on account of the singular endowments wherewith he was furnished of God in order to his performance of the work he designed him for, is called, The Lord’s anointed, verse 1. and verse 4. and 5.——I have called thee by thy name, I have surnamed thee:—I have girded thee with strength, though thou hast not known me. From all which it may be abundantly clear, that all these flow from him, in whose hand the spirit of princes is; who bestows, and removes them at his pleasure, Job.

[Page 164]

xii. 19, and 21. Psal. lxxvi. 12. I have now, in compliance with Mr. Goodlet’s desire, been very plain, and have spoken out. I have been, I doubt, more plain than pleasant. However, as I have endeavoured to form my sentiments on this head from, and according to the light of scripture, it will give me but little trouble though they should be contrary to his system and prejudices. What I have said exhibits a complete answer to his question, viz. “If the providential magistrate derive his office from God, as the supreme King and Lord of all the world, from whence does the preceptive magistrate derive his?” The sum of all just comes to this. The office of both, in itself considered, is from God as Creator, and is not from Christ as Mediator, or, an ordinance of his; but is put into his disposing hand in subjection and subserviency to him, to be ordered and disposed of by him, for the glory of God, and good of men; and especially of good men, or of his church in this world, 1 Pet. ii. 14. Rom. xii. 3. 4. 1 Tim. iv. 10. As a piece of money is money, is the same in itself, and of the same nature and origin, in the hand of a thief or robber, who has violently taken it away, as it was when in the hand and possession of the rightful proprietor; or as sword is the same, when in the hand of a robber or assassin, who is set, and resolved to use it only to the hurt and prejudice of others, as when in the hand of a wise and good man, who is ready and disposed to apply it for the benefit and defence of others, as well as his own. Thus it is with respect to the magistratical power or office abstractly considered: but neither the power abstractly, nor the person abstractly, can make God’s ordinance; but, in order to this, both must go together, and both are required to be lawful, that is, such as are commanded and allowed by the preceptive will of God revealed. If Mr. Goodlet by his “providential magistrate,” means such a person as merely by the favour of providence, without the consent and election of the people, and without, (or perhaps possessing the contrary of) those qualifications which both the law of God and light of nature indispensably require, gets into the possession of the sovereign power, I deny that any such can be called a magistrate; such have no more institution in either the law of nature, or scripture, than thieves and robbers have: So that, in order to anticipate objections or mistakes about what I have said

[Page 165]

above, of the disposing power wherewith the Son of God as Mediator, is clothed, with respect to the magistratical power and dignity, I must here observe, that I am far from thinking that this power of his is exercised merely and only in a providential way, or that he at all, or in any instance, acts herein by himself in an immediate way, without the intervention of natural and subordinate means. He neither deprives men of that natural and original right they have to choose their magistrates and rulers, nor confers any new or additional one, (as Mr. Goodlet would insinuate the Reformed Presbytery maintain); well, what does he then? He does not institute or appoint the office, but enjoins the maintenance of it, as already appointed, (and so much the more expressly, as there is the more need of it by reason of the confusion that sin hath brought in,) for the preservation of order, justice, and righteousness among men, Gen. ix. 5. 6. He exhibits, renews, and confirms the original law of this institution, as being to be continued in force. He inculcates the observation of those instructions, rules, and precepts contained in, and belonging to the law of this ordinance, both those for the guiding and regulation of the people, in using the right they have to choose and set up rulers, and those belonging to rulers, for their direction and regulation in the execution and discharge of their office, so as that the ends of the institution may be accomplished. Those who will not listen to his commandments, nor submit to receive the law from him, but walk according to their own lusts, he severely punishes, making their sinful wills and ways their plague and punishment, Psalm lxxxi. 11. 12. Ezek. xx. 25. Hence kings, rulers, and judges are exhorted, yea required, under pain of his displeasure, and destroying indignation, if disobedient, to acknowledge him as their Lord; not only giving him the kiss of worship and adoration, but of subjection and obedience, Psalm ii. 10. 11. 12. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth; serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way. Thus the Messiah is to be the Lord and Judge of the law of this institution, whether expressed in nature or scripture. He is the Lord of magistrates. I may appeal to any person of judgment, what more absurdity can there be in calling him so, than in his being called the Lord of

