John Fairly on Magistracy II

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CHAP. II.

Some general remarks.—An enquiry into the justness of Mr. Goodlet’s notions of the law of nature.—His vague account of it exposed and confuted.

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These things premised in the foregoing chapter; but not at all touching at the argument of our author’s performance, I shall now apply myself particularly to the examination of that. The which I shall endeavour to do as I have proposed, with candour, doing all the justice possible both to the author and to the truth. Mr. Goodlet, after a page or two of preamble, wherein he apologizes for himself, and gives his readers and brethren some account of his reasons for his meddling, no doubt, with such a dirty task, and passes a few of his haughty and supercilious airs, then proceeds to lay down what he has conceived to be the substance, scope, and tendency of the testimony he writs against, and the design of its authors, viz. “That they go about to confound civil and ecclesiastic policy together;” And from this infers, “That they cannot rightly take up the nature and excellency of either.” Now, I would have thought such a notion as this, could never have entered into any person’s head, who had read the presbytery’s testimony, unless such it may be whose eyes are blinded with pride and prejudice. The Reformed Presbytery, in the assertatory part of their testimony, pages 188, 189, 190, do particularly and expressly declare, that they believe and maintain these ordinances of civil and ecclesiastic government and policy to be things entirely distinct and independent of one another; so that here Mr. Goodlet falls himself into the blunder he unjustly charges upon the Reformed Presbytery, “of coining notions of his own, and charging them upon others; of making and beating men of straw, instead of real adversaries.”

Our author however, applies himself zealously to oppose and confute this doctrine of his own forging and coining; and to this purpose he places himself upon the

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chair, and assumes to play the doctor both in ecclesiastics and politics. His readers are hereupon called, page 5th, with all humble deference to his wisdom, to sit down at his feet, and listen, while he gives them a distinct account of these two different societies, ecclesiastic and civil, as to their nature, ends, and institutions. In this he spends no less than eighteen pages of his book. But here, instead of doing this work himself, he presents us with a remarkable instance of self-diffidence, “For herein, says he, I shall take particular assistance from Dr. Owen and Mr. Locke.” I should think that building very unsure and unsettled; that hath either no foundation, or then but the quicksand to stand upon. The case of that soldier is desperate, when he deserts his colours, and lays down his arms with a resolution rather to die, than fight. The author is professedly a covenanted Presbyterian; the cause he professes to plead is such, yet in the front of the engagement, like the fugitive soldier, he hath deserted the cause, turned out of the Presbyterian road, into the Sectarian and Independent camp. The nature, foundation and ends of civil government and magistracy as a divine ordinance and institution, were the matters in controversy between Mr. Goodlet and the Reformed Presbytery; and nothing relative to ecclesiastic policy or government that I know of: And why might not our author have kept by Cicero or Seneca? Cicero, I’m of opinion, was both as good a lawyer, and as good a divine (consideratis considerandis [the things to be considered having been considered]) as Mr. Locke: Or, if he had been designed to act like an honest Presbyterian, as he professes himself to be, he need not have deserted our Confessions of Faith, from which, and from various approven authors of the Presbyterian persuasion he might had what he wanted, with as clear distinction, as either himself or his assistants can pretend to give them. Dr. Owen, to be sure, has a character for orthodoxy in the points of the Christian faith among the reformed churches; yet being Independent in his judgment, respecting church government, he should not be chosen as referee and decisive arbitrator in this matter, he is sought to for assistance in. But it is long since some have observed, that our author, and his brethren, were too evidently warping off from a covenanted, to a sectarian footing, and losing what they once seemed to have.

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But to return to our purpose, Mr. Goodlet, in his definition of these two distinct societies, ecclesiastic and civil, founds both of them in the law of nature, page 6th, and 8th, “The reasonableness of that social worship and adoration which God exacts from men, is visible by the light and law of nature.” On the other hand, “Civil society consists of a number of men, as reasonable creatures, who have consented to unite their force together, according to the law of nature, for the safety of the whole.” Page 12th, “There is not one duty competent to magistracy, but what is founded on the law of nature.—That practice, law or sentence, that is not founded in, and flows not from the law of nature, belongs not to civil magistracy.” Again, page 20, “They discredit the law of nature, and supernatural revelation, who say that civil government and magistracy have their foundation only (or any way) in supernatural revelation.”

