Musical Instruments in Divine Worship III.
James Dodson
Page 12
CHAPTER III.
A PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN THE QUESTION.
In the statement of the question as given above, there is involved a principle which reveals the inconsistency of the position of the advocates of instrumental music, and furnishes in the outset of the argument a very strong presumption against the correctness of their theory. The reason for the proposed repeal of the law excluding instruments, and the omission of all action by the authority of the church in reference to their use, lies in their theory of the nature of the Scripture warrant which they claim they have for it. Being a mere permissive warrant in the very nature of the case, its application must be optional, and must be determined in all its aspects simply by the voluntary action of any congregation that may choose to avail itself of its authority. The supreme authority of the church cannot be interposed to prohibit or introduce it in any case. And as it is not pretended that the warrant for its use contains in it any specific regulations as to any of the conditions connected with its introduction or use, the whole question is by the warrant itself put into the hands of the congregations, and each congregation is to judge for itself when and how the instruments shall be employed.
In the Form of Government, to which we all have given our solemn sanction, Presbyterianism, as distinct from Congregationalism, is thus defined: “The Presbyterian system * * * in distinction from the Congregational recognizes the organic unity of the church, subordination of courts and ministerial authority de-
Page 13
rived not from the membership, but from Christ the Head of the Church.” See Gov. and Dis., part 1, chap. 1, sec. 3. “The Presbytery is the essential court of the church in administering its general order. The higher courts are constituted simply by a wider application of the principles of Presbytery.” Gov. and Dis., part 1, chap. 5, art. 2, sec. 3. “It belongs to the Presbytery by virtue of the official authority of its members * * * in general to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare and prosperity of the churches under its care.” Idem, sec. 4.
Now if it be so that the supposed warrant for instrumental music must in its very nature be under the supervision of the congregation only, it follows very clearly that such a warrant is not only inconsistent with what we declare to be the fundamental idea of Presbyterianism, but supercedes the office of the Presbytery in reference to that which we declare to be within the sphere of its specific duties. The use of instrumental music does greatly affect the spiritual welfare and prosperity of the churches or congregations where it is employed. Upon this point there is a general agreement on both sides. Now if God has committed to the Presbytery, as we all affirm he has, the charge of “whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare and prosperity of the churches under its care,” could he at the same time give a warrant which in its nature takes an important element in this charge out of the hands of the Presbytery, and commit it solely to the judgment of the congregation, and not be the author of confusion? On the one hand it is said the Presbytery has sole charge of the ordinance of praise, and on the other that God has instituted a very important element in praise that must necessarily be under the sole charge of each congregation, both as to the propriety and manner of its use. The supposed warrant, therefore, brings the two orders
Page 14
—the superior and the inferior—into direct conflict with each other. But God did not institute these orders to be in any respect in conflict, but for the very opposite, that in all things the unity of the body might be maintained, and the purity of worship might be conserved, by the subjection of the inferior to the superior. If the Presbytery be divinely appointed, and her sphere of duty be assigned her by the same appointment, it is utterly impossible to harmonize the principle with the position that there may be an important institution in worship, appointed for the congregation independent altogether of the supervision of the Presbytery.
We need only look at the practical operation of this permissive warrant to see more fully the evidence that it is not Scriptural, if the scope of Presbyterial duty and authority as our profession has described it be Scriptural. Suppose the Presbytery should undertake to administer this optional warrant as plainly within its sphere. It judges that it will be for the edification of a congregation to employ an instrument, and gives order to the congregation accordingly. Presbytery thus makes an obligation of that which is optional. The congregation refuses upon that ground to obey, and if the Presbytery undertakes to enforce the order she becomes at once tyrannical. On the other hand a congregation believes it to be for edification to employ an instrument. It so far yields respect to the Presbytery as to ask her to sanction it. She refuses the sanction. The congregation is thus deprived of the liberty which it is claimed this warrant secures to every congregation as inalienable. The refusal to grant the sanction becomes thus an act of tyranny.
We may go a step further. A minority in a congregation believes that the use of an instrument would be for edification. The majority refuses to employ it. The minority is thus deprived of a liberty granted by divine
Page 15
enactment. The majority thus becomes guilty of spiritual oppression. Or a minority believes the instrument to be a corruption of worship and the majority determines that it shall be employed. The minority is compelled to worship by the use of an instrument. The warrant which is said to be optional in its nature becomes obligatory in its application to the minority, and thus again an element of tyranny. Can that be a divine warrant which in its nature is liable always to produce such results, and which in its application as the history of instrumentation shows has generally produced them?
There is another consideration which greatly strengthens the presumption against the theory that there can be a permissive warrant for any institution in divine worship. As already quoted, “The Presbyterian system * * * in distinction from the Congregational recognizes the organic unity of the church subordination of her courts, etc.” An optional warrant such as this is claimed to be, in application to the worship of God, we have shown to be essentially Congregational. According to that system the ritual of the worship may be simple or complicated. It is not under the control of the church. Its system of doctrines may be Calvinistic, Armenian or Middle, or even Unitarian. There is no subordination of courts. There is no common system of discipline in reference either to the doctrines or morals of its ministers or members. There are only a few things in the system in which there is any real unity. There is not that organic unity in any purely congregational body necessary to maintain the purity of the church in worship and doctrine, and that unity of purpose and effort so essential to the efficiency of the organization of any society.
The object of organic unity, however, is to secure to all alike the privileges of the church in their fullest extent, and from all alike in their several spheres the dis-
Page 16
charge of the obligations of the church in their fullest extent, and thus the power of the church is wielded most efficiently. This can only be secured by the subordination of her courts in the government of the church. As we have shown this alleged permissive warrant interferes with the government of the church by Presbytery, which “is the essential court of the church in administering its general order,” and necessarily mars this organic unity and introduces an element that is schismatic. As an illustration the Presbyterian Church made it a matter of option in her congregations whether they should sing the Psalms or songs of human composure. The results have been that many of her members left her communion; many of her ministers and congregations refused for a time to recognize the optional warrant, and many would sing nothing else than human composure. There was from the day of the formal recognition of this optional warrant no organic unity on the subject of praise. On that subject the Presbyterian Church became essentially congregational. She has actually regained her organic unity, however, by reversing the order. What was once the obligatory is now in her practice the optional warrant, and what was enacted as the optional has become practically the obligatory one. The optional warrant has revolutionized the praise of the church. One of two things will inevitably follow the recognition of any institution in the worship of the church as optional. It will either fall into neglect or it will by a natural process be recognized in time as obligatory. The same thing is practically true in that church in reference to the use of instrumental music. It was a permitted thing at first. It gradually came to be recognized by her congregations generally as an obligatory institution, and it is virtually so in the practice of that church to-day.