Nevin on Instruments in Ceremonial Law
James Dodson
WAS THE USE OF INSTRUMENTS IN WORSHIP CEREMONIAL.
Praise, we are assured, is not ceremonial. It is to be feared that, in too many instances, it degenerates into a mere ceremony, a mere formal service. But we take the statement, as doubtless it is intended, to be an assertion that, when rendered as it ought to be, it was not and is not ceremonial—that such is not its proper nature. It should be remembered, however, although it seems to be systematically forgotten by the instrumentalists, that the question is not about praise, but simply about the use of instruments in praise. An instrument cannot praise in any active way or sense. It takes a living, rational being to do that. The statement, then, is, that the use of instruments in praise was not and is not ceremonial. One of Professor Wallace’s reviewers complains, and with justice, that he deals so little in definition. Had he defined what he means by the ceremonial, we would have been better able to consider what weight, if any, belongs to the assertion. In the absence of definition, we are driven to gather the meaning from his reasoning; and when we try to do so, we only find the darkness made more visible. At page 12 he says—“It is also true in regard to sacrifice, that it was the same from the days of Adam, and underwent no essential change by the laws of Moses. But one important circumstantial change it did undergo, amongst others—namely, that it was to be restricted to one altar, and that no offering might be slain elsewhere. It was thus stringently brought under ceremonial law. But it was not so with the service of song. This is a capital distinction; and proves this service not to be ceremonial; for
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then must it have been prohibited to every family, to every individual, to every synagogue, and restricted to the precincts of the Temple.” It is here assumed that the use of instruments in praise was not restricted, in point of fact at least, to the Temple service, and that of the Tabernacle for some time before the Temple was built. This has not been proved, and cannot be. But passing this for the present, let the reader note the reasoning. This proceeds on the manifestly false ground that mere restriction to place was sufficient to prove an act or service ceremonial, so that what was not thus restricted was, by that circumstance, and by that alone, shown to be not ceremonial. Sacrifice was restricted to place; ergo, sacrifice was ceremonial. The use of instruments in praise was not restricted to place, by any express enactment to that effect (for that is all that can with truth be alleged); ergo, the use of instruments in praise was not ceremonial. Might not the Professor have seen, at the most cursory backward glance, that he was here perpetrating a very palpable non-sequitur? With equal reason might we say—Before Moses’ days, sacrifice was not restricted to place, ergo, sacrifice before Moses’ time was not ceremonial. The observance of the distinction of meats, as clean and unclean, was never, and could scarcely be conceived to be from the nature of the case, restricted to place; ergo, the distinction of meats was never at any period ceremonial. To prove it such, we must be able to show that it was prohibited to every family, to every individual, and restricted to the precincts of the Temple! Rather a hard task, we should think. Capital distinction, indeed! Capital logic, surely!
The only intelligible construction we can put upon the statement, that the use of instruments in worship was not ceremonial, is that it was not part and parcel of what was designed to be observed only temporarily, and to be abolished when the fulness of the time should come. But that is the very thing to be proved; and it is no proof of a proposition merely to express it under a different form, although that is a way of begging the question that reasoners occasionally fall into. If the employment of instruments in worship be not ceremonial, what is it? Moral? We have already seen that the Professor does not shrink from reasoning in a way which implies that the use of instruments is positively a matter of moral obligation, even now, under the Gospel. But the direct and express enunciation of such a sentiment ought, we should think, to be enough to ensure its rejection.
Much is made of the fact that, in the law given to Israel by the instrumentality of Moses, no provision was made for the employment of musical instruments in worship, and the inference sought to be deduced from this is, that the use of these formed no part of the economy designed to be temporary, and that it
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was left to the light of nature and the discretion of worshippers to employ these as they thought fit. Neither the fact, nor the “considerations” by which the Professor seeks to fortify his conclusion, by any means warrant it. One thing the “considerations” do show—that even he can bring statements into very close juxtaposition that are very inconsistent, the one with the other, and which it seems impossible to reconcile. Thus he says at page 10, “It is [? was] not until the time of David and his accession to the throne of the kingdom of Israel that this department of divine service became a regulated and established public ordinance.” David made arrangements for it. And yet we are told on the same page—“None of these affected the institutions of the tabernacle.” We can really see no meaning in this latter statement, nor any consistency with the previous quotation. Again, we are told—“There is no evidence that David held any divine commission to add to or diminish from the institutions of the tabernacle as they were ordered by Moses.” Yet at the foot of the next page we find a paragraph commencing—“When David, by Divine command, introduced this service,” &c. The Professor, in fact, seems to conceive of “the institutions of Moses” as though they were all of one kind, the ceremonial, assuming, of course, that the use of instruments was not ceremonial—for there is a latent begging of the question all through—and as though the Mosaic code contained nothing else, no moral precepts at all. It is futile, in such a connection, to keep discussing about praise, when the whole question is about instruments. The writer who does this is only throwing dust in his own eyes, as well as those of others.