Here therefore, the first point to be debated must be the genuineness and justness of our author’s sentiments about the law of nature. Had Mr. Goodlet done that justice to the public, or to his adversaries (as he designs the Reformed Presbytery) which became a fair disputant, in handling of this matter in debate between him and the presbytery, he ought to have explained his terms, and particularly defined that law of nature which he makes the great foundation of all, and told us distinctly what he intends by it, so that people might have seen and been satisfied as to the fitness and firmness of that basis he directs them to build such a superstructure upon; and likewise, he ought to have explained what he meant by magistracy’s being founded, or having its foundation, in the light and law of nature: Neither of these he has done any where in his performance; but left his reader quite in the dark in these two particulars, which he ought to have explained with exactness and precision. He seems indeed sometimes to signify, that by the law of nature he means “right reason;” at other times he contradicts this, and makes a difference between these two; speaking of reason as one thing, and the law of nature as another; as in page 2d, “Reason and experience (says he) make men see, that tho’ the law of nature is in all things relating to the preservation of life, property and external order, very

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plain and intelligible; yet all are not equally acquainted with it.” And ought not this very reason, that all are not equally acquainted with it, nay the most of his ordinary readers are very liable to misunderstand both the name and the thing; should not this, I say, have moved him more to accuracy and distinction in explaining himself? But this Mr. Goodlet passes over in smooth silence, tho’ there is not perhaps a point or topic, either in law, philosophy, or divinity, that is more obscure, liable to be mistaken, and more needs explanation, than that of the law of nature; especially when brought into a controversy and argument, in which an appeal is made to the discretive judgment of unlearned, as well as more intelligent readers *. It is well known that “the Apostle Paul, (to use the words of an elegant writer on this subject) “to stain the pride of them that gloried in the law, calls “such things by the name of law, as were most odious and “anomalous. Thus he tells us of Νόμος θανάτου, The law of death, and νόμος ἁμαρτίας, The law of sin. Thus he mentions legem membrorum, the law of the members,” Rom. vii. and moreover, as nature, that is, human nature, is now become depraved and corrupt, the ordinary Christian reader thus left to guess at his meaning, may be very ready to mistake Mr. Goodlet’s undefined law of nature, and to think it such a law as springs from, and is agreeable to the dictates and inclinations of nature vitiated and corrupted, which would be the same with what the apostle (as above) calls The law of sin and death. And for

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* Law of Nature.—There are a variety of intricate queries, may natively occur to the mind attentively considering these terms, which require resolution. Nature, what is nature? Is it the works, the visible works of nature, i.e. of the Author of nature, God? For God and nature are terms sometimes used to signify the same thing? Or, is it the human nature? Or does it take in all these? Again, the law of nature, For what reason is this law so called? Whether is it called the law of nature, because nature gives it; or because nature receives it? Whether, because nature, i.e. the light of nature, teaches the perfect and complete knowledge of it, and all its precepts and duties; or rather, because it instructs, enlightens and reaches nature, (the rational nature I mean) and mediately furnishes it with that subjective light which is called the light of nature. All which discover how much those terms needed explication.

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any to call this the law of God would be the vilest imputation that could be cast, either upon God, or upon his natural and eternal law, which is holy, just and good. To supply this defect, and thereby to illustrate and cast all the light I possibly can on the argument in debate between Mr. Goodlet and the Reformed Presbytery, and for the sake of the reader, that he may be better able to judge of the merit of the cause and controversy between Mr. Goodlet and the presbytery, I shall inquire into, and try to find out his meaning in these two particulars above noticed, viz. What he means by the law of nature, and what by magistracy having its foundation only in the law of nature. In doing which, I shall impose no sense on his words, but what most obviously appears to be the meaning of them, or what himself acknowledges to be so.

What the law of nature is, hath been a question much agitated, and about which there have been various and differing sentiments both among lawyers and divines. And because it is a very critical point, and of considerable moment in the controversy between Mr. Goodlet and his brethren, and the Reformed Presbytery, I shall therefore, in speaking of it, endeavour to go upon as good ground and good authority as possible. Following then Mr. Goodlet’s laudable example of self-diffidence, and being sensible that he will pay very little regard to my own, or the judgment of any of the Reformed Presbytery on this head, I shall take particular assistance from the writings of a very judicious and learned divine of our own, on this point, (besides others that may occur in my way as assistants,) the excellent Mr. John Brown of Wamphray whose praise is in the churches. This eminent divine hath largely and learnedly discussed this point, particularly in his book De Causa Dei, and from whom I have been provided with a collection of all the various sentiments of authors both ancient and modern about this question; (notwithstanding, for the sake of more certainty, so far as I have had access, I have consulted the authors themselves quoted by him.) Under the patronage therefore, and (subordinate) assistance of this learned and accurate divine, let me proceed, as I have proposed. For the reader’s information in the first controverted particular, I shall take occasion shortly, to mention two or three of the various accounts that different authors have given of the law of nature; among