[Page 166]

the Sabbath, which was an institution belonging to the original and primitive state of nature; but so he declares himself to be, Mark ii. 27. 28. The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath; therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath, Matth. xii. 8. The learned Dr. Guise explains this text thus; “Christ is that Lord of the Sabbath who instituted it at first in the state of innocency, and renewed the institution at mount Sinai; and therefore must have an original right in himself, to make what circumstantial alterations he pleases about it, and as agreeable to the nature and design of the gospel dispensation he has changed it from the seventh to the first day of the week.—The Messiah has a divine right as Lord of the Sabbath, to order what he judges most proper to be done in subserviency to his honour, and his disciples good, relating to the sabbath day.” (Paraphrase, vol. 1.) And if so, surely he may be allowed an equal right and power with respect to magistracy and magistrates. What I have said on this particular, will completely serve as the fulfilment of my proposal and engagement expressed, page 49. The whole I must submit to the judgment of the candid and impartial reader, and proceed.

Fourth article of charge, page 45. Testimony, page 110. This last article of charge, has surely brought the Reformed Presbytery into a very deep dilemma; they have charged the Seceders with a certain thing they will neither own nor yet defend. The article of charge is, “That no act, or even habitual series of the greatest wickedness, and mal-administration can forfeit the person’s right to the people’s subjection, for conscience sake, considered as individuals, while the majority of the nation continue to recognize, and own his authority.” To this Mr. Goodlet answers nothing; but gives us some tedious transcriptions and transpositions out of the Defence, and Mr. Rutherfoord, excepting some bitter satire and ill humour, when he enters the front, and closes the rear, in this last article of charge. His introduction is this, “It is surely a great misfortune, in having such a strong inclination to calumny, yet to have such a poor invention for it.” Mr. Goodlet seems to glory in a thing of nought, or rather in a thing that should be a man’s shame. Was I to answer him, by the law of retaliation, it might be called a dirty talk to enter the lists with any railing Rabshakeh. He

[Page 167]

seems very proud, that he hath such a quick genius and lively invention to calumny; as this boasting is not good, but an evil quality in any man, especially in any divine or minister, I claim no pre-eminence in this his masterly superiority.

That this article of charge against Seceders, is very just, according to their scheme of principles anent civil government, is evident. Mr. Goodlet first, is something like the incendiary informers against the saints in the late persecution, Clamoribus aliquem consectari [To pursue someone with outcries]. His great complaint is, That the Reformed Presbytery insinuates as if Seceders were of Jacobitish principles; but does he consider their reasons for that? very far from it: he passes them over in smooth silence. They say, Defence, page 55. “They cannot swear the present allegiance to the civil government, seeing there are no oaths to the government in being, but what excludes the oath of our covenants, or homologates the united constitution.” The Presbytery’s words are, page 127. “Seeing they acknowledge, that every constitution of government, that comprehends the will and consent of the civil society, were it as wicked and diabolical as can be imagined, is lawful, yea, as lawful as any that is most consonant to the preceptive will of God, having all the essentials of his ordinance; and seeing, because of the will and consent of the people, they own the present to be lawful, it is most surprising why they cannot swear allegiance to it. Their reasons cannot, in a consistency with their principles, be sustained as valid: That the present oaths of allegiance, and the oath of the covenants are inconsistent is readily granted; but seeing the oath of allegiance binds to nothing more than what they confess they are bound to do for conscience sake, namely to own the lawfulness of the government, and to maintain it, according to the constitution thereof, (which is a duty owned by subjects as to every lawful sovereign); and seeing that whatever is in the oath of allegiance contrary to the covenants, doth not flow from them, abstractly considered, but from the constitution to which they bind, (which constitution is sanctified by the people’s acknowledgment of it). If therefore the covenants forbid a duty, to which they are bound for conscience sake, their authority in that ought not to be regarded; but

