George Paxton I.3
James Dodson
SECT. III.
THE NATURE OF COVENANT OBLIGATION.
THE parts of a proper covenant are two, a Condition and a Promise. The first is a term which one of the parties undertakes to perform as a consideration for which he is to enjoy the benefits of the covenant: the latter is the assurance which the other party gives to perform such an act, as is agreed on, when the condition is fulfilled. The contracting parties are in duty bound to fulfil their engagements; which is the obligation of a covenant. By this, they have mutually a right to insist upon the performance of their engagements, and in case of failure, to call the offender to account, and to inflict upon him the deserved punishment.
Breach of covenant naturally excites resentment, the sentiment which most immediately and directly prompts us to punish. “This passion prompts us to desire not only that the culprit should be punished, but that he should be punished by our means and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Resentment cannot be fully gratified unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action, that others through fear of the like punishment, may be deterred from the like offence†.” The righteous displeasure of God produces effects which bear some distant resemblance to these. “I will give the men that have transgressed my covenant, which have not performed the words of the covenant which they had made before me, when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the pieces thereof, I will even
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* Smith’s Theory of Moral Sent.
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give them into the hand of their enemies, and into the hand of them that seek their life; and their dead bodies shall be for meat unto the fowls of the heaven, and to the beasts of the earth*.”
The primary and strongest obligation of a religious covenant arises from the Moral Law. From this all other obligations flow; to this they are subordinate; and upon this they depend. It is neither lawful to take nor to keep an oath which requires us to do what the law of God forbids, or to neglect what it requires. To take an oath of this kind is to be guilty of sin; and to keep it is to persevere in wickedness. The Law of God lays a primary obligation upon conscience; but that which a voluntary oath imposes is only secondary and subordinate. The former binds men to duty whether they choose it or not; in the latter, men spontaneously bind themselves. We are bound to obey the Divine Law, previous to all enquiry, and though we should never take the trouble to examine what it demands; though it enjoins no duty which the diligent and humble Christian may not ascertain and understand; but we have a right to refuse our assent to the articles of a voluntary engagement, till we have judged of their meaning and import.
The obligation of the Moral Law admits of no addition, but there may be superadded obligations of another and subordinate kind. Of this sort are the ties of gratitude, and the duty arising from voluntary oaths and covenants. These obligations, indeed, flow from the obligation of the Divine Law, and are contained in it. We are required to do to others as we would have them do to us, which comprehends the debt of gratitude. The Third commandment enjoins us to perform our federal engagements, and the Ninth to act consistently with our professions. Now, if a person is under all these obligations to promote the happiness of his neighbour, but neglects his duty, his sin will be aggravated by the additional breach of these commandments. If an Oath or Covenant lay no additional obligation upon the conscience, they are useless, and are neither to be required nor taken. If there be no additional obligation, perjury infers no additional criminality. But, these assertions few will be disposed to make; for it is a truth recognized by all nations, that in every case wherein we are under a primary obligation from the Law of God, we may, as occasions require, come under the subordinate obligation of an oath†.
In every covenant ratified by oath, there is a double obligation originating in a twofold Right, Divine and Human. This obligation re-
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* Jer. xxxiv. 18, 20.
† Anderson’s Essays.
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sembles its source, and consists of a natural obligation, which binds by the force of the Divine Law, and of a civil, which derives its power from human laws. But, besides the distinction of obligation arising from the origin, the Object, or debt which the jurant engages to pay, furnishes another. The debt contracted by a covenant is twofold; the debt of Duty, which every one is bound to perform by the precept of the law; and the debt of Punishment, which, by the sanction of the law, every one who neglects his duty is bound to suffer. According to the first sense, the mutual offices of love are called debts, because the law of God requires them: Owe no man any thing, but to love one another*. In the last sense, sins are called debts; the wages of sin is death†. But, the last is contracted only when the first remains unpaid; for if a person do what the law requires, he is under no obligation to suffer the punishment which it threatens to inflict. With this twofold debt, a double obligation also corresponds, and of precisely the same denomination, viz. an obligation to duty, and an obligation to punishment. The first of these obligations, however, is prior and stronger than the last, both in its own nature and in the design of the law. For it is tyranny, and not right, to punish where no fault has been committed. Therefore it is the primary, direct, and spontaneous design of the Law, to impose an obligation to duty and obedience; but it imposes only a secondary, indirect, and hypothetical obligation to punishment‡.
To these some add an obligation from example: but example does not constitute a new or additional obligation; it only aggravates the punishment of the guilty. It has been shown that the obligation of a covenant is distinct from that of the Moral Law, and superadded to it; for a covenant imposes an obligation, where the law of God leaves man at liberty to do as he pleases. Jephthah was bound by the Moral Law to perform to the Lord his vows; but no precept required him to offer up for a burnt-offering whatsoever came forth of the doors of his house to meet him, when he returned in peace from the children of Ammon. Before his vow he was free to do as he pleased; but when he had opened his mouth to the Lord, he could not go back. But example does not, like an oath or covenant, impose a distinct and separate duty; it does not oblige a man where the Law of God has left him at liberty; it aggravates our breach of a moral precept, but can do no more. If our oath or covenant be not contrary to the Divine Law, we are bound to obey; but in many cases we may, without blame, refuse to follow a laudable example.
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* Rom. xiii. 8.
† Ch. vi. 23.
‡ Sanderson de Juramentis, &c.
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example. The man who bravely puts the robber to flight, and saves his money, commands the approbation of his fellow-citizens, and holds up a noble example for their imitation; but he who, rather than risk his life, quietly parts with his property, incurs no blame. We cannot neglect or despise an approved example of scripture, without exposing ourselves to the anger of God, because he commands us to be followers of them, who through faith and patience, are now inheriting the promises. But where the divine Authority is silent, we may follow our own inclinations, and none have a right to control us by force. From these observations it appears, that if the obligation of religious covenants be confined to the original and immediate covenanters, posterity has no more concern in them than in any other duty which is enjoined by the authority of God, and recommended by the frequent observation of religious progenitors. Upon this supposition, it is improper to speak of the Obligation of our Covenants National and Solemn League. Covenanting is a duty required by the word of God, and therefore obligatory upon us, and all the children of men; but the Covenants of our Fathers, considered as their act, impose no obligation upon us whatever, and affect us in no other way than their praying, praising, hearing, and communicating. The covenanting at Horeb, or at Jordan, is as obligatory upon us, and as interesting as that which took place in this country at the Reformation; excepting, that the last is but as yesterday, while the first is removed towards the beginning of time. And there is as much propriety in acknowledging the obligation of the Old Testament covenants upon us, so far as they were of a moral and general nature, or of the religious covenants of any other people whatever, as of those into which our fathers entered.