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which we may possibly happen upon that sense, that Mr. Goodlet intends and understands it in. And then shall next enquire whether his notions of it be agreeable to truth and godliness, or not. And,

1st, The law of nature is understood by some to be that which is called in other words, the law of creation. viz. That law or revelation of God and his will which was from the beginning given to man, as the obliging and directive rule of his whole duty. The knowledge of this law was originally concreated with man, and imprinted on his heart in a state of innocency when God made him upright: He had then a beautiful, clear and full copy of the law of God written in his heart, distinct from and superadded to his rational nature and faculties. But it is sufficiently plain that this is not Mr. Goodlet’s law of nature that he intends, and makes to be the foundation of the ordinance of civil magistracy; for this is materially the same with the moral law in the decalogue or ten commandments, the which Mr. Goodlet utterly refuses to be the basis of this ordinance, and instead hereof he talks of what he calls the remainder of nature’s light; that is, I suppose of that light and knowledge at first concreated with man. This I may fall to take more particular notice of afterwards.

2dly, Mr. Goodlet boasts, page 14. That all lawyers as well as all Protestant divines give their voice with him, in maintaining that magistracy and civil government have their foundation in the law of nature. When I look into the account that these gentlemen the lawyers, give of the law of nature, or the sense they understand it in, I see no reason our author has to boast of their approbation or consent with him. With them I find the law of nature is nothing more or other than just those natural principles of self-preservation which are common to all animals: For thus they describe it to be, Quod natura omnia animalia docuit, [What nature has taught all animals] &c *. Every being that hath life, irrational as well

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* Thus it is defin’d in that famous codex or system of law composed by order of the Christian emperor Justinian, and which the Civilians have mostly kept by ever since. Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam jus istud non humani generis proprium est: Sed omnium animalium quae in coelo quae in terra; quae in mari nascuntur. Hinc descendit maris atque foeminae,

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as rational, is naturally careful to preserve its life, and provide what is proper for its support and maintainance. But I am confident it will pinch Mr. Goodlet, and all his lawyers too, to evince, that natural instinct, or the innate principles of self-love and self-preservation can be called at all a law *, far less such as can be the prime and only foundation of any divine institution or ordinance. This description of the law of nature, makes it not competent to mankind, but to the whole irrational animal creation, from the huge elephant to the meanest reptile, or flying insect: than which nothing can be more absurd. No unreasonable being is capable of a law. A “law (as the forementioned very neat writer observes †,) is founded in intellectus [the act of knowing, or understanding]; it is nothing else, but a rational restraint—of absolute liberty.—Now all liberty is radicaliter in intellectu [rootedly in the understanding]; and therefore where there is no liberty, there can be no law. These low and slavish beings have not so much liberty as to make them capable of being bound. Inter bruta silent leges. [Among brutes, laws are silent.] There is no turpe [shameful thing] nor honestum [what is honorable] among them; no duty nor obedience to be expected from them; no punishment nor reward can be distributed among them.” Tho’ yet, I am sensible, that these natural principles above said, make up a principal and fundamental part of our author’s law of nature. But I proceed to observe,

3dly, That there are others who would have it to be just the same with what is called jus gentium ‡, or the law of nations. But the law of nature, whatever it is, is

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[continued from page 14] conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus. Hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio. Vidimus enim cetera quoque animalia istius juris peritia censeri. [Natural law is that which nature has taught all animals. For this law is not proper to the human race alone, but belongs to all animals which are born in the sky, on the earth, and in the sea. From this comes the union of male and female, which we call marriage. From this comes the procreation of children; from this, their education. For we see that the other animals also are reckoned as having knowledge of this law.] Justiniani Instit. lib. 1. tit. 2. Vide etiam Arnoldi Vinnii J. C. Commentar. Institution. Imperialium, lib. 1. tit. 2. De Jure Nat. et Gentium.

* How the principles of self-preservation, &c. can be called a law in any other sense than that in which these which among natural philosophers are called the laws of nature, (e.g. The laws of motion—of gravity—of action and re-action, which must be very improperly) I understand not.