[Page 168]

certainly Seceders, who have found it duty to alter and model the covenants according to the circumstances of the times they live in, might have found it easy work to reconcile the oath of the covenants with allegiance to a lawful government.—The other part of their reason is no less ridiculous and self contradictory, viz. they cannot swear allegiance to the present government, because it homologates the united constitution. But is not this constitution according to the will and consent of the body politic? and is it not ordained by the providential will of God?” (Then, according to Mr. Goodlet’s providential moral duty, allegiance to the present government is a moral duty also; but it seems he forgot the argument of the Synod, which hath made him blunder in his terms, about a providential moral duty;) “therefore according to them, has all the essentials of a lawful constitution, which claims their protection, under pain of damnation: how great is the paradox! they cannot swear allegiance, because that would bind them to acknowledge and defend a lawful constitution: Is not active obedience, is not professed subjection for conscience sake, an homologation of the constitution? Certainly they are, and that not in word only, but in deed and in truth.—And what is the allegiance but a promise to persevere in what they do daily, and what they hold as their indispensable duty to do? To grant the one then, and refuse the other, is, in effect to homologate or acknowledge the constitution, and not to acknowledge it at the same time, which is a glaring absurdity.”

Page 137, the Presbytery give other more particular reasons why Seceders cannot swear allegiance to the present government, in a consistency with themselves, viz. “Because then they would be bound by oath to continue faithful to this government in all changes that can happen: whereas now they are free, and equally ready, in a full consistency with their principles, to profess their subjection to another, were it even a Popish pretender; for, according to them, an infidel or Papist may have a just and lawful authority over us, notwithstanding all both reformation and revolution laws to the contrary: If therefore the legislature would in the oaths of allegiance insert this limitation, viz. So long as the body politic is pleased to acknowledge the supreme magistrate,

[Page 169]

they would find it easier to come over their other pretended and inconsistent difficulties; for the truth is, they cannot, in a consistency with their anti-government scheme; and with safe consciences, swear to any government, but with such limitation, in regard they cannot be sure but he that is now owned by civil society, may be rejected, and another set up, who must be acknowledged; so they would be brought into an inextricable dilemma; either they must own them both to be God’s ordinance, which is absurd, or then be perjured, by rejecting him to whom they had sworn; or then incur damnation, by refusing obedience to him who is set up by the body politic: Such is the labyrinth of confusion and contradiction this anarchical system leads into; a system that cancels all constitutions by God and men anent civil government.”

Mr. Goodlet takes no notice of any of the above cited arguments, which is a reason why I have re-inserted them for his further consideration, and for conviction from his error, if he should write again.

2. Mr. Goodlet, in transcribing the words of the Associate Presbytery, carefully suppresses, and glides over in silence, the material part in which the article of charge is founded, which abundantly proves the point. Page 54, “Mere usurpers can have no lawful authority; (here he passes over,) and if they shall acquire the consent of the people, whether expressed or tacit, they then cease to be mere usurpers, and are invested with authority whereunto God commands subjection and obedience in matters lawful.”

It is certain the article of charge is founded here. This was exactly the case in persecuting times before the Revolution, respecting the two united socii criminis [partners in crime]. The first was indeed vested with regal power, on a reforming footing, according to the deed of civil constitution in our best times for reformation: But how soon did the fatal overthrow commence, by the wicked laws, anno 1661. condemning and razing our covenanted reformation? all sound and wholesome laws rescinded, abjured Prelacy and Popery caressed and nourished; perjury, treachery, and tyranny screwed to a prodigious height; desperate hostility against the lives and liberties of the subjects of Zion’s king, all carried on with heaven-daring impiety, yet still

[Page 170]

under the wings of civil government; and yet this raging tyrant, after all he had done against religion and liberty, was still owned by the majority as king and head over all causes civil and ecclesiastic, and so must be a lawful king in lawful authority, according to seceding principles, seeing the majority of the nation still continued to recognize his authority. Further, pages 57, 58, the very reasons the Associate Synod give for the preceding concession, Mr. Goodlet carefully passes over, because, say they, “That civil authority, having its rise in the consent of the people, according to the law of nature, it could not be subverted by their defections and apostacy, or yet by their kings, though wanting scripture qualifications.”

