THE PUBLICATION OF THE BANNS OF MARRIAGE.
James Dodson
[from The Reformed Presbyterian Magazine, Vol. IV, No. 3, May, 1840. pp. 69-76.]
In all countries, and in all ages, marriage has been considered a matter of public interest, and so treated in the laws, civil and ecclesiastical, and in the national habits and customs. If any exception has occurred, it will be found in connexion with a state of society, in other and all respects beneath the decency and propriety of the marriage relation. Laws, requiring a due notification, in some public form, of the intention of marriage, existed, we believe, in all Protestant countries at the Reformation. These laws, in forms Somewhat modified, are still in operation. Most of the United States have laws similar in their tenor; though they are little better than a dead letter anywhere, except in the New-England States. In these states, the character for sobriety and discretion, derived from the worthy Puritan fathers, has not yet been so far corrupted, as to allow of breaking down the salutary hedges, which wisdom erected for the preservation of the purity and solemnity of so important a relation. Such laws we think wise; we think them necessary to the safe-keeping of marriage; agreeable to the divine institution of marriage, and requisite to its proper solemnization. And if so, when enacted, they are binding, as to their observation, upon the conscience. This we proceed to establish by a brief consideration of the subject of marriage itself, and the right method of entering into the married state.
1. Marriage is a divine institution. When God had formed Eve, he introduced her to Adam, and constituted the first marriage; saying “a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cleave unto his wife; and they shall be one flesh.” Gen. ii. 24. These are the words of God, Matt. xix. 4, and contain the law of marriage for all ages and all people. It is to be between one man and one woman; “a man—his wife.” It is a permanent relation, dissoluble only by the death of one of the parties, or by most flagrant misconduct—such as destroys the very ends of the relation: “shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.” And, as this law is explained by the infallible interpreter, Matt. xix. 6, God joins all who are lawfully married.
When we say that it is “a divine institution,” we do not mean, that all persons are bound to marry. This is settled in the negative, very plainly, in the vii. chap, of 1 Cor. It is a voluntary relation. But when constituted it has its laws already prescribed, and no human power can alter them. It resembles, in this respect, civil and ecclesiastical society, both of which have their laws ordained by God. Marriage has its ends, its laws, the parties who may enter into the relation, the duties of the parties, and the reasons for which it may be lawfully dissolved, all arranged and made known by “Him who made them, male and female.” No power can lawfully alter these laws, suspend their execution, or add to them. But it is the duty of rulers in Church and in State to frame such regulations as shall keep up the relation to the divine institution. No power can rightfully permit one ma n to have more than one wife, nor make the wife the head of the husband, nor dissolve this relation on any but scriptural grounds. But it is the solemn and imperative duty of the “higher powers” to adopt such measures as shall tend to keep this institution pure by guarding against hasty, and ill-devised, and wicked formations of the marriage relation. It is a divine ordinance—man cannot alter it, but he can and he ought to, watch over it. To do this, he must begin at the beginning, and watch over the constitution of the relation.
2. Marriage is a matter of public interest. It is not only a divine, but a social institution. Parents have a deep interest in the suitable marriage of their offspring. How often, after all the toil, and expenditure, and anxiety of years, have the hopes and cherished expectations of parents, been dashed in a moment, by the imprudent marriage of their offspring?—Th e church has a great interest at stake in the connections formed by her youth. “And wherefore one? That he might seek a godly seed.” Her children and youth are the hope of the church. Society is based, in a sense, upon the domestic relation. If it goes wrong, law and order, religion and morality, are poisoned in their very fountains. The bible confirms this. Contracts of marriage, during the patriarchal dispensation, and even under the Mosaic, were formed, not by the parties themselves, but by the parents [Gen. xxiv. throughout, xxix. 18—19. Judg. xiv. 2.]: they must consequently have been public to all concerned. This is the case even to the present day in Eastern countries, where the ancient customs are, to a considerable degree, still retained. We have, however, conclusive evidence that marriage was treated, and that with the divine approbation, as a matter that should be previously made known, in the custom of betrothals. That before marriage the parties were, for some time, betrothed, as espoused to each other, is often mentioned in scripture. It is also undisputed, that this was the custom until the advent of Christ, for Joseph was espoused to Mary. These betrothals were of the nature of public engagements of marriage; for we learn from Deut. xxii. 25-27, that the sin of fornication committed with a woman betrothed, was to be punished the same as adultery; which would have been without reason, had not the intention of marriage been made public, so that it would in all probability be known to him who sinned with her. Nor was this betrothing a mere occasional transaction: it was a standing custom, originating, there can be little question, in the known and felt necessity of some plan to secure in the constitution of this relation, the rights and feelings of parents, to protect the interests of the church and of society, and throw a hedge around this divine institution. At all events, the inference from all this, is plain and important. Marriage appears in the scripture history, what it certainly is in its own nature, as of public interest, and to be entered into after the due notification of all concerned.