† Culverwell on the light of nature, page 32.

‡ Jus gentium est quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines

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certainly something that’s permanent, immutable, and not subject to change or alteration. Mr. Goodlet himself calls it the eternal law of God. Now, this character does not at all agree to jus gentium, or the law of nations. This law is observed to be so variable and different in different nations, according to the advantages or disadvantages they may be under for the improvement of their reason and knowledge, and for the better forming and polishing their sentiments and morals, that I cannot imagine it to be that law of nature our author calls the natural and eternal law of God. And therefore, once more, I shall add,

4thly, This law is defined by some to be “human reason, right reason, or the dictates of right reason.” This is the account the famous Roman orator and philosopher Cicero gives of it; and which he tells us was the uniform and current sentiment of all the Grecian sages, of all the philosophers and wise men that had lived and wrote before him, such as Plato, Socrates, Plutarch, Aristotle, &c. as indeed it was. By looking into his books de legibus [Concerning Laws], and some other pieces of his writings, the learned reader will soon find that our author and his brethren are the studious disciples and followers of this Heathen lawyer and divine; from him they seem to have form’d their fundamental principles in politics, and philosophical notions of the law of nature, “Est quidem vera lex recta ratio—naturae congruens,—constans,—sempiterna,—immutabilis,” &c. “Right

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[continued from page 15] constituit, et apud omnes gentes peraeque custoditur. [The law of nations is that which natural reason has established among all men, and which is equally observed among all peoples.] Justin. lib. 1. tit. 2.

Consentio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est. [The consent of all nations is to be regarded as a law of nature.] Cicero. i.e. “The law of nations, are those rules and distinctions about good and evil, or what is just and unjust, which natural reason hath established the observance of among all nations, and which all consent unto.” But must there not surely be a vast difference in this respect between the natives (suppose) of the isle of Britain, favoured with such singular advantages for improvement in every kind of knowledge, and a rude American, or naked Indian.

* Cicero de republica. Et de legibus, lib. I. Lex est ratio insita in natura, quae jubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria, et postea, [Law is reason implanted in nature, which commands those things that ought to be done and forbids the contrary.] ibid. Quibus enim (inquit) ratio a natura data est iisdem et recta ratio data est. Ergo, et lex quae est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando——et rursus, ibid. Quae lex est recta ratio imperandi, atque prohibendi. [For to those to whom reason has been given by nature, to the same also right reason has been given. Therefore law also has been given, which is right reason in commanding and forbidding——And again, in the same place: That law is right reason in commanding and prohibiting.]

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reason, says he, is the only, the true, the universal law, agreeing to nature,—constant,—eternal,—immutable, &c.” Thus, just conform to him, Mr. Goodlet and his brethren describe the law of nature to be right reason. The dictates of right reason, the law of reason, &c. And, this in like manner, they call the law of God,—the eternal law of God,—the natural and eternal law of God, &c. To hear an old philosopher or Pagan divine, who was destitute of the law of God written and recorded in scripture, and had no other light but the dark candle of reason, talking at this rate; or to hear the Deist, who rejects and blasphemes divine revelation, talking thus, would be nothing strange: But to hear such language from Christian divines, teachers and preachers of the gospel, who profess to believe the divine authority of scripture, as being the only rule of faith and manners, is truly strange and surprising *.

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* I do not here make exception at Mr. Goodlet, or any’s reading and perusing the writings of Cicero, or any other of the Heathen moralists. Nay, such a study and employment might be useful, did he consecrate his gain hereby to the Lord, and his substance to the Lord of the whole earth. But “I am (afraid, and so jealous” (to use some of the words of a famous preacher and divine, a quondam brother, or rather father of our authors †) “Of the danger professing Christians are in of losing their way; (I add, and the church of God her integrity and beauty) in the thickets of Pagan philosophy, from which they borrow many dangerous maxims, that I would not choose even that way of speaking which is very common among some Christian philosophers,” and I may say divines.—“It is the baneful plague and pest of this age, that morality,—its virtues and duties are so much taught and inculcated both from the pulpit and from the chair, upon a Pagan and not upon a Christian foundation; inculcated only as becoming the dignity of human nature, as agreeable to (human) reason, and beneficial to human society; but not as commanded by God, as agreeable to his word and revealed will (by taking heed to which only, men can learn to purify their way, Psalm cxix. 9.) nor as beneficial to Christian society, and becoming those spiritual characters and relations the church and professed people of God are clothed with, by him who calls them both to glory and virtue.”