What was in the case of the two tyrants, that this conclusion made by Seceders will not screen, justify, and apologize for in them? Their assertion is, That neither defection, apostacy, or want of scripture qualifications, can make void their authority. The last of these foaming beasts of tyranny, though his claim to regal power was by mere usurpation, yet it is certain, he got a tacit, if not an express consent, which is all that Seceders allow to be essential to kingly authority, when that is obtained from the body politic; which it appears he had from their ugly congratulations, expressing their grateful acknowledgment of his Majesty’s gracious surprising favours to them. This was from the kirk, and what then might be expected from the bloody state at that time. From all which it may evidently appear, that this article of charge against Seceders is not fictitious.

But I have another evidence still behind for the proof of the truth of this article of charge against Seceders, the authority of which Mr. Goodlet will perhaps pay more regard to than any other. This testimony I take from his own mouth and pen, page 70. “Ministers (says he) may degenerate into no ministers of Christ, while they continue to have the people’s consent, whereas magistrates cannot possibly degenerate into no magistrates while they continue to have it.” This of itself is evidence sufficient to prove it, were there no more; at least to prove that it is Mr. Goodlet’s own sentiment, so that he had no reason to storm against it so much as he does. And, in the instances given above, there was the people’s consent. The persons were guilty of the greatest habitual series of wicked-

[Page 171]

edness, (the people also concurring with them in their wickedness), and yet they were still the ordinance of God in a moral sense, according to Mr. Goodlet. From the whole, the impartial world may judge whether the four articles of charge are not sufficiently proven against Seceders, as being a just anatomy, and complete abridgement of their principles anent civil government.

Mr. Goodlet next tacks about a little till he regains strength; goes off the field directly, and falls a beating at the Reformed Presbytery for spending about five pages in citing scripture to prove, “That the actual possession of the throne, under the favour of providence, and by the consent of the majority of the nation, may be in one, whilst the moral power, and right of government is in another;” he grants this would be a bold stroke indeed, could they accomplish it. It is most certain they have accomplished it with great success in point of argument. “But, (says he), nay, they have come far short of doing so, any person will see plainly;” (he might have excepted them who have no eyes to see with,) he finds “it not worth his while to make any particular reply.” There must be no error that he could find vented here, or then it is worth his while to examine every one of them in particular. However, it would appear upon a second reflection, he finds it worth his while to reply only to the particular instance of Saul and David; yet only by an attorney substitute in his own room. But why the instance of Saul and David only? says he, “They lay the whole stress of their proof in that example.” But how did he come to know that? the Presbytery did not say so; perhaps he speaks by some secret prediction, or otherwise it could not be, because it was either first or last of the instances given, and examples condescended upon; it is something dubious why he pitches on this particular instance; but it seems to be this, he had Mr. Rutherfoord, though improperly, substitute to speak for him here; the rest of the examples given he was at a loss where to find advocates to appear in his cause.

For correction to Mr. Goodlet’s reply to this particular instance of Saul and David, let it be considered,

First, He greatly injures the Presbytery in the citation of their words; they say, “After that Saul, by his disobedience to the commandment of the Lord, had forfeited

[Page 172]

his title to the kingdom, he was no more honoured as king by Samuel the prophet; but on the contrary, he openly testified to his face, that the Lord had rejected him from being king, 1 Sam. xv. 26. to 35.” Here the Presbytery adds, “Though he mourned over him as one rejected, he no more acknowledged him as clothed with the authority of a lawful king; nay, the Lord having rejected him, reproves his prophet for mourning for him, 1 Sam. xvi. 1.” Mr. Rutherfoord, Lex Rex, page 14. sect. 8. has no rational connection, as any confutation of the Presbytery’s words; for which way can it appear so: Mr. Rutherfoord is speaking in condemnation of the royalist, or any other, who hold, that David was formally king over Israel, by anointing and divine designation, without the election of the people; but nothing like this is asserted by the Presbytery, only Saul, by his disobedience to the Lord’s commandment, had forfeited his title to the kingdom. That, as king, Samuel honoured him not, but testified the Lord’s rejection of him from being king.