“In point of fact,” says the Professor, “the institutions of the tabernacle were conclusively and finally settled by Moses—so settled that nothing was to be added thereto, nor diminished therefrom.—Deut. xii. 32.” To this statement we must decidedly demur. The words in Deuteronomy are—“What thing soever I command you, observe to do it: thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it.” It is manifest, from the connection in which this injunction stands, that it was designed to include moral precepts as well as ceremonial, and it was an injunction upon man. No man, whether he be Jew or Gentile, is at liberty, or has any right, to add to, or take from, the commands of God. Moses spake and recorded the injunction in the name of God—“What thing soever I command you,” &c. Professor Wallace surely could not mean to assert that Moses so conclusively and finally settled “the institutions of the tabernacle,” by which he clearly intends ceremonial ordinances alone, that the Almighty Himself could not add to them or diminish from them. Surely God had an indisputable right to do one or other as it pleased Him. He had the right not only to add to them, but to abrogate them altogether; and He actually did this, when the ful-
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ness of the time had come. Until that time came He had the right to add to them, and He did. We see a progress in this, as in all other works of God. Ceremonial observances did not originate with Moses. Several of these existed from the earliest period in the history of mankind. Animal sacrifice was never a dictate of the light of nature. It must have originated in a revelation from heaven. There was a ceremonial law, then, from the beginning, and before that of Moses, but only in a traditional form, as we conclude; there is no evidence of a written record. Moses was divinely commissioned to codify this traditional law, and extend it to a number of particulars, many of which, if not all, had this for part of their design—to build up a wall of separation between the chosen people and the Gentiles, heathens, so that Israel should be a peculiar people until the Advent of Him by whom this middle wall of partition should be for ever broken down. By the law of Moses all the sacrifices were to be offered on the one altar of burnt-offering. This was set up in the court before the Tabernacle, and accompanied it in all its migrations. It was intimated that, when the people came into possession of the promised land, there should be one fixed place for it. But Moses could not tell them where that should be. All that he could tell them was, that it would be “the place which the Lord their God should choose.”—See Deut. xii. The place was not actually “conclusively and finally settled” until David’s day, when it was specially revealed to him. Here was an undoubted addition to the law as given by Moses. The Tabernacle itself was an “institution” of a temporary kind, as compared with the more permanent structure that was to succeed it, under an economy that, as a whole, was designed to be only temporary—carried about from place to place, in all the wanderings of Israel in the wilderness, and, even when the people were in possession of Canaan, set up in different places—now in Gilgal, again in Shiloh, Nob, Gibeon, until at last a duplicate of it was pitched on Zion, whereas Moriah was the place which God eventually indicated as that which He had chosen, to place His name there. The Temple was unquestionably a great advance on the Tabernacle, containing, as we have already seen, many articles of furniture that were not in the latter, with modifications of others, all in the way of enlargement and advance, exhibiting exemplifications of the religious use of the arts of architecture, carving, gilding, and statuary, such as were not seen in the Tabernacle. The introduction of the kindred art of musical instrumentation was quite of a piece, quite in character and keeping, with these undoubted additions to what was set down in the law as given by Moses, and was in itself an indubitable addition, preceding the others by a brief interval of time. We can quote the Professor here, as in other instances, against himself. At page 27 he says—“There was no law for the regulation of psalmody, except in respect
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of the service of the Temple.” There was a law, then, on the subject. But it was a law so lately promulgated that it was only for the Temple service, and formed no part of the law as given by Moses. Clearly, then, on the Professor’s own showing, it was an addition to it.
True, “David did not take upon himself to add to the institutions of Moses, or diminish from them.” Equally true is it, that “David, by Divine command, introduced this service.” In these statements of the Professor we quite concur, putting our own construction on the first to make it consistent with the second. And we cannot assent to the opinion of those opponents of instruments in Christian worship, who argue that David introduced the instruments into the Old Testament service only by way of permission, and without any positive divine sanction. They do not strengthen their argument by this, but greatly weaken it. When David added in this way to the institutions of Moses, he certainly did not “take it upon himself”—it was not of his own mere motion he did so—he had a divine command. David was a prophet as well as Moses, and he was not alone. Nathan was his contemporary, with whom he doubtless often took counsel, and Gad is called “the King’s seer.” One Scripture proof of this is explicit and sufficient. Of Hezekiah it is recorded, that “he set the Levites in the house of the Lord with cymbals, with psalteries, and with harps, according to the commandment of David, and of Gad the king’s seer, and Nathan the prophet; for so was the commandment of the Lord by his prophet.”—2 Chron. xxix. 25.