How far our author’s principles and reasoning verges towards this Pagan scheme of morality, in this particular and momentous moral duty of the erection and maintenance of civil government and magistrates, I leave to himself and others to judge.

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† [Ralph Erskine] Faith no fancy, page 114.

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There are two things here in our author’s account of the law of nature that must be examined into. His calling the—dictates of right reason a law, and the law of God. And his calling them the natural and eternal law of God. The first of these I shall directly proceed to consider the justness and propriety of; the other will fall in afterwards of course.

I am frankly willing with reference either to matters moral or religious, to give unto reason the things that are reason’s; to give it its own sphere and place: But, I am afraid, this doctrine of Mr. Goodlet’s will be found to give unto reason the things that are God’s; the which would be unjust and unreasonable in the highest degree. With respect to this, let it be observed, for the sake of more distinction and clearness, that Mr. Goodlet, and those who call reason a law, and say that the law of nature, which is the law of God, is right reason, cannot be understood to intend or mean reason considered as it is a faculty or power of the human mind. This can never be called a law, or the law of God; nor yet can it be said to consist in the acts or exercise of reason, i.e. reasoning; neither can it consist of such principles, dictates and conclusions, as the faculty of reason in man infers or draws, as the result of its perceiving, considering and judging of objects about which it is conversant. Either of these supposed, would be equally absurd as the first,—and big with absurdities. For,

1st, To say that the dictates of reason is a law, the law of nature, the law of God, &c. cloths the faculty of human reason in man with the power and prerogative that belongs only to God the supreme lawgiver. That is to say, with a supreme legislative power and authority to give a law; binding and obliging the reasonable creature; which will appear, even in the light of reason itself, to be very absurd *.

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† Besides our author and his brethren, no Calvinist divine that ever I have seen, uses this way of speaking, viz. Of calling the dictates of reason, a law, and the law of nature, i.e. the law of God, one only excepted, namely, Dr. Edwards in his Theologia Reformata. He indeed defines the law of nature to be the judgment or dictate of right reason—The inconsistency and unsoundness of which will afterwards appear.

* Non dicendum illam regulam esse naturam rationalem,

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To illustrate this, let us but advert what a law is; “A law is the revealed will of a sovereign, in which a debt of obedience is demanded, and a punishment threatened, in proportion to the nature of the offence, in case of disobedience *.” Let us now compare and see how Mr. Goodlet’s account of the law of nature will quadrate with this definition. Here we have a lawgiver or sovereign, and then a revealed law demanding a debt of obedience. According to Mr. Goodlet and his definition, (if it may be called so) reason, i.e. the reasoning power or faculty in man, is the lawgiver, the sovereign; and then the dictates and commands of reason, these are the law binding and obliging the man. Quid hoc! For to suppose any being to be capable to give a law to itself, or to lay a moral obligation upon itself, “Would make the very same being superior to itself, as it gives a law; and inferior to itself, as it must obey it;” which is most absurd and contradictory †. It is true indeed, Mr. Goodlet has not expressly said whether it is the dictates of right reason in man, or the dictates of reason in God ‡, which he makes to be, and calls the law of God,—his natural and eternal law: If he intends the dictates of reason as in God

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nam hoc prorsus absonum est: Quia sic ratio cujuslibet esset factiva legis, &c. [It must not be said that that rule is rational nature itself, for this is altogether absurd; because, in that case, the reason of any individual whatsoever would be productive of law, &c.] Brown De Causa Dei, lib. I. chap. vi. De lege naturae.

* Dr. Ridgley on the Larger Catechism, question 20th.

† Culverwell on the light of nature, page 40.

‡ We must distinguish between reason and reasoning. The knowledge of the truth of propositions, whether self-evident, or evident only by the mediation of others, whether at one view or at several, may in a large sense be called reason.—Reasoning is the mind’s gradual progress from one knowledge to another.—We shall not dishonour God by attributing reason to him, in its most exalted notion, as it is manifest we should, if we supposed him to have any need of reasoning. He hath the idea of all things in his own mind, and by one all-comprehending view, beholds the infinite relations which they bear to one another, so that He at once possesses all possible knowledge. There is therefore in this case no need of reasoning, which always argues imperfection. GROVE’S Discourse on Reason.