The Presbytery’s sentiment seems very agreeable to divine inspiration, and no less consonant with expositors. Mr. Henry says, “His turning with Saul was perhaps not to do honour to Saul; for though Saul worshipped the Lord, it is not said that Samuel presided in that worship, but to do justice on Agag.” Ver. 32. and ver. 34. he says, “Samuel deserts Saul, takes his leave of him, and never came any more to see him, to advise or assist him in any of his affairs. He looked upon him as rejected of God, and therefore forsook him.” In the xvith chapter, verse 1. he says, “After that Samuel was reproved on account of his mourning for Saul, seeing the Lord had rejected him, Samuel retired to his own house in Ramah, and we do not find that, to his dying day, God called him out to any public action, relating to the state, but only to anoint David.” It is evident the judgment of this eminent expositor honourably vindicates the Presbytery’s sentiments, that after Saul’s rejection, it would appear the throne of Israel was regarded as vacant, both by the Lord, and his prophet, until David was anointed; but all this is not saying he was formally king without the election of the people.

Secondly, Mr. Goodlet’s prime argument here against the

[Page 173]

Presbytery is from Mr. Rutherfoord’s words; says he, “David after he was anointed by Samuel, diverse times called him, the Lord’s anointed, by the inspiration of God’s Spirit.” He is not sure of this, that it was by divine inspiration, some think otherwise. David did not always speak by divine inspiration, nor yet the prophet Nathan himself; we have an instance otherwise, on David’s purpose to build the Lord an house, says Nathan, Do all that is in thine heart, the Lord is with thee; yet the same prophet must go to David with a message in contradiction of his own. Titles are very arbitrary; but his calling him the king, the Lord’s anointed, seems not very consistent with some of his dreadful imprecations against him, for the Lord’s avenging him on him; nor will his calling him so, agree to the vile titles ascribed to him by himself, calling him the evil man, the violent man, the wicked man, and the man of wicked devices, Psal. cxl. Mr. Shields says, “His calling him his Lord, the king, and the Lord’s anointed, cannot be justified, more than his using the same language to Achish king of Gath, 1 Sam. xxix. 8.” page 354.

Thirdly, Mr. Goodlet, with Mr. Rutherfoord, think, David, if king, was mistaking in the discharge of his royal duty, as king he should have cut off the murderer Saul, and not deserted his calling in flying to the Philistines.” I should think it were not easy for Mr. Goodlet to prove the contrary. To avouch with good evidence he was in his duty in flying to the Philistines, is with more ease asserted than proven to be duty, seeing he had the promise of protection in his own country. If it was just for David to run his country, then I should think his motive of inducement was just and lawful also, and that was misbelief; One day or other I shall fall by the hand of Saul; all which was contrary to the Lord’s promise, oath, and faithfulness, engaged for bringing him to the kingdom; with me Mr. Henry exactly agrees on the place. Mr. Rutherfoord thinks, “He should not have quit his kingdom, if so he was king, upon no hazards, even of his life, no more than a pilot should give over the helm in an extreme storm.” The similitude is certainly just so far; but it halts, as all similitudes do in the like case. A pilot should not quit the helm as long as possible in an extreme storm, yet the extremity of the tempest may drive him from it per force; and if it was the extreme violence and

[Page 174]

fury of Saul’s sword made David fly, and run his kingdom, it certainly offers a very just apology, in the case of failure, with David in some particulars.

That justice was not done upon Saul, for his murder, or usurpation upon the priest’s office, I see no excuse in reason can be made, more than for Uzziah in the like case and circumstance: take the words of the Hind for this, page 353, “Though but one elicit act of sacrificing, he was indeed such a tyrant as deserved to be dethroned and brought to condign punishment, upon the same account that Uzziah and Amaziah were deposed for afterwards; and in this the people failed in their duty, and for it they were plagued remarkably; shall their omissions be an argument to us? We do not read either of their universal owning him, or their positive disowning him; however, that is no argument which is drawn a non facto, ad non faciendum [from not having been done, to not needing/being obliged to be done]; because they did it not, therefore it must not be done. They owned him, but how? as the minister of God, not to be resisted or revolted from, under pain of damnation, (as all lawful magistrates ought to be owned; Rom. xiii. 2.—4.) this, (says he) I deny: for David, and his six hundred men resisted him resolutely; and though the body of the nation did long lazily lie, and couch as asses under his burdens, yet at length, weary of his tyranny, many revolted from under him, and did join themselves to David at Ziklag, while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish, 1 Chron. xii. 1. who are commended by the Spirit of God for their valour, ver. 2. &c. and many out of Manasseh fell to him, when he came with the Philistines against Saul to the battle, ver. 19. This was a practical disowning of the tyrant, before the Lord deposed him.” So says Mr. Shields, in opposition both to Mr. Goodlet, and Mr. Rutherfoord, and with great advantage.