3. Marriage must be constituted according to some acknowledged form.[1] For five reasons.
First, the marriage vow is most solemn and important. The parties become bound, when they enter into this relation, to many new duties, and that while life lasts. Every proper, every christian feeling, dictates that this vow should not be made in a trifling and irreverent manner. Yet this would inevitably be the result of removing all solemn forms, and exhortation from the formation of this relation. Even Quakers, who have attempted to discard all forms in other things, have seen the necessity of retaining some here; and they, in truth, have a solemn and impressive mode of constituting the married state.
Second. Without some recognized form it would be impossible for either civil or ecclesiastical society to guard marriage by its sanctions. They must first agree upon what shall be considered as marriage. And what they agree upon must be observed in constituting it; otherwise, it is evident, there would be endless difficulty in arriving at the settlement of this primary and fundamental point to all other action.
Third. Without this the relation would not be safely formed: for it would be always difficult, and often impossible to verify it. Let there be no certified evidence of the marriage, and the whole of its civil and ecclesiastical sanctions, at once fall to the ground.
Fourth. Far less important vows, engagements and promises, must receive a certain form, and many of them must pass through the hands of a specified officer, before they become binding, in law. Deeds and mortgages must be registered, wills witnessed and acknowledged according to established forms. Society has found it necessary to guard, in this way, by law, the transfer of property, and other transactions requiring verification, and important to its welfare. So it has marriage, and with still greater reason. For what contract so fundamental to its interests? what so vital to the parties themselves?
Fifth. And, in our opinion, as strong as any we have offered, and bearing directly upon the subject of our article, a public, authorized form of taking marriage vows is absolutely necessary to prevent improper marriages. Leave it open, and marriage would become a mere name: the importance and sacredness of the vows that constitute it would disappear, if, in any presence, at any time, under any circumstances, marriages could be formed. Imagine, for a moment, the state of things that would follow. Youth, under the impulse of passion and caprice, would hastily vow, and as soon repent. Brief connexions would take the place of marriages, and society would go to ruin. And here we observe, in anticipation of our succeeding remark, that those who, under the forms of legal authority, solemnize the hasty marriages that disgrace our country so often, are guilty of an act which tends, and that not remotely, to invalidate the whole domestic relation. They encourage secret marriages; and if our arguments on the subject of its publicity have any weight, act directly in the face of an important element in a divine institution. But this leads to our fourth and last observation. The intention of marriage should be duly notified. For three reasons.
First: without this, the appointment of individuals for the solemnization of marriage, may be rendered nugatory. We do not here repeat what has just been said upon the importance, nay, necessity, of such solemnization. We now take this for granted. Persons authorized to celebrate marriage, will be either honest and well intentioned, or they will be dishonest, and willing to marry whoever comes, and to pass them through the legal forms. Publication of the banns is requisite for both. For the former, that they may, with a clear conscience, perform their part in laying on irrevocable vows. For the latter, that they may be prevented from perverting their trust and degrading their station, by making their power subservient to the impulses of passion, the whims of caprice, &c. Were two strangers to present themselves for marriage, or even persons as well-known as our common acquaintances, what should an honest and conscientious man receive as testimony, that the intended marriage is not secret; that there is no bar, by previous marriage or precontract, or some other thing, to its lawful solemnization? Is he to be at the trouble of investigating the matter? Ought he to defer it unless satisfied? Or must he proceed? Take away publication of the banns, and many such instances would occur. But let there be the lawful and certified proclamation of the parties, and then the administrator could proceed with a good conscience, and however it might result, no blame could be attached to him.