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I have no objection, but perfectly agree with him;—for reason in God is nothing other than himself,—his infinite wisdom and understanding: But, if he understands it of the dictates of reason in man, as it appears he does; then, I say, it is nothing less, than an intruding of human reason in the place of God; as it ascribes unto it a supreme, dictatorial, legislative and governing power. But, let it be further considered,

2dly, That such an use of reason is directly contrary to these ends and purposes for which it was given of God. Reason was not given to rule, but to be subject;—not to give, but receive a law. It is that distinguishing power and faculty which fits man for, and makes him capable of a law and moral obligation, which the unreasonable creature is not, nor cannot be. Excellently to this purpose speaks the ingenious author, above quoted, “Reason does not facere or ferre legem (make or give this law,) but only invenire, (i.e. find it out and discover it,) as a candle does not produce an object, but only presents it to the eye, and make it visible (a).” But further, reason was not given to determine and constitute right or wrong, good or evil, (which yet this vague doctrine will make it to do, if the dictates of reason be the law of God;) but only to discern and perceive what is just and good, right or wrong, as constituted and determined to be so by the will of God, and declared in his revealed law, to which reason is form’d to be subject, and commanded to consult and read it, that it may know what the will of God is. So that if our author’s reason does not lead him to receive and submit to the revealed will of God, I dare say, his reason is not right reason, or at least, he does not make a right use of it. The sense and substance of this paragraph may be seen better expressed below in my author’s own word’s (b).

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(a) Culverwell on the light of nature, chap. ix. Of the light of reason. Vide ejusdem, chap. vi. page 40.—But what are the goodly spoils that these men expect, if they could break through such a crowd of repugnancies? The whole result and product of it will prove but a mere cypher.—For reason—does not bind in its own name, but in the name of its supreme Lord and Sovereign, by whom reason lives, moves, and has its being.

(b) Ratio porro naturalis tantum discernit, et percipit, etiam

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3dly, The light of nature in the dictates of right reason, is the same thing with human knowledge;—But as knowledge is a thing subjective or internal in man, it must be considered as having its proper object without, about which it is conversant. What then can we think is or ought to be the great object of human knowledge? Is it not, ought it not to be God;—the will and law of God? This is clear, John xvii. 3. To say therefore, that the light of nature in the dictates of right reason, is the law of nature, which is the law of God, is to confound the knowledge of the law of God, with the law itself.—How foolish and unreasonable would it be for any man, to think or say, that his knowledge, or even the united knowledge of all mankind, was the law of God? This would be a poor law indeed, unworthy of God, and unfit for man (c). I shall here subjoin the judgment of another orthodox divine and approven writer on this subject, very much to the purpose; “The law of nature, (says he) is (by some) perversely confounded with human knowledge, whose province, viz. that of human knowledge) it is, to acknowledge and approve of the good law of God. These two are to be considered as distinct, whence also practical divines do well observe that the dictates of right reason do (only) manifest and discover (the law,) and so bind (d) to the observation thereof: But that the divine law both binds, obliges and judges the conscience itself; hence the dictates of right reason have their own law or rule, to which they are subject and must be conformed.”

4thly, I want to know, what is the difference between the dictates of reason, and the dictates of conscience; for my part, I know none. “Reason, (says a certain writer)

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[continued from page 20] quando rectissima est) quod justum quodue injustum est, tanquam suum objectum de quo judicat; eoque quod aut justum est, seu bonum, vel malum, tale est, antequam ratio hoc percipit; percipit enim quia est, non autem est quia percipit. [Moreover, natural reason only discerns and perceives—even when it is most right—what is just and what is unjust, as its object concerning which it judges. And therefore, whatever is just or good, or evil, is such before reason perceives it; for reason perceives it because it is so, but it is not so because reason perceives it.] Brown, ubi supra [in the place cited above], chap. v.

(c) Nos nobismetipsis non fingimus hanc legem; auctores ejus nos minime sumus: Sed nobis a deo imponitur. [We do not fashion this law for ourselves; we are by no means its authors. Rather, it is imposed upon us by God.] Brown, ubi supra [in the place cited above].

(d) The author’s words are, Dictatum rectae rationis indicare quidem et ligare, sed legem divinam obligare & judicare, conscientiam ipsam ligantem. [That the dictate of right reason does indeed indicate and bind, but that the divine law obliges and judges, binding the conscience itself.] Apollonius de lege Dei, apud eundem [in the same author].