Mr. Goodlet cannot find time to examine any other of the instances and examples given by the Reformed Presbytery; but it may be easily judged, that if they had appeared with any colour of reason, strength, and advantage on his side, he would have found time; this form of speech is always very common to evade the force of argument. I am therefore under necessity obliged to resume, that both the antecedent and subsequent instances and examples, used

[Page 175]

for illustration of the argument, remain untouched, till Mr. Goodlet repel the invincible veracity maintained in each of them, which he hath not yet done. And therefore it cannot be improper, but highly necessary, that I should insert their words at some length, and with which I shall conclude this chapter.

“The Spirit of God testifies (in scripture), that the actual possession of the throne, under the favour of providence, and by the consent of the majority of a nation, may be in one, while the moral power and right of government is in another. The word of God acknowledges David the rightful sovereign over all Israel for the space of forty years, 1 Kings ii. 11. 1 Chron. xxix. 26, 27.; seven of these he is said to have reigned in Hebron, and thirty-three in Jerusalem. During the first seven years of his reign, there is a positive confinement of his actual reign to the tribe of Judah only, 2 Sam. v. 5. And, at the same time, Ishbosheth is said to be made king over all Israel, and to have reigned two years. In agreeableness to seceding principles, there is no reconciling these different texts. According to their scheme, David can with no propriety be said to have reigned forty years over all Israel, seeing seven of the years were elapsed before he was actually acknowledged by all Israel.

There is another known example, applicable to the present purpose, in the instance of David during the rebellion of his unnatural son Absalom. According to the sacred story, 2 Sam. chap. xv. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix. it appears, that he was wholly ejected both out of the hearts and territories of Israel; and not only the throne, but the will and consent of the people given up to Absalom. But was David therefore divested of his right and title? Though it is most contrary to scripture to suppose it; yet, according to Seceders, seeing Absalom was king by possession of the throne, and had not only the power providentially put into his hand, but had it also by the consent of the people; it necessarily follows that Absalom being a providential magistrate, his office and authority did equally arise from, and agree to the preceptive will of God, and subjection and obedience was equally due to him as to David, by the Israelitish tribes; and so it was a damnable sin in David to fight

[Page 176]

against him, as it could be no less than a resisting the ordinance of God.

Another example is in the case of Solomon, who was ordained or designed by God expressly for the kingdom of Israel. Adonijah had obtained the ascendency both in respect of actual possession, and the inclinations and consent of the majority of the nation. The consent was general, 1 Kings i. 5. 7. 9. 11. 18. 25. and ii. 15. He had all to plead for himself, which Seceders make essential to the constitution of a lawful king. He had got to the throne by providence, and had full admission and possession by the inclinations of the people. If then there is no distinction to be made of those who are acknowledged by civil society, into such as are so by the preceptive will of God, and such as are so by his providential will only, then Solomon had no right nor title to the crown; and the enterprise of David, and Nathan, &c. of setting him on the throne was utterly unlawful; both they and Solomon ought to have acquiesced in the duty of subjection to Adonijah, as being the ordinance of God.

To the same purpose might be adduced the instance of Joash the son of Ahaziah, who was king de jure, even when Athaliah had not only the countenance of providence, but the consent of the people in the possession of the kingdom, 2 Chron. xxii. 10. 12. With a variety of other instances, all discovering, in opposition to their anarchical system, that it is not by the dispensations of providence that the right and title of the lawful magistrate is to be determined.”