On the other hand, of what use would the prescription of certain forms be, unless there is some mode of ensuring their honest execution. But it is plain, that leave it to every administrator to frame his ow n scale of testimony as to the propriety or impropriety of marrying parties offering themselves, and self-interest will lighten the scale. And, in short, the result would be what we often see now, that the forms established by society would furnish little or no cheek to the passions that urge hasty and rash marriages that end so often in the misery and sometimes ruin of the parties.
Second. Proclamation is necessary to prevent marriages taking place unknown to parents, guardians, &c. And here let it be observed, in the first place, that what is requisite, is some regulation which will be a bar in the way of the ill-intentioned, that will prevent the dishonest and the undutiful from acting in this matter secretly. Not that parents, &c. have, in all instances, an arbitrary right of forbidding; but they have always a right to know. And, in the second place, that nothing but a public and well-understood announcement can serve this purpose. Rumor cannot be relied on—her “thousand tongues” utter a thousand lies. There must be some form equivalent, in some degree, to the ancient betrothals. Otherwise, what is to hinder young persons, of either sex, leaving their father’s house, as if for recreation or business, and returning home married? The due publication of banns provides an almost sure guarantee against such gross abuses.
Third. Proclamation is an act of mercy to the parties themselves. It gives them time to reflect, or rather, it compels the most rash and imprudent to take time. And to many, even this would be a boon. But chiefly because it may lead to the discovery of circumstances which would prevent the formation of a miserable relationship; or its formation, by trampling upon the rights of third persons. If but one such instance should occur to hundreds, it would furnish ample reason for the enactment and careful execution of the laws we now advocate.
The necessity of thus guarding it in the very outset, becomes apparent, when we reflect that an injury here is, in most instances, irreparable. Parties once joined, cannot, except in rare instances, be disunited. Instead of considering the publication of their intention to take upon them these unalterable engagements, as a hardship, as exposing them to the public, the parties should learn to view it as a rule fraught with benefits to a community who would conscientiously and universally observe it; and as of importance, possibly, to themselves. And, also, ministers of the gospel and others entrusted with a matter of so high importance as the solemnization of marriage, should look upon proclamation as a wise and good rule; an advantage to others, and as calculated to preserve them from the sin and scandal of being instrumental in forming ill-advised and unbecoming marriage relationships.
Another inquiry suggests itself here. Ought the church to treat the improper celebration of marriage, in this respect, as a censurable offence? We have no doubt she ought. It is the church’s duty to employ all lawful means to preserve the purity of the marriage relation. This will not be doubted by anyone who admits its importance. Now, as marriage is a divine institution, should not those be visited with the church’s censures who would, by their conduct, strike a blow at this relation in a vital part, by refusing, in their own case, to give due publicity to their intention of marriage? We think this unquestionable. In conclusion we merely add, that we are fully aware of the unpopular character of the enactments which we have now been advocating, wherever they are not generally observed in the community; but we are as fully convinced of their value, and would regret to find them disregarded, or lightly esteemed, especially by those who have taken so high a stand for the ordinances of God, notwithstanding the indifference of others, as Reformed Presbyterians have. We would impress upon young and old, married and unmarried, the importance of keeping in this matter, by the good and wholesome regulations of our fathers. These laws embody the wisdom of many of the wisest and best of many lands, and have been sanctioned by the wise and good of many generations. God approves them. And let us remember, “He that breaketh a hedge, a serpent shall bite him.”
FOOTNOTE:
[1] We do not now argue respecting any particular form, or affirm anything respecting the person or persons most suitable to officiate.—Our testimony and the Confession of Faith declare it expedient that it be committed to duly qualified ecclesiastical or civil officers.