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“is, that faculty of intelligent beings which enables them to judge of the truth or falsehood of propositions. Now, these propositions being of two sorts, hence ariseth a distinction of reason, into speculative and practical; the latter of which hath regard either to the happiness of the being, and is called prudence; or to his moral conduct and behaviour, and is then best express by the word conscience (e).” The dictates of conscience may with as great propriety be called the law of God, as the dictates of reason; yea, and some have done so. It is but maintaining the same thing in other words. Must men then embrace and follow the dictates of their conscience in the place of the law of God? How absurd this would be, I shall leave to the reflection of every judicious and Christian reader. Conscience, as it is a man’s judgment concerning himself and his actions, always judges according to another rule, and is not a rule to itself. Its rule of judgement is the revealed law of God: From which it is further and undeniably evident, that these two are distinct, and to be distinguished. Nay, this doctrine of Seceders on this head, not only coincides, and is of a piece with that vague self-deceiving and ungodly opinion which now so dismally prevails, that men are to walk according to their light and consciences, (as the first guide and rule of their life and actions;) and if they do so, they cannot be blamed, though they neglect, or give not that just and becoming honour to the word and law of God that is due to it as the only supreme invariable rule.—But I may say, it has too great an appearance of affinity to that Quakerish principle, that men are to be guided by a light within them, and not by the light of God’s word without them.

Lastly, I am surprized how it should happen that those who speak such excellent and great things of the law of nature, as to call it the divine law, the natural and eternal law of God, &c. should yet make it to be just the light of nature in the moral dictates of right reason. The light of nature in men, and so also the dictates of reason are very variable. I own that the light of nature, and dictates of reason, cannot wholly be extinguished: But yet it is certain, that men by a course of sin, and following their sensual and depraved affections, may, in a great measure, extinguish their

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(e) Groves discourse on reason as it relates to morality.

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their internal light, and sense of good and evil. An evident but awful instance of which, the great apostle gives us, Rom. i. 22,—32. and Eph. iv. 18, 19. Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, thro’ the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts; who being past feeling, hath given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness. Hence, if the light of nature in the moral dictates of right reason, be the law of nature, it will follow, that in so far as the light of nature is diminished or increased in men, contracted or enlarged, accordingly the law of nature, i.e. the law of God; must be so; which is a manifest falsehood and contradiction in terms: For if this be so, how can it be called the natural and eternal law of God. The law of nature, which is the law of God, like its Author, is invariable, and without any shadow of change or alteration. The sense, perception and knowledge of this law may be in a great measure lost; but the law itself is inadmissible, can neither be diminished or increased, contracted nor enlarged. From all which, that which I designed to demonstrate and prove, may be sufficiently evident and clear, as if written with a sun-beam, viz. That the law of nature cannot consist of the light of nature in the moral dictates of right reason, nor in any thing internal and subjective in (the reasonable creature) man, but must be something quite distinct and different from that.

As a conclusion of this particular, I shall just here subjoin the description that the learned Grotius gives of the law of nature, in his book De Jure Belli ac Pacis, who, altho’ he is known to be heterodox and unsound in some particulars, yet in this he seems to speak both more soundly and more sensibly than Mr. Goodlet does. His words are these, “Jus naturae est dictatum rectae rationis, judicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia, cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem aut necessitatem moralem; et consequenter, ab authore naturae, ipso Deo talem actum, aut vetari, aut praecipi (f).” Which I shall translate thus, “The law of nature is the dictate of right reason, the light of which points out and discovers such a moral turpitude and deformity in those actions that are disagreeable and

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(f) Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. I. chap. i. sect. 10.

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contrary to the rational nature, and such a beauty and necessity in those that are agreeable thereunto, that from thence it becomes evident that such actions are accordingly either commanded or forbidden by God himself the author of nature.” Here, though in this description he makes the rational nature to be a sort of standard of good and evil, yet he acknowledges it only to be a subordinate one, and therefore he plainly refers to another law, wherein right reason concludes such evil actions are forbidden, and the contrary commanded. And this is no other than the genuine law of nature, which is the divine law, the law of God.

I find, however, that another author of more orthodox sentiments on this point, hath happily corrected and confuted this too vague description Grotius gives of the law of nature, part of whose words I shall set down; “Non existimandum, (says he) legem naturae esse dictatum rectae rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem rectitudinem, aut turpitudinem; ac consequenter, ab authore naturae Deo, talem actum aut praecipi aut vetari. In convenientia enim aut disconvenientia, qua actus est honestus regula non est ipsa natura rationalis, a qua est rationis dictatum, sed saepius divina voluntas, patefacta a Deo, illuminans naturam rationalem, illam informans, et docens, quod sit honestum et justum. Sicut enim ratio formalis per quam enunciatio vera est aut falsa, non est convenientia, aut disconvenientia tantum cum intellectu, seu concepta loquentis; sed cum re enunciata: Sic ratio formalis per quam actus est formaliter bonus aut malus, non est convenientia cum ipsa natura, quae dictat actum esse bonum aut malum; sed cum idea boni divinitus praescripta.” * Without translating the whole of this author’s words (which would be needless) I shall only observe, that the reason why he rejects Grotius’s definition of the law of nature is, “Because (as he very justly observes) the rule of that agreeableness or disagreeableness from which an action is denominated good or evil, is not the rational nature itself, from which reason’s judgment and dictate proceeds, but rather the revealed will of God

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* [It must not be thought, (he says,) that the law of nature is the dictate of right reason, indicating that in some act, from its agreement or disagreement with rational nature itself, there inheres moral rectitude or moral baseness; and consequently, that such an act is commanded or forbidden by God, the Author of nature. (He then gives the correction:) For in the agreement or disagreement by which an act is honorable, the rule is not rational nature itself, from which the dictate of reason proceeds, but more often the divine will, revealed by God, illuminating rational nature, informing it, and teaching it what is honorable and just. (Then the analogy:) For just as the formal reason by which an assertion is true or false is not merely its agreement or disagreement with the understanding, or with the conception of the speaker, but with the thing asserted; so also the formal reason by which an act is formally good or evil is not its agreement with nature itself, which dictates that the act is good or evil, but its agreement with the divinely prescribed idea of the good.]

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enlightening and informing the rational nature (g) and instructing it in the knowledge of what is just and good: For (says he) as the formal reason why any proposition or declaration is true or false, is not its agreeableness or disagreeableness to the understanding or conception of the speaker; but its real agreeableness or disagreeableness with the thing spoken of, or about which the declaration is made; so the reason why an action is formally good or evil is, not its agreement or disagreement with nature or reason, judging or dictating it to be good or evil, but with the idea or supreme standard of goodness divinely prescribed (h).”

With him agree the sentiments of an English divine of note; “As all things (says he) that are true, are so because they are congruous to the first truth; so whatever is good is such, because it is conformable to the first good, which is God (i).” I have been the more prolix in the representation of my objections against Mr. Goodlet and his brethren’s sense of the law of nature; because it appears to be the grand foundation-point in debate between them and the Reformed Presbytery. As a sort of epilogue or conclusion to what has been said upon this head, I shall just shortly point out to the reader’s observation, how wide the difference is between the right use and true office of reason, and the place and office our author assigns to it.

Reason is required and called to be subservient to faith (I mean here, the word of faith) it brings, and is required to bring, its suffrage and testimony to the truth of revelation, and to bear witness to the truths and doctrines of the

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(g) According to Mr. Goodlet’s system, the rational human nature, instead of being enlightened and informed from revelation, it is the source of its own light: Nay, the faculty or eye of human reason, is with him of such an extraordinary and wonderful contexture, as to afford both light and objects to itself, in as much as he makes it productive not only of human knowledge, but of the divine law and commands of God, which are properly the objects both of human reason and knowledge, whereas, the truth is, all reason’s light proceeds from revelation, either natural or gracious, as will afterwards be made appear.

(h) Apollonius de lege Dei.

(i) Dr. Edward’s Theologia Reformata, vol. II. page 278.

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word; and it is its work to support, enforce and establish the observation of the duties, ordinance and precepts of the revealed will of God, by all the light, influence, and power it hath. And as to those truths, and doctrines that are beyond the reach of its short line, and narrow light, reason will, when sanctified by grace, bow its head and worship, stooping in the way of an humble subjection to them.—But contrary to this, according to Mr. Goodlet, it is only the work of revelation to bear witness to the truth of the dictates of reason; to set forth its duties and ordinances; to support its honour and authority, and enforce the observation of its dictates and commands, under the highest pains, even with a threatening of judgment and damnation to all transgressors. Now, this is, (as one well expresses it) to set Hagar above her mistress, and to make faith, i.e. the precepts of the word of faith or revelation, to wait at the elbow of corrupt and distorted reason (k).

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(k) Culverwell.